


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ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET
CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCES: APPENDICES.

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CACI, Inc.-Federal

October 1, 1978

September 30, 1979

10 Robert B. Mahoney, Jr.
Soviet, Chinese, U.S. Crises

September 30, 1979

October 1, 1978 to
September 30, 1979

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Rept. for 1 Oct 78-30 Sep 79,

The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the U.S. Government.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE APPENDICES

OVERVIEW

Appendices A and B present the codebooks used for the assessment of Soviet and U.S. crisis outcomes (CACI, 1979b). The methodological strategy underlying the codebooks is presented in Chapter 3 of the Technical Report. The rationales for the superpower crisis goals whose outcomes are assessed using this coding document are explicated in Chapters 4 and 5 of CACI (1979b). The codebooks have been designed for use, and therefore do not read as standard narrative exposition of the variety presented in the main body of the report (CACI, 1979b). Appendix C discusses the reliability and validity of the data produced using these codebooks.

Two codebooks are presented:

- U.S. Crisis Goals (Appendix A).
- Soviet Crisis Goals (Appendix B).

Some stylistic differences exist between the U.S. and Soviet goals/outcomes sections. These are primarily due to the differing research problems each poses (Soviet materials are, for example, more difficult to obtain than comparable information concerning U.S. crisis objectives). To a lesser extent they are due to the research styles of the analysts who serve as coordinators for the collection of each type of data (Dr. Farid Abolfathi for the Soviet outcomes and Mr. Thomas H. Johnson for the U.S. materials). Despite the minor differences in presentation format, both are designed to produce the same type of final data: crisis goal outcomes for all U.S. and Soviet incidents from 1966 through 1978.

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CODEBOOK STRUCTURE

Both the U.S. Crisis Goals and Soviet Goals appendices are structured into the same subsections:

- Description of the crisis,
- Selected general postcrisis variables
- Assessment of the relevance of goals, and
- Crisis goals:
 - Outcome,
 - Measures,
 - Technical Notes,
 - Outcome Assessment, and
 - Notes.¹

For convenience, the remainder of this overview describes the substantive sections and subsections in terms of these categories.

Description of the Crisis

This is a straightforward section. It provides a set of standard questions concerning the crisis and its background. Use of standard questions helps to ensure uniformity of treatment over the entire set of cases considered. It also focuses coder attention on the crisis as a whole, in context rather than simply upon one aspect of the situation. The contextual focus is important because crisis goals are only coded when relevant and only over the range of relevant affected actors. Both factors are highly context-dependent.

¹ Notes and Technical Notes are provided only when necessary.

Selected General Postcrisis Variables

In addition to the goal oriented crisis outcomes that are the principal focus in the analysis, a number of general variables have been collected at 1- and 5-year postcrisis intervals. While these are not "outcomes" as the term is used in this analysis, in that they are not related to crisis-specific goals, they are of sufficient interest in and of themselves to warrant collection. In the Soviet case these indicators pertain to Communist party membership, trade, and military commitment. In the U.S. case, trade, economic and military assistance, and U.S. military commitments are the principal concerns. The rationale for collecting these measures was that they will provide valuable contextual information for other analysts employing the outcomes data set at DARPA's Demonstration and Development Facility.

Assessing the Relevance of Goals

For present purposes, "relevance" has several meanings, all of which are touched upon in this subsection of the U.S. and Soviet presentations.

Most obviously, goal relevance relates to the crisis goals. Because of their nature, not all of these goals will be applicable in any given crisis (for example, some crises do not involve significant economic interests). An assessment of the crisis performance of either the U.S. or the Soviet Union that did not take this into account would unwittingly misrepresent their actual performance (as viewed from the perspective of the performers) in these events. It would, for example, be unreasonable to evaluate the achievement of economic goals in those crises in which this was not a crisis-relevant outcome for either superpower.

The assessment of the crisis goals in terms of their relevance also has broader utility. Some goals are unlikely to be seriously challenged in

crises; others may occur in a majority of incidents. To understand how superpower interests are affected by and in crises and to see how their crisis policies interact with their broader structures of political-military policy, it is important to examine these broader ensembles in their entirety. The relevance data for the crisis-specific goals provides information that is of substantive interest in its own right.

Another dimension of relevance addresses the extent to which goals are threatened during crises; relevance is clearly more than simply a dummy variable. Accordingly, for each crisis goal assessed as having some appreciable relevance for a given crisis, a further gradation of the degree to which this goal was threatened or challenged by the crisis situation is provided.²

A third dimension of relevance concerns the basic reliability of the data coded for each crisis-specific goal. Reliability has some obvious interactions with the overall assessment of relevance itself. In the same subsection, some additional technical information concerning the treatment of variables is also included, for example, the ways "state" and "change" variables are handled in the analysis.

Crisis Goals

This section comprises the bulk of both the Soviet and U.S. appendices. In many ways (as argued in Chapter 3 and documented in Chapters 4 and 5 of CACI, 1979b) these are the most substantively interesting indicators to consider, given the ways in which the two superpowers have practiced

² In the codebooks, multiple value scales, usually ranging from 5-7 items, are employed for this evaluation. As required, items were collapsed to fewer categories to provide for more reliable analyses, much as is done in many Likert scaling-type evaluations (Summers, 1970.)

crisis management in recent years. Accordingly, this section documents in considerable detail (much more detail than is normally provided for this type of variable) the types of information that go into the assessments of outcomes and the ranks on the outcome assessment scales themselves.

This level of detail has been dictated by the importance and complexity of the question being addressed. Evaluating goal achievement, while an essential prerequisite for the development of justifiable evaluations of superpower crisis performances, is a most involved process, more involved than (say) the coding of data on basic crisis attributes and actions. Accordingly, at least three and up to five subsections are provided for each goal. Following the presentation of the goal itself, a general statement of the outcome is provided. The outcome assessment question is stated in the form of a coding scale with multiple values. A measures section is provided that lists the types of evidence used in the assessment of the goal outcome. As before, scale values (usually ranging from 1 to 5-7 scale points) were collapsed, where reliability evaluations suggested this was necessary. The wider ranges were used at the outset because, while one can always collapse items, one cannot expand them, and it is extremely useful for subsequent analyses to capture as wide a range of outcome performances for each goal as is practical. Where necessary, technical notes pertaining to measures and notes having to do with the outcome assessment variables are also provided. In sum the format is:

Crisis Goal:

- Outcome,
- Measures,
- Outcome Assessment Question,
- Notes (if required), and
- Technical Notes (if required).

Reliability and Validity

The final component of this volume (Appendix C) discusses the reliability and validity of the data collected using the codebooks that make up Appendices A and B. Reliability addresses the question of whether two coders working independently would produce similar results using the codebooks, while validity has to do with the extent to which indicators actually reflect what they are intended to measure (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). Part of the discussion of validity includes the relationship between the goals collected for this project and the objectives data collected previously in CACI's DARPA-sponsored research in the Crisis Management Program.

APPENDIX A. U.S. CRISIS GOALS

DESCRIPTION OF THE CRISIS

This section is provided to allow the coder to write a brief, general narrative of the crisis. All relevant information, notes, and future reminders/instructions can be written in this space. In addition, there are a number of standard questions to serve as a guide for gathering relevant information. Some of the more important questions include:

- The general historical background of the crisis,
- Major events leading up to the crisis,
- The principal actors and their objectives in the crisis,
- Initial U.S. perceptions and definition of the crisis situation,
- The United States' initial reactions to the crisis,
- Other important actors' actions during the crisis, and
- The situation at the end of the crisis period -- both long-term (five years after the crisis) and short-term (one year after the crisis).

SELECTED GENERAL POST-CRISIS VARIABLES

In addition to the crisis-specific goals, which are the focus of the present project, a small number of variables were collected at 1 and 5 year intervals, postcrisis. These indicators provide contextual information and background for users of the data at DARPA's Demonstration

and Development Facility. The indicators collected for the United States are:

- Trade with the United States as a percentage of total trade (International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade),
- U.S. Economic Assistance (U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants),
- U.S. Military Assistance (U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants), and
- U.S. Military Commitments (From the DARPA-sponsored Threat Recognition and Analysis Project conducted at the University of Southern California).

GOAL RELEVANCE

Relevance

The relevance of a goal to a crisis is coded whenever a primary or secondary American foreign policy goal is threatened.

Primary Goals

Primary goals are those foreign policy goals that are most directly related to the crisis involvement of the United States or are most threatened by the crisis adversaries of the United States.

Secondary Goals

Secondary goals are those foreign policy goals that by themselves are unlikely to lead to American involvement in the crisis or are indirectly threatened by the crisis.

Threat to Goals

The level of threat to each primary and secondary goal is coded separately. The level of threat for each relevant goal is judged separately and

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ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCES. APPENDICES
ABSTRACT

(U) APPENDICES A AND B PRESENT THE CODEBOOKS USED FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF
THE METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY UNDERLYING THE CODEBOOKS IS PRESENTED IN CHAP
OR THE SUPERPOWER CRISIS GOALS WHOSE OUTCOMES ARE ASSESSED USING THIS CO
5 OF CACI (1979B). THE CODEBOOKS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED FOR USE, AND THEREFOR
OF THE VARIETY PRESENTED IN THE MAIN BODY OF THE REPORT (CACI, 1979BAPP
OF THE DATA PRODUCED USING THESE CODEBOOKS.

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ICES. APPENDICES.

ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET AND U.S. CRISIS OUTCOMES (CACI, 1979B).
PRESENTED IN CHAPTER 3 OF THE TECHNICAL REPORT. THE RATIONALES FOR
USING THIS CODING DOCUMENT ARE EXPLICATED IN CHAPTERS 4 AND
5, AND THEREFORE DO NOT READ AS STANDARD NARRATIVE EXPOSITION
CACI, 1979B APPENDIX C DISCUSSES THE RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

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by its own standards. In other words, there is no common standard such as monetary costs or psychological value by which all goals are to be judged comparatively.

1. Very low:

- No significant threat or danger to U.S. interests, objectives, or security.

2. Moderately low:

- Little threat and/or danger to U.S. interests, objectives, or security; requires small sacrifices or effort to secure or save them.

3. Moderate:

- Poses some threat and moderate danger, but not severe, to U.S. personnel, facilities, interests, or relations; requires moderate sacrifice or effort to secure or save them.

4. Moderately high:

- Moderate threat and danger to U.S. interests and objectives; requires costly, but limited sacrifice and effort to save or secure them.

5. Very high:

- Severe threat to U.S. interests and objectives, including personnel, facilities, and relations; danger requires massive effort to save and secure interests.

OUTCOME

The outcome of each crisis is described by either a level or change variable. The variable outcome is coded two times:

1. One year after the crisis (short-term), and
2. Five years after the crisis (long-term).

Impact (Causal) of the Crisis on the Outcome of the Goal

The impact of the crisis on the goal's outcome is a judgmental measure of the degree to which the change of the variable state of the goal can be directly linked to the crisis. In other words, it measures the direct causal effect the crisis had on the goal:

1. Very low:
 - Insignificant or nonexistent causal linkage.
2. Moderately low:
 - Weak causal linkage.
3. Moderate:
 - Moderate causal linkage with many possible exogenous factors.
4. Moderately high:
 - Strong causal linkage with several moderate exogenous factors.
5. Very high:
 - Complete (or near complete) and powerful direct causal linkage.

CRISIS-SPECIFIC GOALS

There are nine categories of U.S. Crisis-Specific Goals for which detailed sets of variables have been developed; these are:

- U.S. Ideological Goals,
- U.S. Military Goals,
- U.S. Economic Goals,

- U.S. Goals Toward Communist States,
- U.S. Goals Toward Europe,
- U.S. Goals Toward Asia,
- U.S. Goals Toward the Middle East,
- U.S. Goals Toward Latin America, and
- U.S. Goals Toward Africa.

The remainder of this Appendix will introduce the categories in turn and present the detailed coding instructions for the crisis goals within each.

1. U.S. Ideological Goals

1.1 Goal: Support Democratic Values and Countries

Outcome. Was there any significant change in the status of democratic institutions and values? Did democratic regimes replace authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in the area?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, democratic values and institution in the area/region have been:

1. Greatly advanced/increased:

- Major increases in the number of democratic regimes in the area (replacing authoritarian/undemocratic ones).
- Major increase in the advancement of/adherence to democratic procedures (e.g., constitutional procedures; development and treatment of opposition parties; increase in number of eligible voters who vote; majority rule, etc.).

2. Moderately advanced/increased:

- Moderate increase in the number of democratic regimes in the area (replacing authoritarian/undemocratic ones).
- Moderate increase in the advancement of/adherence to democratic procedures (present regime(s) promises gradual democratic reforms and makes conciliatory democratic gestures, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset/decreased:

- Moderate decrease in the number of democratic regimes in the area (or increase in the number of authoritarian/undemocratic ones).
- Moderate decrease in the advancement of/adherence to democratic procedures (e.g., freely elected regime loses some of its power to undemocratic groups; military obtains stronger voice in government; democratic rights of citizens obstructed, etc.).

5. Greatly offset/decreased:

- Major decrease in the number of democratic regimes in the area (major increases in the number of authoritarian regimes).
- Major decrease in the advancement of/ adherence to democratic procedures (e.g., many democratic rights of citizens repealed; numerous human rights violations; election mandate obstructed by authoritarian coup; etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Status of human rights (e.g., rights of person -- freedom from torture, and inhuman or degrading punishment).
2. Status of civil and political liberties (e.g., freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
3. Number of democratic regimes.
4. Number of authoritarian/totalitarian regimes.
5. Adherence to constitutional procedures.
6. Development and treatment of opposition parties.
7. Percent of eligible voters who vote.
8. Extent to which power is vested in elected officials.

Technical Notes. It should be noted that data concerning this goal are usually highly subjective. The coder should first check the description of the relevant regime and its policies in the Political Handbook of the World (published in six editions since 1963). Here pay particular attention to sections describing government and politics, political parties, and national legislature. Useful information on "political liberties" can also be found in the annual surveys published by the Freedom House. Additional background data, especially in regard to changes over time, can be found by examining such annual publications as the U.S. Department of State Background Notes, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, New York Times Index, and the World Almanac.

1.2 Goal: Promote Peace and Peaceful Resolution to Conflicts

Outcome. Was there any significant conflict deescalation/resolution in the area? Have the chances for peace in the area improved?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, chances for peace (i.e., absence of conflict) in the area/region have been:

1. Greatly improved/realized:

- Major decrease/deescalation in overt military conflict in the area (e.g., conflicting parties sign peace treaty).
- Major increase in negotiation processes between conflicting parties in the area over substantive issues.
- Major increase in confidence/trust between the conflicting parties.

2. Moderately improved/increased:

- Moderate decrease/deescalation in overt military conflict in the area (e.g., conflicting parties recognize military disengagement, but limited, small-scale conflict engagement continues).
- Moderate increase in negotiation processes between conflicting parties in the area over substantive issues (e.g., conflicting parties open limited dialogue/negotiations, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/deteriorated.

4. Moderately decreased/deteriorated:

- Moderate increase/escalation in overt military conflict in the area (but not full scale conflict).
- Moderate decrease in negotiation processes between conflicting parties in the area over substantive issues (e.g., movement away from negotiations/dialogue).

5. Greatly decreased/deteriorated:

- Major increase/escalation in large-scale, overt military conflict in the area (e.g., appearance of new conflict actors, etc.).
- Major decrease in (or absence of) negotiation processes (e.g., no negotiated settlement to conflict in sight, etc.).

Measures. Relative Changes in:

1. Cooperation/conflict interactions between states as measured by event data files (e.g., WEIS, COPDAB, CREON, etc.).
2. Number of overt conflict engagements.
3. Number of battle deaths.
4. Intensification/abatement of the conflict and/or degree of spread of the conflict.
5. Negotiations/constructive dialogue between adversaries.
6. Official state visits/diplomatic recognition.
7. Utilization and support of mechanisms to arbitrate disputes.
8. Respect for final settlements.

Technical Note. Although nonverbal or direct physical conflict is relatively easier to assess for changes, pay particular attention to verbal conflict and tacit communication. Here examine chronological news sources, such as Keesing's and the New York Times Index, for changes in statements made by the relevant decision-makers over time. Also, events data can be useful indicators for modifications in relations between countries.

1.3 Goal: Advance the Welfare and Human Rights of All People

Outcome. Was there any significant change in the human rights and welfare of the people involved? Were the personal liberties and freedoms of the people in the area enhanced or hindered?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the human rights (e.g., rights of person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press) of people living in the area/region have been:

1. Strongly improved:

- Major increase or realization of the people's fundamental human rights in the area (e.g., human rights legally institutionalized; repeal of undemocratic/racist laws; decolonialization; freedom to all political prisoners, etc.).

2. Moderately improved:

- Moderate increase in people's fundamental human rights in the area (e.g., personal liberties expanded; freedom of the press established/expanded; advancement of civil rights, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately obstructed/disrupted:

- Moderate decrease in (or violation of) people's fundamental human rights in the area (e.g., violations of freedom of the press, speech, religion, assembly, etc; detention of political prisoners, etc.).

5. Strongly obstructed/disrupted:

- Major decrease in (or violation of) people's fundamental human rights in the area (e.g., genocide; large scale arrest/mistreatment of political prisoners; establishment of undemocratic laws; large scale refugee problems/abuse; etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Treatment of political prisoners.

2. Extent of violation of rights analogous to the U.S. Bill of Rights (e.g., denial of religious freedom, confiscation of property without due process of law).
3. Undemocratic/racist laws.
4. Refugee problems.

1.4 Goal: Support International Law

Outcome. Has international law been followed, advanced, or developed? Were there violations of accepted international conduct or bilateral agreements between parties?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis observance and/or development of international law in the area/region has been:

1. Greatly improved/realized:
 - Norms governing territorial boundaries, space and routine rights, sovereignty, human rights, etc., are developed and/or followed without violations.
 - Conflicting parties submit to impartial adjudication/scrutiny and adhere to rulings.
 - U.N. resolutions followed; treaties signed.
2. Moderately improved:
 - Some but not all of the legal disputes of relevant actors are codified and accepted.
 - Actors participate in discussions/negotiations concerning international legal questions.
3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately offset/obstructed:
 - Some international agreements are violated by conflicting actors.
 - Some international agreements/treaties repealed unilaterally by actors.
 - Norms regulating diplomatic and consular exchange circumvented.
5. Greatly offset/obstructed:
 - Agreed upon international laws completely neglected by actors.
 - U.N. resolutions not abided by, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Violations of or adherence to norms governing territorial boundaries, space, and maritime rights, sovereignty, etc.
2. Respect for U.N. resolutions, bi- and multilateral treaties.
3. Violations of or adherence to international conventions.
4. Status of U.S. actions in the area.

Notes. This is basically a symbolic goal that is often used or referred to only to justify actions that have already taken place. Therefore, treat the goal as usually symbolic and examine the event for the deeper, more important goals. This goal will often relate to actions taken by states in regard to the United Nations.

1.5 Goal: Ensure the Prestige and Dignity of the United States

Outcome. Was the prestige and dignity or respect for the United States significantly altered? Was the United States "embarrassed" in any way? Was its position of leadership questioned?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the prestige and dignity of the United States in the area/region have been:

1. Strongly improved/advanced:

- Most/majority of U.S. allies and friends favorably respond to U.S. actions/policies.
- Global opinion is generally supportive of U.S. actions/policies.
- U.S. maintains image of a solid, trustworthy alliance partner.

2. Moderately improved/advanced:

- Most allies favor U.S. actions/policies but not in an overly enthusiastic fashion.
- Global opinion is somewhat supportive, but there is some verbal criticism of U.S. actions.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset:

- Many U.S. allies criticize U.S. policy but not in a strongly overt fashion.
- General negative global opinion of U.S. actions.
- U.S. allies and friends questions U.S. commitments.

5. Strongly offset:

- U.S. action openly criticized by its traditional allies and friends.
- World opinion strongly questions and criticizes scope and breadth of U.S. actions/foreign policy.
- U.S. criticized for not upholding commitments.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall global prestige of the United States.
2. Image of the U.S. as a solid, trustworthy alliance partner.
3. Image of the U.S. as a prudent, rational international actor.
4. Treaty commitments of the U.S.
5. Response of U.S. allies concerning U.S. policies.
6. General global opinion or statements concerning the policies of the United States.
7. Preservation of U.S. diplomatic channels of communication.
8. Receptivity to U.S. military aid and presence.

Technical Note. Be aware that this goal could be loosely related to almost any international action taken by the United States. (Few, if any crisis actions are completely devoid of symbolism.) Code this goal only in instances where the U.S. appears to be directly defending its "honor and prestige" through its policies and actions.

2. U.S. Military Goals

2.1 Goal: Maintain/Increase Military Capabilities for Defending U.S. Territorial Integrity and Possessions

Outcome. Has the United States remained free from external threats and invasion by maintaining strong military capabilities? Has the security of the United States increased? Has the United States maintained relative military superiority over other states?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military capabilities of the United States for defending its territorial integrity and possessions have:

1. Strongly increased/improved:

- U.S. clearly has increased its ability to deter any nuclear first strike.
- U.S. clearly has increased its ability to defend against any surprise air and/or naval attack (conventional).
- U.S. clearly has increased its nuclear war survival capabilities (e.g., civil defense, warning time, etc.).

2. Moderately increased/improved:

- U.S. has numerically and qualitatively increased its strategic capabilities but only relative to Soviet increases.
- U.S. has moderately increased its conventional forces.
- U.S. has moderately increased its civil defense and warning time capabilities.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- U.S. has not increased its strategic capabilities relative to USSR changes.
- U.S. conventional forces have been moderately decreased.
- U.S. "second strike" ability is partially questioned.

- U.S. nuclear war survival capabilities have moderately decreased.

5. Strongly decreased:

- USSR has clearly gained strategic superiority over the U.S.
- U.S. conventional forces have greatly decreased in quantity and quality, etc.
- U.S. nuclear war survival capabilities are highly questionable.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. U.S. nuclear deterrent forces (NORAD, Triad, SAC, etc.) quantity and quality.
2. U.S. nuclear war survival capabilities (civil defense programs, warning time, etc.).
3. U.S. general purpose ground and air forces.
4. Military capabilities of NATO and/or Warsaw Pact.
5. Military capabilities of the USSR and PRC.
6. Capability differentials between U.S. and USSR strategic defense system (operational ICBM launches, SLBM launches, intercontinental bombers, total intercontinental strategic offensive delivery vehicles).

2.2 Goal: Maintain/Increase U.S. Military Capabilities for Defending the Major Industrial Democracies (Western Europe and Japan)

Outcome. Have the military capabilities of the U.S. to deter any hostile country from overthrowing or acutely threatening Western Europe and/or Japan been maintained? Did any country in Western Europe and/or Japan have to submit to hostile threats? Have American capabilities prevented major hostile incursions in these vital areas?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military capabilities of the United States for defending the major industrial democracies (e.g., Western Europe and Japan) have:

1. Strongly increased:

- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against NATO Europe has clearly increased.
- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet and/or PRC attack against Japan has clearly increased.

2. Moderately increased:

- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against NATO Europe has moderately increased as far as quantity and quality of forces is concerned, but capability increases are about equal to Soviet/Warsaw Pact changes.
- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet and/or PRC attack against Japan has moderately increased as far as quantity and quality of forces is concerned, but capability increases are about equal to Soviet and/or PRC changes.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet and/or PRC attack against NATO Europe or Japan has moderately decreased by not keeping pace with Soviet and/or PRC military capabilities.

5. Strongly decreased:

- U.S. ability to deter/defend against Soviet and/or PRC attack against NATO Europe or Japan has strongly decreased because of major American cutback and/or major improvements in Soviet and/or PRC military capabilities.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Qualitative and/or quantitative capabilities of U.S. European and Pacific strategic and conventional forces.
2. Qualitative and/or quantitative military capabilities of NATO.
3. Degree of Soviet and Chinese military threat to these areas.
4. Alliance cohesion between the U.S. and Western Europe or Japan.
5. American military presence in/access to Europe and Japan.

2.3 Goal: Maintain/Increase Military Capabilities for Defending Strategically Important LDC's

Outcome. Have the military capabilities of the United States to defend strategically important LDC's been significantly affected? Has the perception of U.S. power/presence in the region increased?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military capabilities of the United States for defending strategically important LDC's (e.g., Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iran, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Saudi Arabia, etc.) in the area/region have:

1. Strongly increased:

- U.S. military capabilities have greatly increased in quantity and quality in the area.
- U.S. has acquired or improved military bases/facilities in the area.
- Number of American advisers in area has greatly increased.
- Scope of U.S. basing rights has greatly increased.

2. Moderately increased:

- U.S. military capabilities have moderately increased in quantity and quality in the area.
- U.S. has moderately increased the quantity and quality of its military bases/facilities, basing rights, and advisers in the area.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- U.S. military capabilities have moderately decreased in quantity and quality in the area.
- Quantity and quality of U.S. military bases/facilities, basing rights, and advisers have moderately decreased in the area.

5. Strongly decreased:

- Quantity and quality of U.S. military capabilities in the area have strongly decreased.

- U.S. has drastically cut back or lost numerous military bases/facilities, basing rights, and advisers in the area.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of U.S. military personnel stationed in the area.
2. Quantity and quality of American military bases/facilities in the area.
3. Military capabilities of local armed forces.
4. Military capabilities, alignments, and installations of hostile countries in the area.
5. U.S. multilateral and bilateral military agreements/alliances in the area.

2.4 Goal: Maintain Military Capability for Defending U.S. Overseas Maritime Interests

Outcome. Have the military capabilities of the United States for defending its overseas maritime interests been significantly affected? Has the United States maintained the capability to deter or defend against hostile interdiction of vital maritime lines of communication and shipping?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military capabilities of the United States for defending U.S. maritime interests in the area/region have:

1. Strongly increased:

- Major improvements in U.S. naval power (and presence) in the area.
- All major waterways in the area are secure/safe for U.S. naval and merchant ships.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate improvements in U.S. naval power (and presence) in the area.
- Most of major waterways in the area are secure/safe for U.S. naval and merchant ships.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Quantity and quality of U.S. naval power (and presence) in the area has moderately decreased.
- Secure/safe passage of U.S. naval and merchant ships is questionable/challenged in a number of major waterways in the area.

5. Strongly decreased:

- Quantity and quality of U.S. naval power (and presence) in the area has greatly decreased.
- Many major waterways in the area are closed for U.S. naval and merchant ships.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number or quality of U.S. ships and ship-days in the region.

2. Number of U.S. naval port visits in the region.
3. Capability of the U.S. Navy for independent operations in the region.
4. U.S. basing rights and other forms of facilities access in area.

2.5 Goal: Maintain/Increase Military Capability for "Show of Force" and Ability to Intervene in Overseas Conflict Arenas

Outcomes. Has the ability of the United States to "show force" and/or intervene militarily in overseas conflict arenas been significantly affected?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the ability of the United States to "show force" or intervene militarily in the area/region has:

1. Strongly increased:

- Major increase in quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in the area.
- U.S. military assistance in area has greatly increased.
- U.S. relations with strategically located countries in the area have greatly improved.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in the area.
- U.S. military assistance in area has moderately increased.
- U.S. relations with strategically located countries in the area have improved.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in the area.
- U.S. military assistance in the area has moderately decreased.
- U.S. relations with strategically located countries in area have become relatively more conflictual.

5. Strongly decreased:

- Major decrease in quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in the area.
- U.S. military assistance in the area has strongly decreased or has been halted.
- U.S. relations with strategically located countries have greatly deteriorated (have become much more conflictual).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in the area.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. military assistance to the area.
3. U.S. relations with strategically located countries.
4. Capability of U.S. Navy to project power onshore in the region (e.g., presence of Marines, amphibious landing craft, helicopters, etc.).
5. U.S. capability for rapid, large scale military logistical support.

Notes. Although measured by military capability variables, this goal is basically symbolic. Military strength is obviously a measure of a nation's "power," but its ability to project or demonstrate this power is aimed at impressing other nations. Therefore, this goal of military preparedness has direct links to symbolic policies of prestige.

2.6 Goal: Maintain/Increase the Safety and Security of U.S. Government Officials, U.S. Citizens, and U.S. Property Overseas

Outcome. Have the safety and security of U.S. citizens and property in the area been significantly affected? Has the United States been able to protect its citizens and property in the area from hostile elements?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the safety and security of U.S. Government officials, U.S. citizens, and U.S. property in the area have been:

1. Greatly strengthened/improved:
 - Major decrease in (or absence of) acts of violence (e.g., bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, etc.) against U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and property.
 - Major increase in activities by countries in the area to protect U.S. Government officials and U.S. citizens and property.
2. Moderately strengthened/improved:
 - Moderate decrease in acts of violence (e.g., bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, etc.) against U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and property.
 - Moderate increase in activities by countries in the area to protect U.S. Government officials and U.S. citizens and property.
3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately weakened/threatened:
 - Moderate increase in acts of violence (e.g., bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, etc.) against U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and U.S. property.
 - Moderate decrease in activities by (or success of) countries in the area to protect U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and property.

5. Greatly weakened/threatened:

- Major increase in acts of violence (e.g., bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, etc.) against U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and property.
- Major decrease in activities in the area to protect U.S. Government officials and/or U.S. citizens and property.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Actual acts of violence against the U.S. in the area (e.g., bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, etc.).
2. Local countries' activities to protect U.S. citizens and property in the area.
3. U.S. military capabilities to protect U.S. citizens and property in the area.
4. Latent danger to U.S. citizens and property.
5. Capacity of insurgents or hostile element to carry out acts of violence.
6. Attitudes of locals towards terrorist activities.

2.7 Goal: Assist Friendly or Neutral Developing Countries in Strengthening Their Military Capability for Purposes of Promoting Regional Stability

Outcomes. Has the United States through the granting of military aid and assistance helped strengthen the military capabilities of important (strategic) LDC's? Has such aid and assistance helped secure the LDC regime against external threats?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military capabilities of LDC's friendly to the United States in the area/region have:

1. Strongly increased:
 - Major increase in the quantity and quality of friendly LDC's military capabilities in the area (strong ability to deter both internal and external hostile threats).
 - Military capabilities of LDC have become major regional stabilizing force.
2. Moderately increased:
 - Moderate increase in the quantity and quality of friendly LDC's military capabilities in the area.
 - Military capabilities of friendly LDC appear possibly able to serve as a regional stabilizing force.
3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately decreased:
 - Moderate decreases in the quantity and quality of friendly LDC's military capabilities in the area.
 - LDC has questionable ability to deter/defend against external and/or internal hostile attack.
5. Strongly decreased:
 - Major decrease in the quantity and quality of friendly LDC's military capability in the area.

- LDC does not have the ability to deter/defend against external and/or internal hostile attack.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of U.S. military personnel and/or advisers in the area.
2. Quality and quantity of U.S. military aid (grants and loans) to the area.
3. Overall capability of U.S. military forces stationed in the area.
4. Capability of local LDC's' armed forces.
5. Quality and quantity of actual external attacks against the LDC's.

Note. Reliance on "strategic" LDC's was one of the cornerstones of the Nixon Doctrine, which itself was a reflection of earlier U.S. policy priorities.

2.8 Goal: Help Secure the Regime Stability of Countries Allied or Friendly to the United States

Outcome. Was the security and stability of friendly regimes affected in any significant way? Were any friendly regimes in the area replaced by regimes hostile to the United States?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the regime stability of countries friendly to the U.S. in the area has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major increase in popular support for the regime(s).
- Major decrease in domestic instability.
- Major decrease in the capacity of insurgents to overthrow the regime(s).
- Major increase in the regime(s)' capability to maintain domestic order.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate increase in the popular support for the regime(s).
- Moderate decrease in domestic instability.
- Moderate decrease in the capacity of insurgents to overthrow the regime(s).
- Moderate increase in the regime(s)' capability to maintain domestic order.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased/weakened:

- Moderate decrease in the popular support for the regime(s).
- Moderate increase in domestic instability.
- Moderate increase in the capacity of insurgents to overthrow the regime(s).
- Moderate decrease in the regime(s)' capability to maintain domestic order.

5. Greatly decreased/weakened.

- Major decrease in (or lack of) popular support for the regime(s).
- Major increase/escalation in domestic instability.
- Major increase in the capacity (or realization) of insurgents to overthrow the regime(s).
- Major decrease in the regime(s)' capability to maintain domestic order.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of friendly regimes in the area.
2. Capability of friendly countries' security and military forces.
3. Quantity and quality of hostile attacks on friendly regimes.
4. Acts of violence/domestic turmoil in the area (e.g., riots, strikes, guerrilla warfare, etc.) including threats and attempts.
5. Capacity of insurgents to overthrow friendly regimes as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity and quality of their arms.
6. Popular support of friendly regimes.
7. Overall domestic political stability of friendly regimes (e.g., government's average length of time in office, peaceful succession of governments, etc.).

2.9 Goal: Discourage or Deter the Expansion of the Military Influence of Countries Hostile to the United States

Outcome. Have countries hostile to the United States gained military influence and presence in the area?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the military presence in the area of countries hostile to the U.S. has:

1. Greatly decreased:
 - Major decrease in Communist and/or radical leftist military bases/facilities, military personnel and advisers stationed in the area, arms transfers, military aid to the area, etc.
2. Moderately decreased:
 - Moderate decrease in Communist and/or radical leftist military bases/facilities, military personnel and advisers stationed in the area, arms transfers, military aid to the area, etc.
3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately increased:
 - Moderate increase in Communist and/or radical leftist military bases/facilities, military personnel and advisers stationed in the area, arms transfers, military aid to the area, etc.
5. Greatly increased:
 - Major increase in Communist and/or radical leftist military bases/facilities, military personnel and advisers stationed in the area, arms transfers, military aid to the area, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of regimes supported by countries hostile to the U.S. in the area.
2. Number of military bases/facilities controlled by hostile countries in the area.
3. Number of hostile military personnel stationed in the area.

4. Scope of basing rights of hostile countries in the area.
5. Quantity and quality of military assistance and/or arms transfers from hostile states to the area.

3. U.S. Economic Goals

3.1 Goal: Support the Orderly Expansion and Performance of U.S. Firms
Commercial Interests, and Relations

Outcomes. Have the commercial interests or relations of United States firms been significantly affected? Have overall U.S. economic relations in the area contributed positively to U.S. economic growth? Have economic relations been marked by cooperation or conflict?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the performance and expansion of U.S. commercial interests in the area/region have:

1. Greatly improved/increased:
 - Major increase in U.S. trade, aid, and investment in the area.
 - Major increase in cooperative economic relations between U.S. firms and countries in the area.
2. Moderately improved/increased:
 - Moderate increase in U.S. trade, aid, and investment in the area.
 - Moderate increase in cooperative economic relations between U.S. firms and countries in the area.
3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately decreased/obstructed:
 - Moderate decrease in U.S. trade, aid, and investment in the area.
 - Moderate increase in economic "conflict" between U.S. firms and countries in the area.
5. Greatly decreased/obstructed:
 - Major decrease in (or lack of) U.S. trade, aid, and investment in the area.
 - Very conflictual economic relations between U.S. firms and countries in the area (e.g., "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies, uncompensated expropriation of U.S. firms/industries, etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. The ability of U.S. firms to conduct business on at least a most favored nation (MFN) basis in the area.
2. Absolute and relative levels of U.S. trade, investment, and aid in the area.
3. Economic agreements between relevant countries and U.S. companies in the area.
4. Degree of cooperation or conflict in economic relations/interactions.
5. U.S. balance of payments with the area.
6. Quantity of U.S. economic credits to the area.

3.2 Goal: Support International Economic Order/Systems Compatible with U.S. Economic Interests

Outcome. Has there been significant economic growth in the area? How stable are the economies of the countries in the area? Has there been an expansion of free enterprise in the area?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the economic growth and stability of the countries in the area/region have:

1. Greatly improved:

- High rates of economic growth have been realized by the countries in the area.
- Major decrease in rates of inflation and/or unemployment in the countries of the area.
- Major increase in the expansion of the infrastructures in the region.

2. Moderately improved:

- Moderate rates of economic growth have been realized by the countries in the area.
- Moderate decrease in countries' rates of inflation and/or unemployment.
- Moderate increase in the expansion of the infrastructure in the region.

3. Not significantly affected/ changed.

4. Moderately offset:

- Moderate decrease in the rates of economic growth have been realized by the countries in the area.
- Moderate increase in countries' rates of inflation and/or unemployment.
- Moderate decrease in the expansion of the infrastructure in the region.

5. Greatly offset:

- Large decrease in the rates of economic growth in the countries of the area.

- Large-scale economic instability has been realized with high rates of inflation and/or unemployment.
- Major decrease in the expansion of the infrastructure in the region.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Growth rate of GNP's in the area.
2. Growth rate of agricultural and/or industrial production in the area.
3. Public investment in the area -- absolute amount and rates of growth.
4. Economic stability of the area -- rate of inflation, rate of unemployment.
5. Countries' balance of payments.
6. Amount of capital flight from the area.
7. Expansion of free enterprise institutions in the area.
8. Expansion of the countries' infrastructure.

3.3 Goal: Promote the Stability of International Commodities' Prices and Supplies

Outcome. Has the United States had adequate access to markets and raw materials? Have there been attempts to interrupt economic exchange with the United States? Have commodity prices been relatively stable? Has U.S. dependence on regional raw materials or commodities been disruptive to the U.S. economy?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the prices and supplies of the areas'/regions' commodities have become:

1. Very stable:

- Very little fluctuation in commodity prices and supplies has been realized.
- U.S. access to markets in the area has greatly increased.

2. Moderately stable:

- Some fluctuation in commodity prices and supplies has been realized, but they are not overly disruptive to the U.S.
- U.S. access to markets in the area has moderately increased.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately unstable:

- Fluctuations in commodity prices and supplies have increased and are proving disruptive to the U.S.
- U.S. access to markets in the area has moderately decreased.

5. Very unstable:

- Major fluctuations in commodity prices and supplies have greatly increased and are proving very disruptive to the U.S. (e.g., establishment of commodity/resource cartels).
- Limited (or lack of) access of U.S. to markets in the area.

- Interruption of economic exchange with the U.S. has greatly increased.

Measures. Relative change in:

1. Quantity and quality of embargoes against the U.S. in the area.
2. The price stability of the areas' commodities.
3. The dependence of the U.S. on the areas' commodities and/or raw materials (U.S. import of the regions' commodities or raw materials/U.S. total import of the commodities or raw materials).
4. Commodity or raw material cartels in the area.
5. Overall stability of the production and supply of the regions' commodities or raw materials.

3.4 Goal: Promote the Economic Development of Non-Communist Third World Countries

Outcome. Has there been any significant change in the level of economic development in the country?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the economic development of "Third World" countries in the area/region has been:

1. Greatly improved/realized:

- Rates of economic growth of LDC's in the region have greatly increased.
- Expansion of LDC's' infrastructures has greatly increased.
- Major increases in industrial and/or agricultural production in the LDC's in the area.

2. Moderately improved/realized:

- Rates of LDC's' economic growth have moderately increased.
- Some expansion of LDC's' infrastructure has been realized.
- Moderate increases in LDC's' industrial and/or agricultural production.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset:

- Moderate slowdown in rates of LDC's' economic growth.
- No expansion of LDC's' infrastructure.
- Moderate slowdown in growth rates of industrial and/or agricultural production.

5. Greatly offset/hindered:

- Major slowdown in rates of LDC's' economic growth (or negative growth is experienced).

- No new attempts/programs at expanding LDC's' infrastructure.
- No growth or negative growth in LDC's' industrial and/or agricultural production.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. LDC's' GNP growth rate.
2. LDC's' agricultural and/or industrial production growth rates.
3. LDC's' domestic public investment.
4. LDC's' energy consumption per capita.
5. LDC's' infrastructure development (e.g., number of access roads built).

4. U.S. Goals Toward Communist States

4.1 Goal: Reduce Chances of War With the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)

Outcome. Has the United States managed to keep the likelihood of war with the PRC at a low level? Has there been an increase in constructive relationships between the U.S. and PRC?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the chances of direct military confrontation between the United States and Peoples Republic of China (PRC) have been:

1. Greatly reduced:

- Both U.S. and PRC have greatly increased attempts to normalize relations with one another.
- Major reduction in (or lack of) aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc., by both U.S. and PRC toward the other.
- Greatly increased cooperation between the U.S. and PRC in attempts to resolve regional and global problems.

2. Moderately reduced:

- Both U.S. and PRC have moderately increased their attempts to normalize relations with one another.
- Moderate reduction in explicit verbal threats and accusations and very few, if any, aggressive acts and/or demonstrations by either the U.S. or PRC towards the other.
- Moderate increase in constructive negotiations and arbitration attempts between the U.S. and PRC.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased/escalated:

- Moderate increase in explicit verbal threats, accusations, isolated aggressive acts, and demonstrations by either the U.S. or PRC towards the other.

- Both U.S. and PRC view each other as exploiting some local/regional conflicts but not in areas viewed as strategically important.
- Moderate increase in military alerts by either U.S. or PRC.

5. Greatly increased/escalated:

- Large-scale escalation of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc. by both the U.S. and PRC towards the other.
- Both U.S. and PRC view and accuse the other of exploiting local/regional conflicts by aiding and abetting "client" states in an area viewed as strategically important.
- Major increase in number of military alerts by both U.S. and PRC.
- Near total absence of constructive negotiations and/or mechanisms to arbitrate disputes between the U.S. and PRC.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc. between the U.S. and PRC (as measured by events data sources -- COPDAB, WEIS).
2. Quantity and quality of Chinese aggression against U.S. friend or allies.
3. Quantity of PRC-promoted "people's wars."
4. Number of serious international crises involving the U.S. and PRC.
5. Quantity and quality of negotiations and attempts at normalization of relations between the U.S. and PRC (e.g., the Warsaw talks).

4.2 Goal: Reduce Chances of War With the USSR

Outcome. Has the United States managed to keep the likelihood of war with the Soviet Union at a low level? Has there been an increase in constructive relationships between the U.S. and USSR?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the chances of direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union have been:

1. Greatly reduced:

- Both U.S. and USSR restrain actions towards each other.
- Greatly increased cooperation between the U.S. and USSR in attempts to resolve regional and global problems.
- Military threats and/or actions greatly reduced by both actors.
- Major increase in mutually beneficial cooperative enterprises between the U.S. and USSR (e.g., detente, reduction in tensions, etc.).

2. Moderately reduced:

- Moderate reduction in explicit verbal threats and accusations and very few, if any, aggressive acts and/or demonstrations by either the U.S. or USSR towards the other.
- Moderate increase in negotiations and arbitration attempts between U.S. and USSR.
- Moderate increase in mutually beneficial cooperative enterprises between the U.S. and USSR (e.g., detente, reduction in tensions, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased/escalated:

- Moderate increase in explicit verbal threats and accusations but few (or

isolated) aggressive acts and demonstrations by either the U.S. or USSR toward the other.

- Both U.S. and USSR view each other as exploiting some local/regional conflicts but not in areas viewed as strategically important.
- Moderate increase in military alerts by either U.S. or USSR.

5. Greatly increased/escalated:

- Large-scale escalation of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc., by both the U.S. and USSR towards the other.
- Both U.S. and USSR view and accuse the other of exploiting local/regional conflicts by aiding and abetting "client" states in an area viewed as strategically important.
- Major increase in number of military alerts by both U.S. and USSR.
- Near total absence of constructive negotiations and/or mechanisms to arbitrate disputes between the U.S. and USSR.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc., between the U.S. and USSR (as measured by events data sources -- COPDAB, WEIS) and level of international tension.
2. Number of military alerts in the U.S. or USSR.
3. Quantity and quality of USSR and/or U.S. "client" states' conflicts.
4. Number of Soviet-promoted "wars of national liberation."
5. Number of serious international crises involving the U.S. and USSR.
6. Number of conflicts or quality of domestic instability in countries (or regions) viewed as strategically important by the U.S. or USSR.
7. Quantity and quality of negotiations between the U.S. and USSR (e.g., SALT and MBFR).

4.3 Goal: Contain/Restrain/Deter the Expansion of Communist Influence

Outcome. Has Communist influence in the area expanded? Have friendly countries been overrun by Communist forces or has a friendly regime been overthrown?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the expansion of Communist influence in the area/region has been:

1. Greatly reduced:

- Major reduction in or absence of Communist-promoted "wars of national liberation" and/or major reduction in (or lack of) capacity of Communist insurgents to carry out acts of violence in the area.
- Major reduction in (or lack of) Communist-controlled military bases/facilities and/or arms contact in the area.
- Major increase in non-Communist regime stability in the area.
- Major reduction in (or lack of) Communist-backed or allied regimes in the area.

2. Moderately reduced:

- Moderate reduction and/or absence of Communist-promoted "wars of national liberation" and/or moderate reduction in capacity of Communist insurgents to carry out acts of violence in the area.
- Moderate reduction in Communist-controlled military bases/facilities and/or arms contact in the area.
- Moderate increase in non-Communist regime stability in the area.
- Moderate reduction in Communist-backed regimes in the area.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased:

- Moderate escalation and/or presence of Communist-promoted "wars of national liberation" and/or improvement in the capability of Communist insurgents to carry out acts of violence in the area.
- Moderate increase in Communist-controlled military bases/facilities and/or arms contact in the area.
- Moderate increase in non-Communist and regime instability in the area.
- Moderate increase in Communist-backed or allied regimes in the area.

5. Greatly increased:

- Major escalation and/or presence of Communist-promoted "wars of national liberation" and major improvement in the capability of Communist insurgents to carry out acts of violence in the area.
- Major increase in Communist-controlled military bases/facilities and arms contact in the area.
- Major increase in non-Communist and domestic regime instability in the area.
- Major increase in Communist-backed or allied regimes in the area.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of Communist aided (e.g., those receiving military aid from USSR, other Warsaw Pact states, PRC, and/or Cuba) regimes in the area.
2. Quantity and quality of formal or informal acts establishing closer relations between countries in the area and Communist states (as measured by event data sources -- COPDAB, WEIS).
3. Size of Communist diplomatic missions in the area.
4. Size of Communist trade and aid with the area.

5. Number of Communist military bases/facilities in the area.
6. Quantity and quality of Communist military assistance and/or arms transfers to the area.
7. Capacity of Communist insurgents to overthrow friendly regimes (as measured by organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quality, and arms types).

4.4 Goal: Encourage "Polycentrism" Within the Communist World

Outcome. Has there been a significant change in the degree of independence or diversity displayed in the ideologies, policies, and actions between the USSR and PRC? What degree of autonomy do Communist states and parties have from the USSR or PRC?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, movement towards "polycentrism" within the Communist world has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Complete or near complete "independence" (e.g., autonomy, diversity) of PRC and USSR in their ideologies, policies, and actions.
- Major increase in ideological, domestic, and foreign policy diversity among Communist parties and states (e.g., greater independence of Eastern Europe from USSR, etc.).

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in independence (diversity) of PRC and USSR in their ideologies, policies, and actions.
- Moderate increase in ideological, domestic, and foreign policy diversity among Communist parties and states (e.g., moderate independence of Eastern Europe from USSR, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate increase in the unity of PRC and USSR in their ideologies, policies, and actions.
- Moderate increase in the unity of Communist parties and states (e.g., less autonomy of Eastern Europe from USSR, etc.).

5. Greatly decreased:

- Complete or near unity (little diversity) of PRC and USSR in their ideologies, policies, and actions (e.g., "monolithic" Communist world).

- Great increase in the unity (lack of diversity) of Communist parties and states (e.g., little autonomy/greater unity between Eastern Europe and USSR, etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall degree of autonomy/independence between the PRC and USSR.
2. Quantity and quality of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc., between the USSR and PRC.
3. Overall degree of autonomy/independence between the USSR and Eastern Europe and between satellites dependent on PRC.
4. Percentage of trade and aid of Communist states with non-Communist states.

4.5 Goal: Encourage Liberalization Trends in Communist States

Outcome. Have the internal policies of Communist states been modified in any way to allow for greater personal freedom and liberties for their citizens? Have the positions of those leaders in Communist states who perceive coexistence as possible been reinforced?

Outcome Assessment Questions. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, liberalization trends in major Communist states (e.g., USSR and PRC) have:

1. Greatly increased/promoted:
 - Major increase in human rights and "political freedoms" of people living in Communist states (e.g., increased emigration of Soviet Jewry).
 - Major increase in selected social and economic interaction between U.S. and Communist states.
 - Major increase in free enterprise trends in Communist states, etc.
2. Moderately increased/promoted:
 - Moderate increase in human rights and "political freedoms" of people living in Communist states (e.g., moderate increase in emigration of Soviet Jewry).
 - Moderate increase in selected social and economic interaction between U.S. and Communist states.
 - Moderate increase in free enterprise trends in Communist states.
3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately decreased/offset:
 - Moderate decrease in human rights and "political freedoms" of people living in Communist states.
 - Moderate decrease in selected social and economic interaction between U.S. and Communist states.
 - Moderate decrease in free enterprise trends in Communist states.

5. Greatly decreased/offset:

- Major increase in human rights violations and lack of "political freedoms" of people living in Communist states.
- Major decrease in (or lack of) selected social and economic interaction between U.S. and Communist states.
- Major decrease in (or lack of) free enterprise trends in Communist states, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Human rights and political freedoms of people living in Communist states (e.g., violations).
2. Government control of immigration and travel (e.g., number of emigrant visas issued).
3. Societal interactions (e.g., commercial, social) between Communist states and the West (e.g., number of U.S. citizen passports issued or renewed).

4.6 Goal: Promote Normalization of Relations Between the U.S. and the Communist World (e.g., USSR and PRC)

Outcome. Has there been a reduction in tensions between the United States and the USSR and/or PRC? Have relations between the U.S. and the USSR and/or PRC become more positive and stable with more collaboration resulting concerning international problems such as arms control, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, law of the sea, etc?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, normalization of relations between the United States and the major Communist states (e.g., USSR and PRC) has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in cooperation between the U.S. and Communist states in resolving regional and global problems (e.g., detente, reduction of tensions, etc.).
- Major increase in negotiations concerning and proscriptions of certain military behavior between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g., SALT).
- Major increase in mutually beneficial exchanges between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g., trade, cultural, and scientific exchanges, etc.).

2. Moderately increased/promoted:

- Moderate increase in cooperation between the U.S. and Communist states in resolving regional and global problems (e.g., detente, reduction of tensions, etc.).
- Moderate increase in negotiations concerning and proscription of certain military behavior between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g. SALT).
- Moderate increase in mutually beneficial exchanges between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g., trade, cultural, and scientific exchange, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased/offset:

- Moderate increase in conflict (tensions) between the U.S. and Communist states concerning regional and global problems.
- Moderate decrease in negotiations concerning and proscription of certain military behavior between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g., nuclear nonproliferation, test bans, etc.).
- Moderate decrease in mutually beneficial exchange between the U.S. and Communist states.

5. Strongly decreased/offset

- Major increase in conflict (tensions) between U.S. and Communist states concerning regional and global problems.
- Major decrease in (or lack of) negotiations concerning and proscriptions of certain military behavior between the U.S. and Communist states (e.g., nuclear nonproliferation, test bans, etc.).
- Major decrease in (or lack of) mutually beneficial exchanges between the U.S. and Communist states.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall degree of cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR and PRC (as measured by events data -- WEIS, COPDAB).
2. Level of international tension.
3. Quantity and quality of negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR and/or PRC (e.g., SALT).
4. Total trade between the U.S. and the USSR and/or PRC.
5. Pro-U.S. votes or positions in U.N. and other international groups taken by USSR and/or PRC.
6. Status of diplomatic channels (e.g., size of diplomatic mission).
7. Control of emigration and travel (e.g., number of U.S. citizen passports issued or renewed).

5. U.S. Goals Toward Europe

5.1 Goal: Guarantee the Security and Independence of Western Europe

Outcome. Has the stability, security, and confidence of Western Europe been affected in any significant way? Has the United States maintained a strong defense posture in Western Europe? Have there been any threats or challenges to Western European order and security?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the security and independence of Western Europe have been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major decrease in the probability of Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against Western Europe.
- Major increase in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Western Europe (e.g., strong nuclear and conventional U.S. forces).
- Major increase in military capabilities of NATO and Western European countries.
- Major increase in economic and political stability of Western Europe.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate decrease in the probability of Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against Western Europe.
- Moderate increase in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Western Europe (e.g., nuclear and conventional U.S. forces).
- Moderate increase in economic and political stability of Western Europe.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:

- Moderate increase in the probability of Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against Western Europe.
- Moderate withdrawal/reduction in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Western Europe.

- Moderate decrease in military capabilities (or cohesion) of NATO and Western European countries.
- Moderate decrease in economic and political stability of Western Europe.

5. Greatly threatened/disrupted:

- Major increase in the probability of Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against Western Europe.
- Major withdrawal/reduction in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Western Europe.
- Major decrease in the military capabilities (or cohesion) of NATO and Western European countries.
- Major decrease in Western European regime stability.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Hostile Western European regimes in power or overthrow of friendly regime.
2. Likelihood of a Soviet nuclear and/or conventional attack against Western Europe.
3. Quantity and quality of Soviet aggression against Western Europe.
4. Quantity and quality of U.S. military capabilities in Europe (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
5. Quantity and quality of NATO military capabilities (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
6. Quantity and quality of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military capabilities (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
7. Political and economic stability of Western European regimes.

5.2 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Strong Cooperative Ties With Western European Countries

Outcome. Has the maintenance and/or expansion of cooperative relations between the United States and Western Europe been affected in any way? Is there a strong sense of political, military, and economic interdependence between the United States and Western Europe?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, cooperative relations between the United States and Western Europe have been:

1. Greatly increased/strengthened:

- Major increase in cooperative consultations and interdependence between the U.S. and Western European allies and friends.
- U.S. greatly expands its influence, contacts, and presence in Western Europe.
- Major reduction in (or lack of) regimes and/or groups hostile to the U.S. in Western Europe.
- Major reduction (or absence of) political or economic conflicts between the U.S. and Western Europe.

2. Moderately increased/strengthened:

- Moderate increase in cooperative consultations and interdependence between the U.S. and Western European allies and friends.
- U.S. moderately expands its influence, contacts, or presence in Western Europe.
- Moderate reductions in (or virtual lack of) regimes and/or groups hostile to the U.S. in Western Europe.
- Moderate reduction in political or economic conflict between the U.S. and Western Europe.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset/frustrated:

- Moderate decrease in cooperative consultations and interdependence between the U.S. and Western European allies and friends (greater autonomy and disagreement concerning major issues).
- Moderate decrease in U.S. influence, contacts, and presence in Western Europe.
- Moderate increase in regimes and/or groups hostile to the U.S. in Western Europe, etc.
- Moderate increase in political or economic conflicts between the U.S. and Western Europe.

5. Greatly offset/frustrated:

- Major decrease in cooperative consultations and interdependence (or major increase in conflict) between the U.S. and Western Europe.
- Major decrease in U.S. influence, contacts, and presence in Western Europe.
- Major increase in regimes and/or groups hostile to the U.S. in Western Europe.
- Major increase/escalation in political or economic conflicts between the U.S. and Western Europe.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall political cooperation consultation between the United States and Western Europe (as measured by events data -- WEIS).
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. -- Western European trade and economic aid.
3. Status of diplomatic channels between the U.S. and Western Europe.
4. Pro-U.S. votes or positions in U.N. and other international groups.
5. U.S. access to key Western European decision-makers.

6. Western European responsiveness to U.S. requests and suggestions.
7. Overall economic cooperation and consultation between the United States and Western Europe.

5.3 Goal: Work for the Economic Stability and the Economic, Military, and Political Integration of Western Europe

Outcome. Has economic, political, and military collaboration among Western European countries been maintained or increased? What is the status of organizations such as the EC that promote Western European integration?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American promotion of the stability and integration of Western Europe has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in the diplomatic support of the U.S. for integrationist moves in Western Europe.
- Major increase in economic, political, and military collaboration among Western European countries.
- Major increase in American support for the EC and its policies, etc.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. diplomatic support for integrationist moves in Western Europe.
- Moderate increase in economic, political, and military collaboration among Western European countries.
- Moderate increase in American support for the EC and its policies.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. diplomatic support for integrationist moves in Western Europe.
- Moderate decrease in economic, political, and military collaboration among Western European countries.

- Moderate decrease in American support for the EC and its policies.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. diplomatic support for integrationist moves in Western Europe.
- Major decrease in economic, political, and military collaboration among Western European countries.
- Major decrease in American support for the EC and its policies.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Intra-European political, military, and economic cooperation and consultation.
2. Quantity of intra-European trade (vs. total trade) and investment (vs. total investment).
3. U.S. support for Western European integration and the EC and its policies.
4. Quality of Western European support for EC policies.

5.4 Goal: Promote the Stabilization of Potential or Realized Conflict Arenas in Europe

Outcome. Has there been a reduction in or resolution of conflicts involving European countries or groups? Has there been any significant increase in the possibility of future conflict between hostile countries or groups?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, potential or realized conflict arenas (e.g., Berlin, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, etc.) in Europe have been:

1. Greatly stabilized:

- Conflicting parties/regimes greatly decrease (or end) conflict and/or resolve potential dispute (parties negotiate in absence of military conflict, parties sign a peace treaty, etc.).
- Major advances in detente between adversaries in Europe.

2. Moderately stabilized:

- Conflicting parties/regimes moderately decrease conflict and/or move towards resolving potential conflicts (constructive negotiations take place between conflicting actors).
- Moderate advances in detente between adversaries in Europe.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately agitated:

- Moderate conflict escalation and potential for future conflicts/disputes increases.
- Little movement towards negotiations/dialogue and/or conciliation between hostile parties.

5. Greatly agitated:

- Major conflict escalation.
- Appearance of new conflict actors as conflict spreads/widens.

- No (or very little) movement towards conflict arbitration/negotiations, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Abstention from acts of aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes.
2. Quantity and quality of acts of domestic violence (e.g., bombings, assassinations, kidnappings).
3. Negotiations between hostile groups.
4. Outside attempts at mediation or conciliation.
5. Adherence to international law and conventions.
6. Degree of conflict spread or escalation.

5.5 Goal: Improve Relations Between the United States and Eastern Europe

Outcome. Has there been an improvement in the political, economic, and social relations between the United States and Eastern Europe?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, relations between the United States and Eastern Europe have:

1. Greatly improved:

- Major movement towards normalization of relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Major increase in political, commercial, and cultural interactions between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Major decrease in tension between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.

2. Moderately improved:

- Moderate increase in movement towards normalization of relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Moderate increase in political, commercial, and cultural interactions between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Moderate decrease in tension between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately worsened/deteriorated:

- Moderate increase in tension between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Little (or no) increase in movement towards normalization of relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Moderate decrease in political, commercial, and cultural interactions between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.

5. Greatly worsened/deteriorated:

- Major increase in tension between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Major decrease (or lack of) movement towards normalization of relations between the U.S. and Eastern Europe.
- Major decrease (or lack of) political, commercial, and cultural interactions between the U.S. and Eastern Europe, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall cooperation between the United States and Eastern Europe (as measured by WEIS and other types of events data).
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. trade with Eastern Europe.
3. U.S. access to key decision-makers in Eastern Europe (official state visits).
4. Status of diplomatic channels between U.S. and Eastern Europe (size of diplomatic missions).
5. Number of Eastern European students in U.S. educational institutions.
6. Number of U.S. citizen passports issued or renewed for Eastern Europe travel.

6. U.S. Goals Toward Asia

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6.1 Goal: Avoid Direct Military Confrontation with the Chinese Peoples' Republic (PRC) and the Soviet Union (USSR) in Asia

Outcome. Has the United States avoided direct military confrontation or events that might lead to military conflict with the PRC and/or USSR in Asia? Has the likelihood of an Asian war between the U.S. and the PRC and/or USSR decreased?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, chances of military confrontation between the United States and the PRC and/or USSR in Asia have:

1. Greatly decreased:

- Major deescalation (or elimination) of local/regional conflicts in Asia between client states or allies of the U.S. and PRC and/or USSR (e.g., Southeast Asia, Korea, Taiwan, etc.).
- Major decrease in (or elimination of) threats directed at U.S. allies or friends by the PRC and/or USSR in Asia or their clients/allies.
- Major decrease in the expansion of USSR and/or PRC influence and aggression in Asia.
- Major reduction of tensions between the U.S. and USSR and/or PRC.

2. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate deescalation of local/regional conflicts in Asia between client states or allies of the U.S. and PRC and/or USSR.
- Moderate decrease in threats directed at U.S. allies or friends by the PRC and/or USSR in Asia or their clients/allies.
- Moderate decrease in the expansion of USSR and/or PRC influence and aggression in Asia.
- Moderate overall reduction of tensions between the U.S. and USSR and/or PRC.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased/escalated:

- Moderate escalation of local/regional conflicts in Asia between client states or allies of the U.S. and PRC and/or USSR.
- Moderate increase in threats directed at U.S. allies or friends by the PRC and/or USSR in Asia or their clients/allies.
- Moderate increase in the expansion of USSR and/or PRC influence and aggression in Asia.
- Moderate increase in overall tension between the U.S. and USSR and/or PRC.

5. Greatly increased/escalated:

- Major escalation of local/regional conflicts in Asia between client states or allies of the U.S. and PRC and/or USSR.
- Major increase in threats directed at U.S. allies or friends by the PRC and/or USSR or their clients/allies.
- Major increase/escalation of USSR and/or PRC influence and aggression in Asia.
- Major deterioration of overall relations between the U.S. and USSR and/or PRC.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. U.S. perception of PRC and/or USSR aggression in Asia.
2. Quantity and quality of aggressive acts, threats, accusations, demonstrations, etc., between the U.S. and the PRC and/or USSR in Asia (as measured by events data sources -- WEIS, COPDAB).
3. Number of serious Asian crises including the U.S. and PRC and/or USSR.
4. Escalation and/or spread of local or regional Asian wars.
5. Utilization and support of mechanisms to arbitrate local/regional Asian disputes.

6. U.S., PRC, USSR respect for final settlements of Asian conflicts/disputes.
7. Capacity of Communist insurgents to overthrow a friendly Asian regime.

6.2 Goal: Contain the Expansion of Communist Aggression and Influence in Asia

Outcome. To what degree have the USSR, PRC or local Communists and/or insurgents gained influence in Asia? Has there been a significant increase in Communist military aggression in Asia? Has the United States maintained a strong presence in Asia?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, Communist influence and aggression in Asia have been:

1. Greatly reduced:

- Major reduction in (or elimination of) PRC-promoted "people's wars" in Asia and/or comparable Soviet-backed efforts.
- Major reduction in (or elimination of) the capacity of Communist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.
- Major reduction in (or elimination of) Communist-controlled military bases) facilities and/or arms contact in Asia.
- Major increase in the stability of non-Communist or neutral regimes in Asia.

2. Moderately reduced:

- Moderate reduction in (or deescalation of) PRC/USSR-promoted "people's war" in Asia.
- Moderate reduction in Communist insurgents' capacity to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.
- Moderate reduction in Communist controlled military bases/facilities and/or arms contact in Asia.
- Moderate increase in the stability of non-Communist or neutral regimes in Asia.

3. Not significantly affected/changed:

4. Moderately increased/escalated:

- Moderate increase in (or escalation of) PRC/USSR-promoted "people's wars" in Asia.

- Moderate increase in (or success of) Communist insurgents' capacity to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.
 - Moderate increase in Communist-controlled military bases/facilities and/or arms contacts in Asia.
 - Moderate decrease in the stability of non-Communist or neutral regimes in Asia.
5. Greatly increased/escalated:
- Major increase/escalation in (or success of) PRC/USSR-promoted "people's wars" in Asia.
 - Major increase in (or success of) Communist insurgents' capacity to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.
 - Major decrease in the stability of non-Communist or neutral regimes in Asia, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number and/or escalation of Communist-promoted "wars of national liberation" in Asia.
2. USSR and/or PRC influence in Asia as measured by:
 - Total trade with Asian states.
 - Total economic and military aid to Asia.
 - Status of diplomatic channels (size of PRC and/or USSR diplomatic missions).
 - Formal or informal alliances/treaties between Asian countries and PRC and/or USSR.
 - PRC and/or USSR military bases/facilities.
3. Number of hostile Asian regimes.
4. Capacity of Communist insurgents to overthrow friendly regimes (as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity, and quality of arms).
5. U.S./Asian political, economic, and military presence in Asia as measured by:
 - Total U.S. troops in the area.
 - Quantity and quality of U.S. military bases/facilities in Asia.

- Quantity and quality of U.S. military and economic assistance to Asia.
- Total U.S. trade in Asia (both absolute and relative levels).
- Status of U.S. diplomatic channels in Asia (size of U.S. diplomatic missions).

Notes. The wording of this goal is primarily relevant to the 1960's.

6.3 Goal: Promote the Security and Stability of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan

Outcome. Has the stability, security, and confidence of the major industrial states of Asia been affected in any significant way? Has the United States maintained a strong defense posture in Asia. Have there been any significant threats or challenges to the order and security of the major Asian industrial states?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the security and independence of the major industrial states in Asia (e.g., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan) have been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major decrease in the probability of a PRC and/or USSR attack against any or all of the major Asian industrial non-Communist states.
- Major increase in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Asia.
- Major increase in the military capabilities and cooperation among U.S./Asian allies and friends (e.g., major increase in regional role of Japan).
- Major increase in economic and political stability of non-Communist, industrial, Asian regimes (or region as a whole).

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate decrease in the probability of PRC and/or USSR attack against any or all of the major Asian industrial, non-Communist states.
- Moderate increase in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Asia.
- Moderate increase in the military capabilities and cooperation among U.S./Asian allies and friends (e.g., moderate increase in regional role of Japan).
- Moderate increase in the economic and political stability of Asian industrial non-Communist regimes (or region as a whole).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:
 - Moderate increase in the probability of a PRC and/or USSR attack against any or all of the major Asian industrial non-Communist states.
 - Moderate withdrawal/reduction in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Asia.
 - Moderate decrease in the military capabilities and cooperation among U.S. Asian allies and friends (e.g., moderate decrease in regional role of Japan).
 - Moderate decrease in economic and political stability of Asian industrial non-Communist regimes (or region as a whole).
5. Greatly threatened/disrupted:
 - Major increase in the probability of a PRC and/or USSR attack against any or all of the major Asian industrial non-Communist states.
 - Major withdrawal/reduction in U.S. defense position (or commitment) in Asia.
 - Major decrease in the military capabilities and cooperation among U.S./Asian allies and friends.
 - Major decrease in economic and political stability of Asian industrial non-Communist regimes (or region as a whole).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Hostile influence in or regime control of the major Asian industrial states.
2. Likelihood of PRC and/or USSR attack against U.S. Asian industrial allies.
3. Quantity and quality of PRC and/or USSR aggression against U.S. Asian industrial allies.

4. Quantity and quality of U.S. military capabilities Asia (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
5. Quantity and quality of local allies' armed forces (e.g., troops, bases/facilities, materials).
6. Quantity and quality of PRC and USSR military capabilities in Asia (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
7. Political and economic stability of Asian regimes.

6.4 Goal: Support the Stability of Non-Communist Developing Asian Countries

Outcome. Have any of the non-Communist developing countries in Asia been wholly or partly overrun by forces hostile to U.S. interests? Have any of these countries been forced to submit to external threats or aggression?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the regime stability of non-Communist less developed Asian countries has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Stability of predominantly friendly regimes in Asia is greatly increased or many Communist regimes in the area lose power.
- Border security of non-Communist Asian regimes is greatly enhanced.
- Major reduction in (or elimination of) local/regional Asian conflicts.
- Major reduction in (or elimination of) the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Stability of predominantly friendly regimes in Asia is moderately increased or some Communist regimes in the area lose power.
- Border security of non-Communist Asian regimes is moderately enhanced.
- Moderate reduction in (or elimination of) local/regional Asian conflicts.
- Moderate reduction in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression in Asia.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:

- Moderate decrease in the stability of predominantly friendly regimes in Asia or Communist regimes in the area gain some power/influence.

- Moderate decrease in the border security of non-Communist Asian regimes.
- Moderate increase/escalation in local/regional Asian conflicts.
- Moderate increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents.

5. Greatly threatened/disrupted:

- Major decrease in the stability (or overthrow of) predominantly friendly regimes in Asia or Communist regimes in the area come to power.
- Major decrease in the border security of non-Communist Asian regimes.
- Major increase/escalation in local/regional Asian conflicts.
- Major increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression.

Measures. Relative change in:

1. Number of pro-U.S. non-Communist LDC Asian regimes (e.g., overthrow of friendly regimes).
2. Degree of threats/aggression by hostile insurgents against friendly Asian LDC regimes.
3. Military capabilities of friendly Asian LDC regimes.
4. Capacity of insurgents to overthrow friendly Asian LDC regimes as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity, and quality of their arms.
5. Escalation and spread of local/regional conflicts.
6. Overall domestic political stability of Asian LDC regimes (e.g., regimes' average length of time in office, peaceful succession of governments, etc).

6.5 Goal: Contain Soviet Expansionism in Asia

Outcome. Has the Soviet Union expanded its political, military, economic influence and/or presence in Asia? Have groups or regimes friendly to the Soviet Union either come to power or gained influence in Asia?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American containment of Soviet influence in Asia has been:

1. Very successful:

- Major decrease in Soviet influence and/or aggression in Asia.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) Soviet exploitation of regional/local conflicts in Asia.
- Major moves toward normalization of relations between the U.S. and PRC.
- Major increase in U.S. presence and influence in Asia.

2. Moderately successful:

- Moderate decrease in Soviet influence and/or aggression in Asia.
- Moderate decrease in Soviet exploitation of regional/local conflicts in Asia.
- Moderate moves toward normalization of relations between the U.S. and PRC.
- Moderate increase in U.S. presence and influence in Asia.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately unsuccessful:

- Moderate increase in Soviet influence and/or aggression in Asia.
- Moderate increase in Soviet exploitation of regional/local conflicts in Asia.

- Moderate hardening of relations (or moderate increase in tension) between the U.S. and PRC.
- Moderate withdrawal/reduction of U.S. presence and influence in Asia.

5. Very unsuccessful:

- Major increase in Soviet influence and/or aggression in Asia.
- Major increase in Soviet exploitation of regional/local conflicts in Asia.
- Major increase in tension between the PRC and U.S.
- Major withdrawal/reduction of U.S. presence influence in Asia.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of pro-Soviet regimes in Asia.
2. Quantity and quality of Soviet military presence in Asia (e.g., troops, advisers, materials, bases/facilities, assistance).
3. Total Soviet trade in Asia.
4. Total Soviet economic aid to Asia.
5. Status of Soviet diplomatic channels in Asia (size of Soviet diplomatic missions).
6. Quantity and quality of Soviet formal or informal acts establishing closer relations with Asian regimes (e.g., recognition, alliances, treaties, acceptance of missions).

Notes. This goal is more relevant for the 1970's than the 1960's when Soviet rather than "Communist" expansion gained greater salience for American policymakers.

6.6 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Relations with Japan

Outcome. Have the United States and Japan maintained close cooperative relations based on mutual consultation and confidence? Have both the United States and Japan avoided policies and actions that might undermine U.S./Japanese relations?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, cooperative relations between the United States and Japan have been:

1. Greatly increased/strengthened:

- Major reduction in (or absence of) political or economic conflict/disputes between the U.S. and Japan.
- Major increase in consultation/compatibility/complementarity between U.S. and Japanese military forces and doctrines.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S. or Japanese policies and actions that would undermine U.S./Japanese relations and/or confidence in one another.

2. Moderately increased/strengthened:

- Moderate reduction in (or absence of) political or economic conflicts/disputes between the U.S. and Japan.
- Moderate increase in consultation/compatibility/complementarity between U.S. and Japanese military forces and doctrine.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. or Japanese policies and actions that undermine U.S./Japanese relations and/or confidence in one another.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset/frustrated:

- Moderate increase in political or economic conflicts/disputes between the U.S. and Japan.

- Moderate decrease in consultation/compatibility/complementarity between U.S. and Japanese military forces and doctrine.
- Moderate increase in U.S. or Japanese policies and actions that undermine U.S./Japanese relations and/or confidence in one another.

5. Greatly offset/frustrated:

- Major increase in (or presence of) political or economic disputes between the U.S. and Japan.
- Major decrease in (or lack of) consultation/compatibility/complementarity between U.S. and Japanese military forces and doctrine.
- Major increase in (or presence of) U.S. or Japanese policies and actions that undermine U.S./Japanese relations and/or confidence in one another.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Overall U.S./Japanese cooperation (as measured by events data sources -- WEIS and COPDAB).
2. Maintenance of pro-U.S. attitudes in Japan:
 - Japanese students in U.S. educational institutions.
 - Official government visits to and from the U.S.
 - Relations between U.S. and Japanese attaches and military personnel.
 - Anti-U.S. acts or demonstrations in Japan.
 - Pro-U.S. votes or positions in U.N. and other international groups taken by Japan.
 - U.S. access to key Japanese decision-makers.
 - Japanese responsiveness to U.S. requests and suggestions.
 - Status of diplomatic channels (size of diplomatic missions).
3. U.S./Japanese trade and U.S./Japanese balance of payments.

6.7 Goal: Promote Economic Development and Stability in Asian Non-Communist LDC's

Outcome. Has the United States established or expanded programs and policies to assist Asian non-Communist LDC's to develop economically? Was the development aid or assistance significant in maintaining/improving cooperative relations between the country and the U.S?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American support and promotion of the economic development/stability of non-Communist Asian LDC's has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Asian LDC's.
- Major increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Asian LDC's.
- Major increase in domestic and American foreign investment in Asian, LDC's.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Asian LDC's.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Asian LDC's.
- Moderate increase in domestic and American foreign investment in Asian LDC's.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance in Asian LDC's.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Asian LDC's.
- Major increase in domestic and American foreign investment in Asian LDC's.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S. economic and technical assistance to Asian LDC's.
- Major decrease in (or lack of) U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Asian LDC's.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) domestic and American foreign investment in Asian LDC's, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. economic assistance programs (e.g., grants and loans) in Asia.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. development projects in Asia.
3. U.S. economic credits to Asia.
4. Quantity and quality of U.S. technological assistance and transfers in Asia.
5. U.S. support of multilateral (e.g., World Bank, IMF, etc.) economic aid to Asia.
6. U.S. support of Asian regional economic development organizations/agencies.

7. U.S. Goals Toward the Middle East

7.1 Goal: Promote an End to Conflicts in the Middle East

Outcome. What are the chances for peace in the Middle East? Has there been a deescalation of military confrontations in the Middle East? Has there been a reduction in the potential of superpower conflict in the Middle East?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, chances of peace (e.g., absence of military conflict) in the Middle East have:

1. Strongly improved:

- Major increase in the chances of success in negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and an absence of direct military confrontations.
- Major steps taken towards military disengagement between Israel and Arab states.
- Chances of major power conflict in the Middle East greatly reduced.
- Major movement towards creation of stable regional balances of power in the Middle East.

2. Moderately improved:

- Moderate increase in the chances of success in negotiations between Israel and the Arab states and an absence of direct military confrontation.
- Moderate steps taken toward military disengagement between Israel and the Arab states.
- Moderate reduction in chances of major power conflict in the Middle East.
- Moderate movement toward creation of stable regional balances of power in the Middle East.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately deteriorated:

- Moderate decrease in the possibility of negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.

- Moderate escalation in conflict behavior between Israel and the Arab states.
- Moderate increase in the chances of major power confrontation in the Middle East.
- Moderate escalation of the Middle Eastern "arms race."

5. Strongly deteriorated:

- Little, if any, possibility of constructive negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.
- Large scale escalation of conflict between Israel and the Arab states.
- Major increase in the chances of major power confrontation in the Middle East
- Major escalation of the Middle Eastern "arms race."

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of actual military confrontations in the Middle East (e.g., battle deaths).
2. Overall cooperation/conflict in the Middle East (as measured by events data sources -- WEIS, COPDAB).
3. Quantity and quality of aggressive actions in the Middle East (e.g., military alerts).
4. Utilization and support of mechanisms to arbitrate disputes in the Middle East.
5. Quantity and quality of negotiation processes in the Middle East.
6. Chances of superpower confrontation in the Middle East.
7. Adherence to/violation of U.N. resolutions/cease-fires.

7.2 Goal: Guarantee Israeli Security

Outcome. Has there been any significant change in the United States' commitment to the security of Israel? Has Israel maintained or increased its military capabilities? Have there been significant threats to Israel's "right to exist" and/or territorial integrity (pre-1967 borders)?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, Israeli security has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major decrease in the probability of an Arab military attack against Israel.
- Major increase in military capabilities of Israel to deter/defend against a surprise Arab attack.
- Major increase in U.S. commitment to Israel's territorial integrity and security.
- Major increase in the border security of Israel.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate decrease in the probability of an Arab military attack against Israel.
- Moderate increase in military capabilities of Israel to deter/defend against a surprise Arab attack.
- Moderate increase in U.S. commitment to Israel's territorial integrity and security.
- Moderate increase in the border security of Israel.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:

- Moderate increase in the probability of an Arab military attack against Israel.
- Moderate decrease in military capabilities of Israel to deter/defend against a surprise Arab attack.

- Moderate decrease in U.S. commitment to Israel's territorial integrity and security.
- Moderate decrease in the border security of Israel.

5. Greatly threatened/disrupted:

- Major increase in the probability (or realization of) an Arab military attack against Israel.
- Major decrease in the military capabilities of Israel to deter/defend against a surprise Arab attack.
- Major decrease in U.S. commitment to Israel's territorial integrity and security.
- Major decrease in the border security of Israel.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. U.S.'s commitment to Israel's security.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. military assistance to Israel.
3. Quantity and quality of U.S. arms exports to Israel.
4. Israel's overall military capabilities (e.g., men under arms, military/defense budget).
5. Quantity and quality of aggressive actions directed at Israel by hostile neighbors.

Notes. Between 1967-1973 this goal should read "maintain/increase Israel's military superiority in the Middle East."

7.3 Goal: Minimize Soviet Influence in the Middle East

Outcome. Has the presence and influence of the Soviet Union decreased in the Middle East?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, Soviet military influence in the Middle East has:

1. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in the number of Soviet naval vessels in the Middle East.
- Major decrease in Soviet military assistance and advisers in the Middle East.
- Major decrease in Soviet-controlled military bases/facilities in the Middle East.
- Major decrease in Soviet arms contact with countries of the Middle East.

2. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in the number of Soviet naval vessels in the Middle East.
- Moderate decrease in Soviet military assistance and advisers in the Middle East.
- Moderate decrease in Soviet-controlled military bases/facilities in the Middle East.
- Moderate decrease in Soviet arms contact with countries of the Middle East.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in the number of Soviet naval vessels in the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in Soviet military assistance and advisers in the Middle East.

- Moderate increase in (or acquisition of) Soviet-controlled military bases/facilities in the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in Soviet arms contact with countries of the Middle East.

5. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in the number of Soviet naval vessels in the Middle East.
- Major increase in Soviet military assistance and advisers in the Middle East.
- Major increase in (or acquisition of) Soviet-controlled military bases/facilities in the Middle East.
- Major increase in Soviet arms contact with countries of the Middle East.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of pro-Soviet regimes in the Middle East.
2. Quantity and quality of formal or informal acts establishing closer relations between the USSR and countries in the Middle East (as measured by event data sources -- WEIS, COPDAB).
3. Status of Soviet diplomatic channels in the Middle East (e.g., size of diplomatic missions).
4. Quantity and quality of USSR trade and aid with the Middle East.
5. Number of Soviet military bases/facilities in the Middle East and amount of use Soviets are permitted to make of same.
6. Quantity and quality of USSR military assistance, advisers, and arms transfers to the Middle East.

7.4 Goal: Promote/Support Political Stability in the Middle East

Outcome. Has the political stability of pro-Western and neutral regimes in the Middle East increased? Have threats to the political stability of pro-Western and neutral regimes in the Middle East increased?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the political stability of friendly Middle Eastern countries has:

1. Greatly increased/secured:

- Major reduction in or elimination of military conflict in the Middle East.
- Major reduction in terrorism in the Middle East.
- Major loss of power/influence (or elimination) by "radical" leftist regimes and organizations in the Middle East.
- Major increase in the stability of pro-West or "traditional regimes" in the Middle East (e.g., Israel, Jordan, Iran (pre-1979), Saudi Arabia, Morocco, etc.).

2. Moderately increased/secured:

- Moderate reduction of military conflict in the Middle East.
- Moderate reduction in terrorism in the Middle East.
- Moderate loss of power/influence by "radical" leftist regimes and organizations in the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in the stability of pro-West or "traditional regimes" in the Middle East (e.g., Israel, Jordan, Iran (pre-1979), Saudi Arabia, Morocco, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased/threatened:

- Moderate escalation of military conflict in the Middle East.

- Moderate increase in terrorism in the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in power/influence of "radical" leftist regimes and organizations in the Middle East.
- Moderate decrease in (or increase of threats to) the stability of pro-West or "traditional regimes" in the Middle East (e.g., Israel, Jordan, Iran (pre-1979), Saudi Arabia, Morocco, etc.).

5. Greatly decreased/threatened:

- Major escalation of military conflict in the Middle East.
- Major increase in terrorism in the Middle East.
- Major increase in power/influence of "radical" leftist regimes and organizations in the Middle East.
- Major decrease in (or the elimination/overthrow of) the stability of pro-West or "traditional regimes" in the Middle East (e.g., Israel, Jordan, Iran (pre-1979), Saudi Arabia, Morocco, etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Pro-Western and neutral regimes length of time in office.
2. Peaceful succession of governments in pro-Western and neutral countries.
3. Quality of regimes' popular support.
4. Capacity of insurgents to overthrow the government (as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity, and quality of arms).
5. Capacity of terrorists to carry out acts of violence.
6. Quality and quantity of pro-Western and neutral regimes' internal security forces.

7.5 Goal: Promote the Economic Stability and Development of Middle Eastern Countries

Outcome. Has the United States established or expanded programs and policies to assist in the economic development of Middle Eastern countries?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American support/promotion of the economic development/stability of Middle Eastern countries has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to the Middle East.
- Major increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multi-lateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Middle Eastern countries.
- Major increase in economic interdependence between the Middle East and the United States, etc.
- Major increase in U.S. support for the diversification of the economies of the Middle East.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multi-lateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Middle Eastern countries.
- Moderate increase in economic interdependence between the Middle East and the United States.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support for the diversification of the economies of the Middle East.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance to the Middle East.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Middle Eastern countries.
- Moderate decrease in economic interdependence between the Middle East and the U.S.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support for the diversification of the economies of the Middle East.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S. economic and technical assistance to the Middle East.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S. support for economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Middle Eastern countries.
- Major decrease in economic interdependence between the Middle East and the U.S.
- Major decrease in U.S. support for the diversification of Middle Eastern countries.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. economic assistance programs (e.g., grants and loans) in the Middle East.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. development projects in the Middle East.
3. U.S. economic credits to the Middle East.
4. Quantity and quality of U.S. technological assistance and transfers to the Middle East.

5. U.S. promotion of economic interdependence between Middle Eastern countries and between the latter and the U.S.
6. U.S. support for the diversification of Middle Eastern economies.
7. U.S. encouragement of the recycling of Arab oil wealth.

7.6 Goal: Maintain/Increase United States' Access to Markets and Raw Materials in the Middle East

Outcome. Has there been any interruptions or threat of interruptions of the flow of Middle Eastern oil to the United States? Has the United States had unlimited access to Middle Eastern markets and commodities other than oil?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American access to markets and raw materials (e.g., oil) in the Middle East has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major decrease in (or absence of) the interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern petroleum to the U.S.
- Major increase in U.S. foreign investment and trade in the Middle East.
- Major increase in the stability of the major oil producing states and in their cooperative relations with the U.S.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate decrease in the interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern petroleum to the U.S.
- Moderate increase in U.S. foreign investment and trade in the Middle East.
- Moderate increase in the stability of the major oil-producing states and in their cooperative relations with the U.S.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate increase in the interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern petroleum to the U.S.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. foreign investment and trade in the Middle East.

- Moderate decrease in the stability of the major oil-producing states and in their cooperative relations with the U.S.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major increase in the interruption of the flow of Middle Eastern petroleum to the U.S. (e.g., OPEC embargo).
- Major decrease in U.S. foreign investment and trade in the Middle East.
- Major decrease in the stability of the major oil-producing states and a major decrease in cooperation with the U.S.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Ability of the United States to conduct business on at least a most favored nation (MFN) basis in the Middle East.
2. Threat of an OPEC or OAPEC oil embargo against the United States.
3. Use (or threat of use) of oil as a political weapon.
4. U.S. foreign investment and trade in the Middle East.

8. U.S. Goals Toward Latin America

8.1 Goal: Promote Economic Stability/Development in non-Communist Latin American Countries not Opposed by U.S.

Outcome. Has the United States established or expanded programs and policies to assist Latin American economies to stabilize and develop?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American support of the economic development/stability of Latin American countries has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Latin America.
- Major increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Latin American Countries.
- Major increase in U.S.-sponsored programs to offset domestic economic instability in Latin America (e.g., inflation, unemployment, etc.).
- Major increase in U.S.-supported programs for Latin American infrastructure development.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance in Latin America.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc) to Latin American countries.
- Moderate increase in U.S.-sponsored programs to offset domestic economic instability in Latin America (e.g., inflation, unemployment, etc.)
- Moderate increase in U.S.-supported programs for Latin American infrastructure developments.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Latin America.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Latin American countries.
- Moderate decrease in U.S.-sponsored programs to offset domestic instability in Latin America (e.g., inflation, unemployment, etc.).
- Moderate decrease in U.S.-supported programs for Latin American infrastructure development.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Latin America.
- Major decrease in U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Latin America.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S.-sponsored programs to offset domestic economic instability in Latin America (e.g., inflation, unemployment, etc.).
- Major decrease in (or absence of) U.S.-supported programs for Latin American infrastructure development.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. economic assistance programs (e.g., grants and loans) in Latin America.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. development projects in Latin America.
3. U.S. economic credits to Latin America.
4. Quantity and quality of U.S. technological assistance and transfers to Latin America.

5. U.S. support of economic aid provided through multi-lateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to Latin American Countries.
6. U.S.-sponsored programs to offset Latin American economic instability (e.g., inflation, unemployment).
7. U.S. encouragement of countries to "untie" their aid to Latin America.
8. U.S. programs to help Latin American states ease their debt burdens.

8.2 Goal: Continue/Strengthen American Economic Presence in Latin America

Outcome. Has the United States' position as a major economic force in Latin America been affected in any significant way? Have there been any threats to the United States' economic presence in Latin America?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American economic presence in Latin America has:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. trade in Latin America.
- Major increase in U.S. access to raw materials and markets in Latin America.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) expropriations of U.S. firms in Latin America.
- Major increase in U.S. investment in Latin America.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. trade in Latin America.
- Moderate increase in U.S. access to raw materials and markets in Latin America.
- Moderate decrease in expropriations of U.S. firms in Latin America.
- Moderate increase in U.S. investment in Latin America.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. trade in Latin America.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. access to raw materials and markets in Latin America.
- Moderate increase in expropriations of U.S. firms in Latin America.

- Moderate decrease in U.S. investment in Latin America.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. trade in Latin America.
- Major decrease in U.S. access to raw materials and markets in Latin America.
- Major increase in expropriation of U.S. firms in Latin America.
- Major decrease in U.S. investment in Latin America.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. trade in Latin America.
2. Latin American trade with the U.S./total Latin American trade.
3. Size of U.S. foreign investment in Latin America.
4. Ability of U.S. to conduct business on at least a most-favored-nation basis.
5. Number of violent acts against U.S. commercial interests and property in Latin America.
6. U.S. access to Latin American raw materials.
7. Agreements between Latin American countries and U.S. companies.
8. Expropriations/nationalizations of U.S. companies in Latin America.

8.3 Goal: Keep Latin America Free of External, Hostile Aggression and Influence

Outcome. Has the United States maintained its alliance and security relationships in Latin America? Have hostile countries gained alignments, installations, or influence in Latin America?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, external "hostile" aggression and influence in Latin America has:

1. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in (or absence of) formal or informal acts establishing closer relations between Latin America and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries (e.g., recognition, furtherance of trade, acceptance of missions).
- Major increase in the strength of alliances and security relationships between U.S. and Latin America (e.g., OAS, Rio treaty, etc.)
- Major decrease in alignments or presence of hostile forces and/or material in Latin America.

2. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in formal or informal acts of establishing closer relations between Latin America and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries (e.g., recognition, furtherance of trade, acceptance of missions).
- Moderate increase in the strength of alliances and security relationships between U.S. and Latin America (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).
- Moderate decrease in alignments or presence of hostile forces and/or material in Latin America.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in formal or informal establishment of closer relations between Latin America and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries (e.g., recognition, furtherance of trade, acceptance of missions).
- Moderate decrease in the strength of alliances and security relationships between the U.S. and Latin America (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).
- Moderate increase in alignments or presence of hostile forces and/or material in Latin America.

5. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in formal or informal acts establishing closer relations between Latin America and the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries (e.g., recognition, furtherance of trade, acceptance of missions).
- Major decrease in the strength of alliances and security relationships between the U.S. and Latin America (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).
- Major increase in alignments or presence of hostile forces and/or material in Latin America.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of hostile regimes in Latin America.
2. U.S./Latin American alliances and security relationships (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, bilateral military agreements).
3. Latin American countries' reaction to Cuban threat.
4. Quantity and quality of formal or informal acts establishing closer relations with countries hostile to the United States (e.g., recognition, furtherance of trade, acceptance of missions).

5. Capacity of externally-promoted insurgents to overthrow friendly regimes (as measured by their organizational and numerical strength; popular support; quantity and quality of arms).
6. Quantity and quality of U.S. military presence in Latin America (e.g., troops, advisers, materiel, bases/facilities, assistance).
7. Quantity and quality of local regimes' military capabilities.

8.4 Goal: Promote Democratic Institutions in Latin America

Outcome. Was there any significant change in the status of Latin American democratic institutions? Did any democratic regimes replace any authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in Latin America?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, democratic institutions and free enterprise in Latin America have:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in the number and stability of democratic regimes in Latin America.
- Major increase in the adherence to human rights by Latin American regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Major increase in Latin American economic development in the capitalist mode.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in the number and stability of democratic regimes in Latin America.
- Moderate increase in the adherence to human rights by Latin American regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Moderate increase in economic development in the capitalist mode.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in the number and stability of democratic regimes in Latin America.

- Moderate decrease in the adherence to human rights by Latin American regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Moderate decrease in economic development in the capitalist mode.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in the number and stability of democratic regimes in Latin America.
- Major decrease in the adherence to (or major increase in the violations of) human rights by Latin American regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Major decrease in economic development in the capitalist mode.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of democratic regimes in Latin America.
2. Status of human rights in Latin America (e.g., rights of person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest, or imprisonment).
3. Status of civil and political liberties in Latin America (e.g., freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
4. Adherence to constitutional principle by Latin American regimes.
5. Development and treatment of opposition parties in Latin America.
6. Percent of Latin American eligible voters who vote.
7. Extent to which power is vested in elected officials in Latin America.

8.5 Goal: Promote/Support the Political Stability of Latin American Countries

Outcome. Has the political stability of Latin American regimes increased? Have any friendly regimes in Latin America been wholly or partly overrun by forces hostile to the United States?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the political stability of Latin American countries has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major increase in the capabilities of friendly regimes to maintain domestic order.
- Major decrease in (or elimination of) the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against Latin American regimes.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) disputes (e.g., over borders) between Latin American countries.
- Major increase in the development and support of regional cooperation and organizations (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate increase in the capabilities of friendly regimes to maintain domestic order.
- Moderate decrease in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against Latin American regimes.
- Moderate decrease in disputes (e.g., over borders) between Latin American countries.
- Moderate increase in the development and support of regional cooperation and organizations (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).

3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:
 - Moderate decrease in the capabilities of friendly regimes to maintain domestic order.
 - Moderate increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against Latin American regimes.
 - Moderate increase in disputes (e.g., over borders) between Latin American countries.
 - Moderate decrease in the development and support of regional cooperation and organizations (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).
5. Greatly threatened/disrupted:
 - Major decrease in the capabilities of friendly regimes to maintain order or stay in power.
 - Major increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against Latin American regimes.
 - Major increase in disputes (e.g., over borders) between Latin American countries.
 - Major decrease in the development and support of regional cooperation and organizations (e.g., OAS, Rio Treaty, etc.).

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of friendly regimes in power.
2. Degree of threats/aggression by hostile insurgents against friendly Latin American regimes.
3. Capabilities of internal security forces of friendly Latin American regimes.

4. Capacity of insurgents to overthrow friendly Latin American regimes as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity and quality of their arms.
5. Overall domestic political stability in Latin America (e.g., governments' average length of time in office, peaceful succession of governments, etc.).
6. Friendly regimes' popular support.
7. Border disputes between Latin American countries.

9. U.S. Goals Toward Africa

9.1 Goal: Promote Peaceful Transition of African Countries to Independence

Outcome. Has the United States helped and/or promoted sub-Sahara African countries in peacefully reaching independence? Has there been increased independence? Has there been an increased movement towards "majority rule" in Africa?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American promotion for the peaceful transition to independence of African countries has:

1. Greatly increased/successful:

- Major increase in American encouragement of imperial powers (e.g., U.K., France, Portugal, etc.) to voluntarily decolonize in Africa.
- Major increase in American support for majority rule in southern Africa.
- Major increase in American promotion of U.N. involvement in difficult African decolonization cases (e.g., Rhodesia, South West Africa).
- Major increase in American discouragement of Soviet involvement in African countries fighting for independence.

2. Moderately increased/successful:

- Moderate increase in American encouragement of imperial powers (U.K., France, Portugal, etc.) to voluntarily decolonize in Africa.
- Moderate increase in American support for majority rule in Southern Africa.
- Moderate increase in American promotion of U.N. involvement in difficult African decolonization cases (e.g., Rhodesia, South West Africa).
- Moderate increase in American discouragement of Soviet involvement in African countries fighting for independence.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately decreased/unsuccessful:
 - Moderate decrease in American encouragement of imperial powers (e.g., U.K. France, Portugal, etc.) to voluntarily decolonize in Africa.
 - Moderate decrease in American support for majority rule in Southern Africa.
 - Moderate decrease in American promotion of U.N. involvement in difficult African decolonization cases (e.g., Rhodesia, South West Africa).
 - Moderate increase in Soviet involvement in African countries fighting for independence.
5. Greatly decreased/unsuccessful:
 - Major decrease in the imperial powers voluntary decolonization in Africa.
 - Major decrease in American support for majority rule in Southern Africa.
 - Major decrease in American promotion of U.N. involvement in difficult African decolonization cases (e.g., Rhodesia, South West Africa).
 - Major increase in Soviet involvement in African countries fighting for independence.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. U.S. support for decolonization in Africa.
2. Number of "independent" sub-Saharan African states.
3. Formal U.N. activities or participation in African decolonization process.
4. Status of U.S.-African diplomatic channels.

Notes. This goal is relevant primarily for American foreign policy in the 1960's as it relates to decolonization processes. In the 1970's, focus primarily on U.S. promotion of "majority rule" in Southern Africa.

9.2 Goal: Promote Economic Stability and Development of Sub-Saharan African Countries not Opposed by U.S.

Outcome. Has the United States established or expanded programs and policies to assist, economically develop, and stabilize sub-Saharan Africa?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, American support and promotion of the economic development/stability of African LDC's have been:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Africa.
- Major increase in U.S. support and encouragement of economic aid provided through multi-lateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) and of aid provided from former European colonial powers.
- Major increase in U.S.-supported programs for African infrastructure development.
- Major increase in U.S.-supported foreign and domestic investment in Africa.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Africa.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support and encouragement of economic aid provided through multi-lateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) and of aid provided from former European colonial powers.
- Moderate increase in U.S.-supported programs for African infrastructure development.
- Moderate increase in U.S.-supported foreign and domestic investment in Africa.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Africa.

- Moderate decrease in U.S. support and encouragement of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) and of aid provided from former European colonial powers.
- Moderate decrease in U.S.-supported programs for African infrastructure development.
- Moderate decrease in U.S.-supported foreign and domestic investment in Africa, etc.

5. Strongly decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. economic and technical assistance to Africa.
- Major decrease in U.S. support and encouragement of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) and of aid provided from former European colonial powers.
- Major decrease in U.S.-supported programs for African infrastructure development.
- Major decrease in U.S.-supported foreign and domestic investment in Africa.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. economic assistance programs (e.g., grants and loans) in sub-Saharan Africa.
2. Quantity and quality of U.S. development projects in sub-Saharan Africa.
3. U.S. economic credits to sub-Saharan Africa.
4. U.S. support of economic aid provided through multilateral channels (e.g., the World Bank, IMF, etc.) to sub-Saharan Africa.
5. U.S. encouragement of European countries (especially former colonial powers) taking action to assist Africa in developing.
6. U.S.-sponsored programs to offset African economic instability (e.g., inflation, unemployment).
7. U.S. support of African regional economic organizations.

9.3 Goal: Increase/Promote U.S. Economic Relations with African Countries.

Outcome. Has the United States' economic presence in Africa been significantly affected? Has the United States continued to promote its economic interests in Africa?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, U.S. economic relations with African countries have:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in U.S. trade and investment in Africa.
- Major increase in U.S. access to African resources and markets.
- Major increase in cooperative economic projects between the U.S. and African states.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. trade and investment in Africa.
- Moderate increase in U.S. access to African resources and markets.
- Moderate increase in cooperative economic projects between the U.S. and African states.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. trade and investment in Africa.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. access to African resources and markets.
- Moderate decrease in cooperative economic projects between the U.S. and African states.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. trade and investment in Africa.

- Major decrease in U.S. access to African resources and markets.
- Major decrease in cooperate economic projects between the U.S. and African states.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. trade to Africa.
2. African trade with U.S./total African trade.
3. Size of U.S. foreign investment in Africa.
4. Ability of U.S. to conduct business in Africa on at least a most-favored-nation basis.
5. Number of violent acts against U.S. commercial interests and property in Africa.
6. U.S. access to African raw materials.
7. Agreements between Africa and U.S. companies.
8. U.S. economic aid (e.g., loans and grants) to Africa.

9.4 Goal: Promote Democratic Institutions in Africa

Outcome. Was there any significant change in the status of African democratic institutions? Did any democratic regimes replace any authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in Africa?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, democratic institutions and free enterprise in sub-Saharan Africa have:

1. Greatly increased:

- Major increase in the number and stability of democratic institutions and regimes in Africa.
- Major increase in the adherence to human rights by African regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest imprisonment; right to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Major increase in African economic development in the capitalist mode.

2. Moderately increased:

- Moderate increase in the number and stability of democratic institutions and regimes in Africa.
- Moderate increase in the adherence to human rights by African regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech and the press).
- Major increase in African economic development in the capitalist mode.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately decreased:

- Moderate decrease in the number and stability of democratic institution and regimes in Africa.

- Moderate decrease in the adherence to (or moderate increases in the violations of) human rights by African regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Moderate decrease in African economic development in the capitalist mode.

5. Greatly decreased:

- Major decrease in the number and stability of democratic institutions and regimes in Africa.
- Major decrease in the adherence to (or major increase in the violations of) human rights by African regimes (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment; rights to civil and political liberties -- freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
- Major decrease in African economic development in the capitalist mode.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of democratic regimes in Africa and number of minority-ruled regimes.
2. Status of human rights in Africa (e.g., rights of the person -- freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, arbitrary arrest or imprisonment).
3. Status of civil and political liberties in Africa (e.g., freedom of thought, religion, assembly, speech, and the press).
4. Adherence to constitutional principles by African regimes.
5. Number of military coups in Africa.
6. Development and treatment of opposition parties in Africa.
7. Percent of African eligible voters who vote.

9.5 Goal: Promote/Support Non-Communist Political Stability in African Countries

Outcome. Has the ability of friendly African regimes to maintain political stability been significantly affected? Have any friendly African regimes been wholly or partly overrun by forces hostile to the United States or have any African regimes established closer ties with countries hostile to the United States?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the political stability of non-Communist African countries has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major increase in the capabilities of African non-Communist regimes to maintain domestic order.
- Major decrease in (or elimination of) the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against African non-Communist regimes.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) formal or informal acts (e.g., bases, advisers, equipment/facilities, etc.) establishing closer military relations between Africa and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries.
- Major decrease in (or elimination of) super-power conflict, border disputes, civil wars, and/or irredentism in or between African countries.
- Major increase in movements towards national unification in the African countries.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate increase in the capabilities of African non-Communist regimes to maintain domestic order.
- Moderate decrease in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against African non-Communist regimes.

- Moderate decrease in formal or informal acts (e.g., bases, advisers, equipment/facilities, etc.) establishing closer military relations between Africa and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries.
 - Moderate decrease in superpower conflict, border disputes, civil wars, and/or irredentism in or between African countries.
 - Moderate increase in the movement towards national unification in the African countries, etc.
3. Not significantly affected/changed.
4. Moderately disrupted/threatened.
- Moderate decrease in the capabilities of African non-Communist regimes to maintain domestic order.
 - Moderate increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against African non-Communist regimes.
 - Moderate increase in formal or informal acts (e.g., bases, advisers, equipment/facilities, etc.) establishing closer military relations between Africa and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries.
 - Moderate increase/escalation in superpower conflict, border disputes, civil wars, and/or irredentism in or between African countries.
 - Moderate decrease in the movement towards national unification in the African countries.
5. Greatly disrupted/threatened:
- Major decrease in the capabilities of African non-Communist regimes to maintain domestic order.
 - Major increase in the capacity of Communist/leftist insurgents to carry out acts of aggression against African non-Communist regimes.
 - Major increase in formal or informal acts (e.g., bases, advisers, equipment/facilities, etc.) establishing closer military relations between Africa and Cuba, the Eastern European bloc, or Asian Communist countries.

- Major increase/escalation in superpower conflict, border disputes, civil wars, and/or irredentism in or between African countries.
- Major decrease in the movement towards national unification in the African countries, etc.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Number of friendly African regimes in power.
2. Degree of threats/aggression by hostile insurgents against friendly African regimes.
3. Capabilities of internal security forces of friendly African regimes.
4. Capacity of insurgents to overthrow friendly African regimes as measured by their organizational and numerical strength, popular support, quantity and quality of arms.
5. Overall domestic political stability in Africa (e.g., tribal disputes, governments' average length of time in office, number of coups, peaceful succession of governments, etc.).
6. Popular support for friendly African regimes.
7. African border disputes.
8. Quantity and quality of formal or informal acts (e.g., bases, advisers, equipment/facilities, etc.) establishing closer relations between African countries and countries hostile to the United States.

9.6 Goal: Promote Security of Cape Route and Other Major Sea Lanes of Communications Around Africa

Outcome. Has the security of the Cape Route been significantly affected in any way? Has there been any hostile interdiction of African sea lanes of communication?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, the security of the Cape Route and other major sea lanes of communication around Africa has been:

1. Greatly enhanced/strengthened:

- Major increase in U.S. naval presence in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
- Major increase in U.K. and French military presence in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.
- Major decrease in (or absence of) Soviet naval and land facilities/bases in Africa.
- Major increase in the possibility of peaceful (gradual) transition to majority rule and stability in South Africa.

2. Moderately enhanced/strengthened:

- Moderate increase in U.S. naval presence in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
- Moderate increase in U.K. and French military presence in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.
- Moderate decrease in Soviet naval and land facilities/bases in Africa and/or ability to interdict sea lines of communication.
- Moderate increase in the possibility or actual realization of peaceful (gradual) transition to majority rule and stability in South Africa.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately threatened/disrupted:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. naval presence in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

- Moderate decrease in U.K. and French military presence in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.
- Moderate increase in Soviet naval and land facilities/bases in Africa and/or ability to interdict sea lines of communication.
- Moderate decrease in the possibility or actual realization of peaceful (gradual) transition to majority rule and stability in South Africa.

5. Strongly threatened/disrupted:

- Major decrease in U.S. naval presence in South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
- Major decrease in U.K. and French military presence in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic.
- Major increase in Soviet naval and land facilities/bases in Africa and/or ability to interdict sea lines of communication.
- Major decrease in possibility or actual realization of peaceful (gradual) transition to majority rule and stability in South Africa.

Measures. Relative change in:

1. Quantity and quality of U.S. naval presence in South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
2. Quantity and quality of British and French military presence in South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
3. U.S. facilities/military access in sub-Saharan Africa.
4. Quantity and quality of Soviet naval presence in South Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
5. Quantity of Soviet military bases in Africa and quality of Soviet basing rights.
6. Political stability in Southern Africa and movement toward wider nonwhite participation in government.

9.7 Goal: Promote Better Diplomatic Relations with Black African Countries

Outcome. Has the United States improved its relations with Black African countries? Have the United States' policies toward Africa been viewed positively by Black African regimes?

Outcome Assessment Question. One year (short-term)/five years (long-term) after the crisis, U.S. promotion of better diplomatic relations with Black Africa has been:

1. Greatly fulfilled/increased:

- Major increase in U.S. support for the liberalization of racial laws in South Africa.
- Major increase in U.S. support for a more rapid resolution of African disputes with Southern African white regimes.
- Major increase in U.S. pressure on Rhodesia/ South Africa for change in political and racial policies.
- Major increase in U.S. support for moderate African socialist countries.

2. Moderately fulfilled/increased:

- Moderate increase in U.S. support for the liberalization of racial laws in South Africa.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support for a more rapid resolution of African disputes with Southern African white regimes.
- Moderate increase in U.S. support for moderate African socialist countries.

3. Not significantly affected/changed.

4. Moderately offset/decreased:

- Moderate decrease in U.S. support for the liberalization of racial laws in South Africa.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support for a more rapid resolution of African disputes with Southern African white regimes.

- Moderate decrease in U.S. pressure on Rhodesia/ South Africa for change in political and racial policies.
- Moderate decrease in U.S. support for moderate African socialist countries.

5. Greatly offset/decreased:

- Major decrease in U.S. support for the liberalization of racial laws in South Africa.
- Major decrease in U.S. support for a more rapid resolution of African disputes with Southern African white regimes.
- Major decrease in U.S. pressure on Rhodesia/ South Africa for change in political and racial policies.
- Major decrease in U.S. support for moderate African socialist countries.

Measures. Relative changes in:

1. Cooperation between the United States and Black African countries as measured by events data sources (e.g., WEIS).
2. Black African perception of U.S. policies toward Southern Africa.
3. U.S. policies towards Rhodesia and Republic of South Africa.
4. Status of diplomatic channels between the U.S. and Black Africa (size of missions).
5. OAU resolutions concerning the United States (positive or negative).
6. U.S. relations with "front line" states in Southern Africa.

Notes. This goal is primarily relevant for the Ford and Carter administrations.

APPENDIX B. SOVIET CRISIS GOALS

CRISIS DESCRIPTION

This part of the coding form is provided for writing a general narrative description of the crisis. All relevant information, notes, and reminders that the coder gathers for the crisis can be written in this space. In addition, there are a number of standard questions listed in the corresponding subsection of the U.S. crisis goals appendix that are provided in order to focus the data collection phase of the research on the most relevant information.

SELECTED GENERAL POSTCRISIS VARIABLES

In addition to the crisis-specific goals, which are the focus of the present project, a small number of variables were collected at 1 and 5 year intervals, postcrisis. These indicators provide contextual information and background for users of the data at DARPA's Demonstration and Development Facility. The indicators collected for the Soviet Union are:

- Communist Party Membership (Hoover Institute, Yearbook of International Communist Affairs and Department of State, World Strength of the Communist Party Organization).
- Trade with the Soviet Union as a percentage of total trade (UN Yearbook of International Trade Statistics).
- Soviet Military commitments (From the DARPA-sponsored Threat Recognition and Analysis Project conducted at the University of Southern California).

GOAL RELEVANCE

The relevance of a goal to a crisis is coded whenever a primary or secondary Soviet goal is threatened by an adversary.

Primary goals are those that are most directly related to the crisis involvement of the Soviet Union or are most directly threatened by its adversaries.

Secondary goals are those that by themselves are unlikely to lead to Soviet involvement or are indirectly threatened by the crisis.

Relevance is defined fairly narrowly to avoid over-coding. Primary goals are the first priority in coding.

THREAT TO GOALS

The level of threat to each primary and secondary goal in the more selective sets of nation-specific goals are coded separately. The level of threat for each relevant goal is judged separately and by its own standards. There is no common standard such as monetary costs or psychological value by which all goals are to be judged comparatively.

Level of Threat to Soviet Goals During the Crisis Period¹

1. EL Goal/value is in no significant danger.
2. VL Goal/value is in minor danger and requires very modest efforts to save it.
3. L Goal/value is in moderate danger requiring small sacrifices to save it.
4. M Goal/value is in moderate danger requiring moderate sacrifice to save it.
5. H Goal/value is in high danger requiring costly but limited sacrifice to save it.

6. VH Goal/value is in very high danger requiring massive and unlimited sacrifice to save it.
7. EH Goal/value is in danger of extinction, not even massive Soviet effort may save it.

RELIABILITY

Reliability of information used to code relevance, outcomes, and causal linkages are coded by a 7-point scale.

Reliability of Codes

1. EL Missing Data.
2. VL Codes are based on coder judgment and relatively unreliable information, for example precedent Soviet actions, objectives.
3. L Codes are based on limited information and informed coder judgments.
4. M Codes are based on reliable information with a few major inconsistencies.
5. H Codes are based on reliable information with minor inconsistencies.
6. VH Codes are based on highly reliable and consistent data.
7. EH No significant doubt about reliability of codes.

TYPE OF DATA SOURCE

The type of data that are primary sources of coding are indicated by seven codes.

¹ As is the case with other scales, these values were collapsed where deemed necessary.

Primary Source of Data

1. Soviet sources in Russian or Western translations.
2. Soviet sources in English (Soviet translations only).
3. Journalistic Western sources.
4. Scholarly Western sources.
5. Anti-Soviet literature (code in preference to 3 or 4).
6. Coder inference from a mix of sources.
7. Other.

OUTCOMES

The outcome of each Soviet crisis was originally coded as a level variable and then converted into a change variable to correspond with the U.S. data. It was necessary to adopt this strategy because primary Soviet data were more often available in the form of "levels" rather than "changes." Hence the variables were coded three times:

1. Before crisis,
2. 1-year after crisis,
3. 5-year after crisis.

The before crisis data were then used as a "benchmark" by which change was measured.

IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON THE OUTCOME

The impact of the crisis on the outcome variable is a measure of the degree to which the crisis could have led to (or caused) an outcome.

1. EL Insignificant or nonexistent causal linkage.
2. VL Minor but likely causal linkage.
3. L Weak causal linkage with many exogenous factors equally likely.
4. M Moderate causal link with many possible alternative causal factors.
5. H Strong causal link with several moderately exogenous factors.
6. VH Very strong causal link with a few weak exogenous factors.
7. EH Complete and powerful causal linkage.

CRISIS GOALS

Crisis-specific goals are detailed for the following general categories of Soviet interest:

- Soviet ideological goals,
- Soviet interparty goals,
- Soviet stability goals,
- Soviet military goals,
- Soviet economic goals,
- Soviet goals toward capitalist countries,
- Soviet goals toward Europe,
- Soviet goals toward the Third World,
- Soviet goals toward Asia,
- Soviet goals toward the Middle East and South Asia,
- Soviet goals toward Africa, and
- Soviet goals toward Latin America.

1. Soviet Ideological Goals

1.1 Goal: Support Marxist-Leninist Ideology

Outcome. To what degree did the Soviet Union give support to legitimate² Marxist-Leninist groups under threat in the countries in the crisis?

Measures:

1. Soviet military support.
2. Soviet financial support.
3. Soviet logistical support of another Communist army going to assistance of the CP (e.g., Cubans in Ethiopia).
4. Soviet diplomatic support (e.g., at the U.N.).
5. Soviet verbal/moral support.
6. Limited Soviet covert operation support.
7. Soviet naval demonstrations.
8. Soviet advisory support.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union often does not publicize its aid to CP's, particularly when they are in a country where such aid would prove embarrassing if publicized (e.g., the Italian CP).

Outcome Assessment Question. Support for Marxist-Leninist Groups:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Limited diplomatic support with full moral support.
3. L Moderate to low financial support with full diplomatic support.
4. M Large financial support with minor military assistance.
5. H Limited Soviet naval deployment.
6. VH Limited Soviet ground/air forces deployment.

² A "legitimate" Marxist-Leninist group is one which is not Maoist or openly anti-Soviet and is recognized by the Soviet Union as a fraternal party or movement. Groups declaring themselves Marxist-Leninist but not yet recognized by the Soviet Union as legitimate are excluded from consideration in coding.

7. EH Complete military support for the groups
(unlimited support).

Notes. The escalatory nature of support is not a neatly continuous or cumulative set of actions. Therefore, the coder should exercise a good deal of judgment before assigning a code to the level of Soviet support for Marxist-Leninist groups in a crisis. Nevertheless, there is evidence supporting the proposition that at least some varieties of Soviet aid form at least a rough cumulative scale (Squires, 1976).

1.2 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Ideological Unity of the Fraternal Communist Parties

Outcome. Did the unity of fraternal Communist parties remain high or decline?

Measures.

1. Did the level of criticism of policies of CPSU increase?
2. Did any member of Warsaw Pact attack common policies?
3. Did any of the CP's advocate regionalism?
4. Did any CP publicly attack CPSU's foreign policy?
5. Did the unity of CP's over approach to world revolution decline?
6. How many CP's broke away from the "pro-Soviet" line to join Maoists, Trotskyites, or any other renegade groups?
7. Did any CP's take adventurist roads against the advice of CPSU and other pragmatic CP's?

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union sees narrow nationalism, regionalism, adventurism, dogmatism, revisionism, and reformism as major dangers to the unity of the fraternal parties.

Definition: In the Soviet Union's view, fraternal CP's exclude all Maoist parties. Yugoslavia rejoined the list of fraternal parties after the 20th CPSU Congress.

From Soviet viewpoint unity requires some degree of discipline and is not compatible with a situation in which CP's frequently criticize each other publicly.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Unity of Fraternal Parties:

1. EL Complete disunity with no identifiable groupings.
2. VL Large scale disunity with more than two major groups.
3. L Large scale disunity with two major groups.
4. M Moderate disunity with one major and one minor group.

5. H Frequent criticisms of common policies but no break on major issues.
6. VH Complete unity except for occasional public criticisms.
7. EH Complete unity with no significant public criticism of common policies.

Notes. Since the Sino-Soviet dispute took an ideological flavor, the level of unity of CP's has ranged from moderate to low. Under Stalin, unity was high to very high and perhaps even extremely high.

1.3 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Ideological Leadership of CPSU

Outcome. Did the prestige and historical leadership role of CPSU in the ideological field remain high? Did the leadership of CPSU receive any major new challenge from another CP?

Measures.

1. Did any CP's attack the CPSU as hegemonic?
2. Did any CP's assert that the CPSU has inappropriate historical experience for their countries' path toward socialism?
3. Did any CP's join China against the Soviet Union?
4. Did any European CP's advocate regionalism (i.e., Euro-Communism)?
5. Did the ideological prestige of CPSU suffer from any of its actions?
6. Did the CPSU leadership experience any disunity or succession crisis that gave away some of their initiative in ideological matters concerning world Communism?

Technical Notes. Since Soviet leaders always deny any desire for the tangible rewards of a leadership role among world CP's, the coder will have to make inferences from their speeches and actions as well as from the behavior of other CP's. The Italian CP's reactions are often key signals.

"Ideological leadership" is defined as a role in which a CP maintains initiative in interpreting Marxist-Leninist doctrines in a manner consistent with its own preferences and persuades other CP's to adopt a similar interpretation. The instruments of persuasion need not be coercive. There could be logical reasoning or the historical prestige of the persuader.

Outcome Assessment Question. Ideological Leadership of CPSU Among CP's:

1. EL No significant CP accepts the leadership of CPSU.
2. VL Only a small group of major CP's accepts leadership of CPSU.
3. L Many CP's challenge CPSU for the leadership role.
4. M Most CP's accept CPSU leadership but with frequent criticism.

5. H Only a few significant CP's do not accept CPSU leadership.
6. VH Only a few insignificant CP's do not accept CPSU leadership.
7. EH Absolute leadership; no significant challenge.

Notes. During the period of Sino-Soviet conflict ideological leadership of CPSU has been at least moderate and generally high to very high. Under Stalin the post-World War II CPSU leadership was very high to extremely high.

1.4 Goal: Support Progressive Ideologies (Other Than Marxism-Leninism)

Outcome. To what extent did the Soviet Union give support to progressive movements? To what degree did the Soviet Union come to the aid of progressive groups under threat from reactionary forces?

Measures.

1. Soviet military support.
2. Soviet financial support.
3. Soviet logistical support of another Communist army going to the assistance of a progressive group.
4. Soviet diplomatic support.
5. Soviet verbal/moral support.
6. Limited Soviet covert-operation support.
7. Soviet naval demonstration.
8. Soviet advisory support.

Technical Notes. Covert operations of the Soviet Union are generally not covered in open sources.

The Soviet Union traditionally has symbolically supported most progressive movements but has given material assistance in relatively few cases.

A progressive movement is defined as any group struggling for popular causes such as national liberation, economic independence, racial equality, and political equality. Groups that challenge the Soviet Union's own record in these areas or support the anti-Soviet policies of China are excluded.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support for Progressive Groups:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Limited diplomatic support with full moral support.
3. L Large financial support with full diplomatic support.
4. M Limited Soviet naval demonstration.
5. H Soviet military assistance (mainly materiel).

6. VH Limited Soviet ground/air forces deployment.

7. EH Large-scale military support for the groups.

Notes. The escalatory nature of support is not a neatly continuous or cumulative set of actions. Therefore, the coder should exercise a good deal of judgment before assigning a code to the level of Soviet support for progressive groups in a crisis.

2. Soviet Interparty Goals

2.1 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Leadership of CPSU in International Policymaking of CP's

Outcome. Did CP's support of CPSU foreign policy decline/increase? Did any CP's seriously challenge the de facto leadership of the CPSU in international policy-making for the world Communist movement?

Measures.

1. Did any CP publicly attack CPSU's foreign policy?
2. Did any CP join China/Albania CP's in criticizing the CPSU's foreign policy program?
3. Did any CP's challenge the CPSU for the leadership of CP's foreign policy?
4. Did any CP's claim the right to publicly deviate from the CPSU and other CP's on foreign policy issues?
5. Did any CP's support foreign policy positions of reactionary and capitalist groups?
6. Did any CP's advocate formation of CP's foreign policy according to regional groups that exclude CPSU? (e.g., European or Asian groups that exclude the Soviet Union.)

Technical Notes. Some degree of overlap with ideological variables should be expected since interparty and ideological goals are not mutually exclusive.

Much of the effort of the Soviet Union in pursuit of the above goal is directed toward keeping the foreign policies of CP's along the mainstream of Marxism-Leninism as defined by the USSR. This generally involves taking conservative positions and discouraging extremism and adventurism while preventing the right and left extremes from forming splinter groups.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support by World CP's for the CPSU's Foreign Policy Leadership:

1. EL No significant support by any major CP's.
2. VL Support by only a small group of small CP's.
3. L Support by only a group of CP's (including some major CP's).
4. M Support by most CP's except a small group of CP's (including a few large CP's).

5. H Support by most CP's except a small group of CP's.
6. VH Support by all CP's except occasional criticism by a few small parties.
7. EH Complete support by all CP's.

Notes. On balance, support for the CPSU's foreign policy leadership has always been moderate or higher; however, such a measurement -- even while felt necessary for the coding system utilized in this study -- can obscure both the dynamic, issue-oriented fluctuations and the limitations of such support, especially by CP's outside, or desiring to be outside, Moscow's sphere of military control. Under Stalin, support was high to extremely high.

2.2 Goal: Maintain/Enhance Unity of CP's in Foreign Affairs

Outcome. Did the unity of CP's in the foreign policy field increase/decrease? Did the number of CP's supporting the common internationalist policies of CP's decline? Did any CP's support China's foreign policy?

Measures.

1. Did any CP's publicly criticize the common policies of CP's?
2. Did any CP's withdraw their support from common policies?
3. Did any CP's join China on foreign policy issues?
4. Did any CP's form a splinter group on foreign policy issues?
5. Did any CP's support reactionary foreign policies?
6. Did any CP's give aid to anti-Soviet groups in other countries?

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union's attempt to maintain the foreign policy unity of CP's is closely related to its efforts to maintain a leadership role in the foreign policy formulation of the world Communist movement. Therefore, the measures for the outcomes of both goals are nearly identical. However, the coder should try to distinguish between attempts at leadership and efforts to maintain unity wherever feasible.

Outcome Assessment Question. Unity of CP's in Foreign Policy Field:

1. EL Complete disunity, many changing factions.
2. VL High disunity with several major hostile groupings.
3. L Disunity with two major hostile groupings.
4. M Unity is broken by a small group of CP's (including a major CP).
5. H Unity is broken by a small grouping of CP's.
6. VH Unity is broken only occasionally by a few small CP's.
7. EH Complete unity; no significant dissent by any CP's.

Notes. The foreign policy unity of CP's has generally been no lower than moderate. Under Stalin, unity was high to extremely high. Since the initiation of the Sino-Soviet dispute it has ranged from moderate to high.

2.3 Goal: Give Support to CP's in Developed Capitalist Countries

Outcome. Did the Soviet Union give support to CP's in capitalist countries?

Measures.

1. Financial support.
2. Political support.
3. Diplomatic support.
4. Military support.
5. Moral/verbal support.
6. Covert operation support.

Technical Notes. The nature or amount of Soviet aid to other CP's is seldom known publicly; some European sources provide speculation, as does the U.S. independent left press.

It is assumed that anti-Soviet CP's are not eligible for Soviet aid and should not be coded.

It is assumed that for this goal the important variables are Soviet acts in support of CP's rather than what happened to the CP's themselves. In otherwords, a favorable image of Soviet actions in assisting fraternal parties is the major Soviet goal.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Support to CP's in Developed Capitalist Countries:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral/verbal support.
3. L Diplomatic support.
4. M Small financial aid only.
5. H Moderate financial aid only.
6. VH Large financial aid with small covert operations.
7. EH Large financial aid with covert military aid.

Notes. Soviet support to CP's in the developed capitalist countries has apparently fluctuated greatly but it has generally been moderate or less.

2.4 Goal: Give Support to CP's in Developing Countries

Outcome. Did the Soviet Union give support to CP's in developing countries?

Measures.

1. Military support.
2. Diplomatic support.
3. Financial support.
4. Political support.
5. Moral/verbal support.
6. Covert operation support.

Technical Notes. The nature or amount of Soviet aid to CP's is seldom known publicly.

It is assumed that anti-Soviet CP's are not eligible for Soviet aid and should not be coded.

It is assumed that for this goal the major Soviet concern is how the world, and particularly progressive groups, viewed Soviet generosity towards CP's in developing countries rather than what actually happened to the CP's.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support to CP's in Developing Countries:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral/verbal support.
3. L Small financial support
4. M Large financial support with limited military aid.
5. H Naval deployment and limited military aid.
6. VH Limited land/air force deployment.
7. EH Unlimited military support.

Notes. The coding range for this goal outcome is much greater than for the preceding goal outcome. This is because the USSR is much more likely to take actions that could be risky in support of CP's in developing countries than in developed capitalist countries.

Soviet support for CP's in developing countries has generally been low to extremely low. However, as Soviet overseas military presence increases, Soviet support for CP's in developing countries may begin to increase.

3. Soviet Stability Goals

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3.1 Goal: Maintain/Restore Domestic Stability

Outcome. Did any part of the Soviet Union experience political instability, turmoil, unruly demonstrations, riots, or terrorism?

Measures.

1. Riots.
2. Revolts.
3. Demonstrations (unauthorized or unruly ones only).
4. Assassinations.
5. Acts of terrorism.
6. Hijackings.
7. Mutinies.
8. Strikes.

Technical Notes. Only events linked to international crises are relevant, for example, unruly demonstrations by Chinese students in Moscow in the 1960's.

Ignore all orderly demonstrations that have apparent backing of the Soviet Government.

Include events that are related to the nationalities problem. Even though this may lead to some degree of double coding, it is justified because of its implications for domestic stability in addition to its more direct relevance for the issue of the "nationalities problem."

Coverage of this factor in open source materials is poor; some data are available in Soviet dissidents' writings.

Outcome Assessment Question. Domestic Stability:

1. EL Widespread major instabilities of all types.
2. VL Frequent, escalating major incidents.
3. L Frequent, related major incidents.
4. M Isolated, frequent major incidents.
5. H Isolated, infrequent major incidents.

6. VH Isolated, infrequent minor incidents.

7. EH No significant incidents.

Notes. During the post-World War II period, Soviet domestic stability has been generally high to very high.

3.2 Goal: Prevent External Interference in Soviet Domestic Affairs

Outcome. Did the level of external interference in Soviet domestic affairs (e.g., domestic politics, human rights of Soviet citizens, operations of Soviet economy, and so on) increase? (Did the Soviet perception of such interference change?)

Measures.

1. Interference in Soviet political processes.
2. Interference in the operations of the Soviet economy.
3. Interference in the development/operations of the Soviet armed forces.
4. Interference in the Soviet legal system.
5. Interference in the affairs of the Soviet nationalities.
6. Interference in the civil and political rights of Soviet citizens.
7. Sending hostile propaganda into the Soviet Union from outside.
8. Sending material assistance to Soviet dissidents, terrorists, or political deviants from outside.
9. Harboring Soviet refugees hostile to the Soviet Union.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union may sometimes blame outsiders for disturbances that are unrelated to outside interference. On the other hand, it may deemphasize external interference in order not to appear weak against external threats.

Outcome Assessment Question. Absence of External Interference:

1. EL Widespread, systematic infiltration and subversion attempts from outside.
2. VL Infrequent infiltration of men and material.
3. L Hostile propaganda encouraging instability, but no infiltration of men and material.
4. M Critical propaganda but not excessively hostile.
5. H Infrequent but strongly critical propaganda.

6. VH Infrequent and mild critical comments aimed at Soviet population.
7. EH No significant incidence or accusation of interference.

Notes. For calibration purposes the following may be useful: during the worst period of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War (e.g., the 1950's), the Soviet Union experienced very low "absence of external interference" while its experience since 1972 has been in the moderate to very high range.

"Absence of external interference" is coded because the Soviet goal is to maximize this variable. Alternatively, the goal can be stated in terms of minimizing external interference.

3.3 Goal: Maintain/Restore Stability of Non-Russian Nationalities in the Soviet Union

Outcome. Did any of the Soviet national states experience significant national agitation, disturbances, riots, or rebellions?

Measures.

1. Nationalist public criticisms of Soviet system of government.
2. Demonstration/protests demanding nationalist autonomy.
3. Demand by states to establish or reestablish the use of national languages.
4. Accusations of discrimination from nationalists against the Soviet Government.
5. Nationalist riots and/or unruly protests/demonstrations.
6. Nationalist acts of terror, hijacking, or assassination.
7. Nationalist rebellions or mutinies.
8. High receptivity by national groups to anti-Soviet and anti-Russian propaganda.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Government generally is reluctant to publicize cases of nationalistic agitation and often tries to attribute such events to other causes such as social hooliganism, nonpolitical criminals, and interference from the outside. Dissident publications sometimes contain reports.

Outcome Assessment Question. Stability of Nationalities:

1. EL Widespread rebellion by nationalities in two or more states.
2. VL Widespread rebellion by one national group.
3. L Isolated but frequent major events by groups.
4. M Isolated but frequent minor agitation by groups.
5. H Isolated, infrequent minor agitation by groups.
6. VH Isolated, infrequent agitation efforts by individuals.
7. EH No significant incident of nationalist agitation.

Notes. For calibration purposes the following examples may be useful: (1) the Soviet Union experienced very low to extremely low levels of stability among national groups during the 1919-1922 period; (2) since 1960 the experience of stability has been moderate to very high.

Agitation by Jewish groups is hard to classify because large numbers of Jews identify themselves as Russians (rather than a non-Russian nationality) and they are not concentrated in one region. At the same time, internal passport regulations help to foster a sense of ethnic identity. Therefore, it is often difficult to relate agitation by individuals and small groups to the dispersed Jewish population at large.

4. Soviet Military Goals

171

4.1 Goal: Defend the First Socialist State (Soviet Union) Against External Threats

Outcome. Did the Soviet Union remain safe from conquest, threats of aggressive neighbors, and military blackmail by capitalist countries? Did the security of the Soviet Union increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Did the Soviet Union remain militarily secure (unconquered)?
2. Did any part of the Soviet Union (population, economy, etc.) suffer attack by or damage from hostile military forces?
3. Did any part of the Soviet borders get crossed by hostile military forces?
4. Did the Soviet Union successfully repulse intruders?
5. Did the credibility of the Soviet Union to defend herself remain high?
6. Did the Soviet armed forces receive any setbacks in border skirmishes or overseas military actions?
7. Was Soviet airspace violated by hostile aircraft with no effective countermeasures?
8. Did any hostile neighbor act aggressively against the Soviet Union and mobilize for war with no apparent concern about Soviet responses?
9. Did any neighboring country stockpile strategic nuclear arms aimed at Soviet population centers?

Technical Notes. This outcome should be coded with regard to Soviet security in specific relevant areas closest to the zone of crisis. For example, a Far East crisis may threaten the security of Soviet Far Eastern regions.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Soviet Union's Security:

1. EL Large-scale invasion or nuclear devastation of Soviet Union.
2. VL Partial invasion of Soviet Union.
3. L High likelihood of military attack.

4. M Potential threat from an adversary that is weaker than the Soviet Union but strong enough to be able to damage the Soviet Union and reckless enough to try.
5. H Potential threat from an adversary capable of partially conquering the Soviet Union but unlikely to do so.
6. VH Potential but unlikely threat of military attack from a powerful adversary (e.g., NATO in the 1970's).
7. EH No serious threat from any hostile forces.

Notes. The coder should approach the problem of assessing Soviet security problems from a Soviet perspective.

For calibration purposes use the following examples:

- o Soviet security on the Iranian border during the 1960's was extremely high.
- o Security against the NATO threat during the 1970's was very high.
- o Security against NATO during the 1960's was high.
- o Security against China in the late 1960's was moderate.
- o Security against China in the 1990's may prove to be low.
- o Security against Nazi Germany during 1941-1944 was very low.
- o Security against external enemies during 1919-1922 was extremely low.

In general an extremely high level of security would be one in which military forces of potential adversaries are relatively weak and/or are not deployed in any aggressive/offensive posture against the Soviet Union.

An extremely low security situation would be one in which the Soviet Union sustains large scale nuclear devastation or destructive invasion or is subject to such destruction with no significant retaliatory potential.

4.1.1 Goal: Avoid Worldwide Nuclear War

Outcome. The most relevant outcome is: Did the Soviet Union avoid nuclear war? However, a more useful outcome measure is did the Soviet Union manage to keep the likelihood of nuclear war at a low level?

Measures.

1. Likelihood of nuclear war.
2. Level of international tensions.
3. Level of U.S.-Soviet tensions (Soviet perception).
4. Level of U.S.-Soviet tensions (U.S. perception).
5. Level of U.S.-Soviet tensions (third country perceptions).
6. Avoidance of superpower military confrontation.
7. Avoidance of adventurism³ against capitalist countries.

Technical Note. Assess the period as a whole rather than its end point. For instance, if the period under evaluation involved a major crisis but the crisis was followed by a period of detente do not evaluate the likelihood of war at the end point of the period alone. Focus on the crisis itself.

Outcome Assessment Question. Likelihood of Worldwide Nuclear War:

1. EH Period of high tension, numerous crises, and frequent incidents of brinkmanship among major powers.
2. VH Period of high tension with numerous crises but superpowers are careful to control the level of tension as well as frequency and type of hostile interaction.
3. H Period of high tension and occasional major crises but superpowers trying to cooperate in reducing the risks of war.
4. M Period of moderate tension with occasional major crises but little risk of nuclear war.

³ "Adventurism" in this context refers to a situation in which a socialist country/group attempts to bring about political/military change to its advantage with inadequate means or follows policies that have a high likelihood of resulting in major setbacks for the socialist countries.

5. L Period of occasional crises but little risk of superpower conflict.
6. VL Period of occasional minor crises but no risk of escalation.
7. EL Period of no significant tension or arms races.

Notes. For calibration purposes use the following examples:

- During the Cuban crisis of 1962 the threat of worldwide nuclear war was very high.
- During the 1948 Berlin crisis the threat was very high.
- During the 1961 Berlin crisis the threat was moderate to high.
- During the 1973 Middle East war the threat was low to moderate.
- During the 1972 U.S.-Soviet summit the threat was extremely low.

4.2 Goal: Defend the Fraternal Socialist Countries and the Three Strategically Located Neutral Countries in Europe (Finland, Austria, and Sweden)

Outcome. Did any of the fraternal socialist countries or the three neutral European nations become wholly or partly overrun by military forces from any source hostile to Soviet interests? Did any of the countries have to submit to external threat? (e.g., blackmail by capitalist countries.)

Measures.

1. Overthrow of friendly regimes.
2. Transition to anti-Soviet foreign policy.
3. Military takeover by agents of capitalist or reactionary elements.
4. Successful aggression by anti-Soviet military blocs.
5. Successful military blackmail by anti-Soviet military blocs.
6. Military power of Soviet Union.
7. Military power of Soviet Union versus NATO countries.
8. Military power of Soviet Union versus the U.S.
9. Military power of Soviet Union versus China.
10. Military power of Soviet Union versus all major potential adversaries (U.S., China, Germany, France, U.K., Japan, Iran, Turkey).
11. Military power of Warsaw Pact countries versus NATO countries.

Technical Notes. Measures 6 through 11 are indicators of deterrent capability.

Outcome Assessment Question. Security of Socialist Countries (Plus Three Neutral European Countries):

1. EL Country is or can be overrun by a hostile and aggressive power (e.g. Laos by China in 1979).

2. VL Country is or can be partly occupied at considerable cost by a hostile and aggressive country (e.g., Vietnam in 1979).
3. L Country is vulnerable to conquest by hostile forces at great cost (e.g., East Germany in 1948).
4. M Country is vulnerable to conquest by hostile forces but invasion is unlikely.
5. H Country is vulnerable to attack but not conquest (e.g., Mongolia).
6. VH Country is vulnerable to attack only in an extreme situation (e.g., Bulgaria).
7. EH No significant military threat to any of the countries.

Notes. It is important to take Soviet military deterrent forces into consideration when coding the security of socialist states and the three neutral European countries.

Other factors remaining the same, the countries closest to the Soviet Union would be the safest. For instance, Bulgaria is more secure than Cuba.

Similarly, the closer a country is to a potential adversary the more it is insecure. For instance, Laos is more insecure (by being close to China) than Cambodia.

4.3 Goal: Support Progressive and Democratic Forces Abroad

Outcome. Did the Soviet Union establish/maintain/improve relations with progressive/democratic forces through material assistance to progressive/democratic regimes and movements abroad? (Did the Soviet Union successfully deter imperialist threats of aggression against such regimes and movements?)

Measures.

1. Material assistance (aid).
2. Logistical support.
3. Military advisory support.
4. Soviet naval demonstration.
5. Limited land/air forces deployment.
6. Unlimited military support.
7. Use of military threats (verbal).

Technical Notes. Ideally this goal outcome should be assessed in terms of security needs (or level of threat) rather than by an absolute standard. However, for this study, the coder should concentrate on the level of Soviet military support and disregard its relation to need (or threat levels).

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Soviet Military Support to Progressive/Democratic Forces Abroad:

1. EL Moral support only/no material assistance.
2. VL Low-level material aid.
3. L Moderate-scale material aid.
4. M Small-scale logistical support and advisory presence and/or large scale material aid.
5. H Large-scale logistical support and advisory presence.
6. VH Limited troop deployment on a small scale.
7. EH Large-scale troop deployment.

Notes. For calibration purposes use the following examples:

- Soviet support for the Western allies during the 1944 Ardennes German counteroffensive was extremely high.
- Soviet support for Egypt in 1970 was very high.
- Soviet support for China in 1951-1952 was moderate to high.
- Soviet support for North Yemen in 1968 was low to moderate.
- Soviet support for Nigeria in 1968-1969 was low.
- Soviet support for Chile in 1973 was extremely low.

Note that none of the codes in the above examples take the level of threat into consideration (see Technical Note).

4.4 Goal: Increase the Prestige of the Soviet Armed Forces

Outcome. Did the Soviet armed forces increase their prestige and deterrent capability through their actions during the crisis?

Measures.

1. Receptivity to Soviet military aid.
2. Receptivity to Soviet military presence in the region.
3. Perception of increased credibility of Soviet deterrent ability among other countries.
4. Successful conduct of military operations (including exercises and demonstration of force).
5. Results of actual "use" of deterrence capability.
6. Actual Soviet-U.S. military balance.

Technical Notes. In cases where the result of actions are highly ambiguous the coder should use the Soviet-U.S. and Soviet-China military balances to assess Soviet military prestige.

This could be considered an "instrumental" goal used to achieve other aims/outcomes that are also valued and pursued in their own right. However, Soviet military writers often treat it as an end in itself.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Soviet Military Prestige:

1. EL Unsuccessful deterrence of minor adversaries and/or successive major military failures.
2. VL Unsuccessful deterrence of middle level powers and/or several military setbacks in strategically important regions.
3. L Unsuccessful deterrence of a major power and/or minor military setbacks against other countries.
4. M Ambiguous outcomes of deterrence actions; high Soviet military capability but uncertainty about its utility; stalemate situation against all military adversaries.
5. H Successful deterrence of minor powers' aggression with no major military setbacks in other areas.

6. VH Successful deterrence of middle level powers' aggression (e.g., Japan or Germany) with no significant military setbacks in other cases.
7. EH Successful deterrence of a major aggressor (e.g., China or U.S.) and/or perception of very high Soviet capability among other countries with no military setbacks.

Notes. Soviet military prestige reached its zenith during 1944 when the Soviet Army was rolling back the German army in East Europe seemingly at will. However, the U.S. acquisition of the atomic bomb and the swift advance of the U.S. Army in West Europe during 1945 reduced the relative prestige of the Soviet military forces. The postwar Stalin and Khrushchev purges of the Soviet armed forces did not help their prestige. Since the early 1960's, the Soviet military prestige has been gradually increasing from a low to moderate range to a moderate to extremely high range.

5. Soviet Economic Goals

5.1 Goal: Increase the Economic Capacity of the Soviet Union at a Rapid Rate

Outcome. Did the Soviet economy grow at a historically rapid rate? If not, did the rate appear rapid for recent years? If not, did the rate slow because of exogenous natural and internal causes?

Measures.

1. Output/world GNP.
2. Output/GNP of U.S.
3. Output/GNP of industrialized countries.
4. Output/GNP of OECD countries.
5. Output/GNP of socialist countries.
6. Output compared to Soviet economic growth since 1920.
7. Output compared to Soviet economic growth since 1946.
8. Output compared to Soviet economic growth since 1960.
9. Output compared to Soviet economic growth since 1970.

Technical Notes. The Soviet economic growth rate has declined greatly from the spectacular rates of the post-World War II reconstruction period. Most observers expect the growth rate to remain well below 6 percent per annum because of the maturity of the economy, slow birth rate of the population, and gradual shift in investment patterns to more emphasis on consumer goods. Some experts also believe that the high defense burden may slow economic growth rates.

Outcome Assessment Question. Growth Rate of Soviet Economy (Percent Average Annual):

1. EL Soviet GNP growth \leq 0.25 x OECD growth.
2. VL Soviet GNP growth \approx 0.33 x OECD growth.
3. L Soviet GNP growth \approx 0.5 x OECD growth.
4. M Soviet GNP growth \approx 1 x OECD growth.
5. H Soviet GNP growth \approx 2 x OECD growth.
6. VH Soviet GNP growth \approx 3 x OECD growth.
7. EH Soviet GNP growth \geq 4 x OECD growth.

Notes. In cases where the growth rates do not fit any of the above codes they should be rounded.

5.2 Goal: Increase Economic Cooperation With Fraternal Socialist Countries

Outcome. Did the level of economic cooperation with fraternal socialist countries increase? Did the socialist economies become more specialized and integrated? Did their economic plans become more coordinated?

Measures.

1. Trade with socialist countries/total trade.
2. Trade with socialist countries/GNP of socialist countries.
3. Trade with socialist countries/GNP of USSR and GNP of socialist countries.
4. Trade agreements with socialist countries.
5. Trade with socialist countries/previous levels of trade.
6. Degree of cooperation in development of regional resources.
7. Degree of coordination of economic plans.
8. Degree of cooperation in specialization of industry.
9. Degree of cooperation and investment in developing regional transportation.
10. Degree of economic assistance to the weaker members of the socialist community.

Technical Notes. Soviet trade shares with socialist countries should be a function of transportation cost (distance) and the types of export commodities available in the socialist countries.

Outcome Assessment Question. Trade of Fraternal Socialist Countries With the Soviet Union:

1. EL Two percent or less of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.
2. VL Five percent of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.
3. L Ten percent of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.

4. M Twenty percent of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.
5. H Thirty percent of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.
6. VH Forty percent of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.
7. EH Fifty percent or more of fraternal socialist countries' trade is with the Soviet Union.

Notes. In cases where trade data are not available, the coder should estimate its size from other variables.

5.3 Goal: Expand Mutually Beneficial Commercial Relations With Nonsocialist Countries

Outcome. Did mutually beneficial economic relation with nonsocialist countries in the area affected by the crisis increase?

Measures.

A. Trade Relations

1. Trade with the Soviet Union/total trade of area.
2. Trade with the Soviet Union/GNP of the area.
3. Trade with the Soviet Union/previous levels of trade with USSR.
4. Trade with Soviet Union/world trade.
5. Long-term trade/development agreements.
6. Short-term trade/credit agreements.

B. Other Economic Relations

1. Transfer-of-technology agreements.
2. Agreements for solving regional economic problems.
3. Agreements for development of border resources (e.g., rivers).
4. Agreements for cooperation in technology development (e.g., energy, space, etc.)

Technical Notes. In the long run the most important constraints to expansion of Soviet trade with nonsocialist countries have been shortage of hard currencies and the limited overseas market for Soviet consumer and industrial goods.

Outcome Assessment Question. Economic Relations With the Nonsocialist Countries:

1. EL Insignificant economic relations with nonsocialist countries.
2. VL Minor economic relations with selected capitalist countries.

3. L Low level of trade with nonsocialist countries, with a few exceptional cases where the trade level with the USSR is high.
4. M Moderate to high level of trade with many capitalist countries.
5. H Widespread economic ties with many capitalist countries.
6. VH Widespread economic ties with most capitalist countries.
7. EH Widespread economic cooperation in all fields, no external restrictions on Soviet trade.

Notes. Soviet economic relations with nonsocialist countries have never been extremely high. Because of domestic and external restrictions the Soviet economic relations with capitalist countries have remained at moderate to high levels during the 1970's.

5.4 Goal: Assist Economic Independence of Developing Countries

Outcome. Did the developing countries in the area affected by the crisis become economically more independent from the major capitalist economies? Did they become more socialist in their economic orientation?

Measures.

A. Trade Independence

1. Trade with the Soviet Union/trade with capitalist countries.
2. Trade with socialist countries/trade with capitalist countries.
3. Trade with socialist countries/GNP of the country.
4. Trade with socialist countries/world trade.

B. Socialist Economic Orientation

1. Declaration of socialist policies.
2. Nationalization of foreign investments.
3. Nationalization of major domestic industries.
4. Nationalization of material means of production.
5. Nationalization of financial institutions.
6. Nationalization of foreign trade.
7. Nationalization of all private property.
8. Nationalization of all financial capital.
9. Redistribution of wealth.
10. Nationalization of service industries.
11. Percent of economy nationalized (% GNP).

Technical Notes. Major capitalist countries are U.S., Japan, Germany, France, U.K., Italy, Canada, and Australia. The first five are the most important.

Outcome Assessment Question. Economic Independence of Developing Countries:

1. EL Socialist program is discarded in favor of capitalism, dependence is extremely high.
2. VL Socialist program is greatly undermined by reactionary policies, dependence on capitalist countries is very high.
3. L Socialist program is adjusted to local conditions by local reformists, economic dependence is high.
4. M Partially socialist program adopted but unlikely to be implemented, moderate to high dependence on capitalist countries.
5. H Partially socialist program adopted and is being implemented, economic dependence is moderate to high.
6. VH Extensive socialist program adopted but faces instability because of dependence on capitalist countries.
7. EH Comprehensive socialist policy adopted, no significant dependence on capitalist countries.

Notes. In cases where data are available, use trade with major capitalist countries/total trade to measure dependence. "Socialist" policies are defined, for the purposes of this item, as the term is understood by the Soviets, for example, centralized planning and nationalization of major enterprises.

6. Soviet Goals Toward Capitalist Countries

6.1 Goal: Reduce Chances of War With the United States and NATO

Outcome. Did the probability of war with the United States and NATO increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Number of major international crises.
2. International tension levels.
3. Number of major unresolved international issues.
4. Number of local wars.
5. Intensity of East-West accusations.
6. Stability of strategic and conventional arms buildup.
7. Willingness of major powers to refrain from use of armed force over international disputes.

Technical Notes. In coding this variable the coder should exercise a good deal of judgment about contextual information and weighting of variables.

In evaluating the probability of war the coder should emphasize Soviet perceptions of what factors cause war. The Soviet writers generally blame war on capitalist/imperialist aggressors but also recognize that the likelihood of war increases by the presence of international tension spots, "hotbeds of wars," and unreasonableness on the part of international actors.

Outcome Assessment Question. Probability of Peace With the United States and NATO:

1. EL War with the U.S. or NATO has occurred or is certain to occur shortly.
2. VL Many major disputes and crises are unresolved and are likely to escalate into major wars.
3. L Some major disputes and crises are unresolved but likelihood of war is not very high.
4. M Some major disputes are unresolved and could escalate to international crisis level.
5. H Some major disputes are unresolved but not likely to lead to war.

6. VH Chances of war with the U.S./NATO are remote,
only minor disputes exist.

7. EH No chance of war.

Notes. Since 1946 the periods with highest probabilities of U.S.-Soviet war have been during the first Berlin crisis (1948), Korean war period (1950-1952), and Cuban missile crisis (1962). During these crises the probabilities of no war (or continued peace) were very low to low. Since the 1972 U.S.-Soviet strategic arms agreements the probability of no war has been generally high to very high.

The ordinal scale used above has more value for situations in which war is unlikely than cases with high likelihood of war. This is because the probability of war continues to be very low.

6.2 Goal: Increase Mutually Beneficial Exchanges With Capitalist Countries

Outcome. Did the level of commercial, scientific, technological, and cultural ties with capitalist countries increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet trade with OECD countries.
2. Soviet scientific/technological exchanges with OECD.
3. Soviet financial ties with OECD.
4. Soviet cultural ties with OECD.

Technical Notes. Soviet writers often include cultural ties among the above list of desirable relationships. However, in practice they seem to show a desire for only a selected range of cultural ties. In particular they seem hesitant to expose the Soviet public to the full range of diverse publications and artistic expressions that exist in the West.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Commercial, Scientific, and Technological Ties With Capitalist Countries:

1. EL No significant ties.
2. VL Restricted ties with only a few major capitalist countries.
3. L Restricted ties to many capitalist countries.
4. M Ties with most major capitalist countries.
5. H Widespread ties but with selected major restrictions by the capitalist countries.
6. VH Widespread ties with some minor restrictions by the capitalist countries.
7. EH Widespread ties with no political restrictions/obstacles by the capitalist countries.

Notes. It is assumed that the Soviet Union will always try to maintain some restrictions on its contacts with the capitalist countries even though it desires to remove all restrictions placed by the other side.

During the Soviet Union's most isolated period, its ties with capitalist countries were very low to low. During the early 1950's its ties were low to moderate to high. It is possible that by the 1980's Soviet ties with the capitalist countries will increase further.

Deemphasize the volume of contacts between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries (OECD). Instead, emphasize the freedom of the Soviet Union to interact with OECD countries without political restrictions from the latter.

6.3 Goal. Continue the Anticapitalist Ideological Struggle

Outcome. Did the credibility of the Soviet Union's anticapitalist policy among socialist countries and progressive movements decline? Did any fraternal parties or progressive group accuse the Soviet Union of weakening its anticapitalist struggle? What is the level of the Soviet Union's anticapitalist efforts?

Measures.

1. Did any socialist countries or CP's accuse the Soviet Union of weak anticapitalist policies?
2. Did any socialist countries or CP's form a new anti-capitalist grouping with more aggressive policies?
3. Did any socialist countries or CP's join China in criticizing the weakness of Soviet anticapitalist policies?
4. Did the Soviet Union's symbolic (verbal) attacks against capitalism decline in quantity or intensity?
5. Did the Soviet Union's efforts in the anticapitalist struggle decline in intensity? (e.g., material aid to anticapitalist groups and countries.)

Technical Notes. Ideally there should be two measures for this two-dimensional concept. Its two dimensions are actual level of Soviet anticapitalist struggle and the perceptions of the Soviet efforts on the part of socialist countries and progressive movements in other countries.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Union's Anticapitalist Efforts (Aid to Anticapitalist Countries and Groups):

1. EL No significant efforts.
2. VL Only occasional symbolic (verbal) efforts.
3. L Frequent and intense symbolic (verbal) efforts with very small financial assistance.
4. M Frequent symbolic (verbal) efforts with limited military aid.
5. H Moderate military assistance with small-scale naval or troop deployment.
6. VH Massive Soviet military aid with limited troop deployment.

7. EH Large-scale military deployment.

Notes. Only actual (rather than perceived) level of effort should be coded.

Except during the last 2 years of the Second World War, the Soviet Union has seldom used military force to support anticapitalist groups. Soviet support of anticapitalist groups in the Third World has generally been very low to moderate. In the case of Ethiopia (1977-1979) the Soviet effort was moderate to high. In the cases of Czechoslovakia (1968) and Hungary (1956) Soviet efforts were extremely high.

7. Soviet Goals Toward Europe

7.1 Goal. Maintain/Increase Security of East European Buffer States

Outcome. Did the military cohesion and security of Warsaw Pact countries increase/decrease? Did the external or internal threats to Warsaw Pact members increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Balance of East-West theater forces in Europe.
2. Capacity of the Soviet Army to deter capitalist aggression.
3. Level of U.S. troops in Europe.
4. German militarism and military capability.
5. International recognition of European boundaries.
6. Willingness of NATO countries to negotiate the resolution of outstanding problems.
7. Mutually beneficial, peaceful cooperation among East and West Europeans.
8. Disolution of aggressive military blocs (i.e., NATO).
9. Military defense capability of individual East European countries threatened.

Technical Notes. Security depends on pro-Soviet military forces, forces of opposition, and the degree of tension or ongoing disputes between the two sides. The coder should pay attention first to the likelihood of threat directed at East Europe (from the Soviet perspective) and then to the balance of East-West forces in the area of conflict.

Outcome Assessment Question. Security of East European Buffer States:

1. EL No significant defense against potential aggressors for any state.
2. VL Security is very low for many states.
3. L Security is very low for a few states and cohesion of Warsaw Pact is weak.
4. M Security of a few states is low but cohesion of Warsaw Pact is strong.
5. H Security of some members is low but Soviet deterrent makes defense possible.

6. VH Security of the weakest members is low but there is no immediate threat as long as Soviet deterrent is maintained.

7. EH Complete security, no significant threat.

Notes. The coder should measure threat to East Europe from the Soviet perspective. In the Soviet world view, the major threats to East Europe are capitalist aggression from West Europe, NATO adventurism, West German militarism, and the reactionary elements within East Europe.

The countries perceived to have been under the most threat are East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

Since the 1969 detente with West Germany, the Soviet Union has seemed far more relaxed about the security problem of East Europe. However, this may be partly a result of the strengthening of Warsaw Pact forces.

7.2 Goal. Oppose Revival of Militarism in West Germany

Outcome. Did militaristic tendencies in West Germany increase/decrease?
Did conditions conducive to revival of militarism in West Germany increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Military spending/GNP in West Germany.
2. Number of men under arms in West Germany.
3. Military spending at constant prices in West Germany.
4. Support for nuclear armaments in West Germany.
5. Level of development of the arms industry in West Germany.
6. Soviet perceptions of German participation in overseas military adventures (e.g., Zaire).

Technical Notes. It is difficult to separate genuine Soviet concerns about German militarism from its propaganda statements designed to embarrass the Bonn Government and NATO allies.

The coder should use his judgment to separate out and evaluate genuine concerns, making some allowance for the fact that the Soviet Union's view of Germany is far different from that of most Westerners, particularly Americans.

Outcome Assessment Question. German Militarism:

1. EH Germany decides to develop large numbers of strategic nuclear weapons.
2. VH Germany decides to develop tactical and small numbers of strategic nuclear weapons.
3. H Germany boosts its defense spending to 10 percent or more of its GNP or 30 percent or more of U.S. spending.
4. M Germany boosts its defense spending by 50 percent or more in a 5-year period (real).
5. L Germany maintains its 1978 defense/GNP ratio.
6. VL Germany reduces its 1978 defense/GNP ratio.
7. EL Germany greatly reduces its defense spending (real).

Notes. The above codes emphasize indicators of actual militarism rather than conditions conducive to militarism.

Soviet fear of German militarism was most acute during the late 1940's and early 1950's. During these years it probably ranged from moderate to high. Since 1969, Soviet fears appear to have declined to low to moderate levels.

7.3 Goal. Promote Unity of Fraternal Socialist Parties of Europe

Outcome. Did the unity of fraternal socialist parties increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Did advocates of Euro-Communism gain in strength?
2. Did any Warsaw Pact member attack the common defense policies?
3. Did advocates of revisionism (e.g., Yugoslavs) gain strength?
4. Did discord among European COMECON increase?
5. Did leaders of West European CP's attack CPSU policies?
6. Did advocates of economic reformism gain strength in East Europe?
7. Did advocates of dogmatism and adventurism (e.g., Albania) gain strength among European CP's?

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union sees narrow nationalism, regionalism, adventurism, dogmatism, revisionism, and reformism as major dangers to the unity of the fraternal socialist parties.

In the Soviet view, fraternal socialist parties exclude all Maoist and all other anti-Soviet parties. For instance, the Albanian Party of Labor is excluded.

From the Soviet viewpoint unity requires some degree of discipline and is not compatible with a situation in which socialist parties frequently criticize each other publicly.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Unity of Fraternal Parties in Europe:

1. EL Complete disunity with no identifiable groups.
2. VL Large scale disunity with more than two major groups.
3. L Large scale disunity with two major groupings.
4. M Moderate disunity with one major and one minor group.
5. H Frequent criticisms of common policies but no break on major issues by any significant party.

6. VH Complete unity except for occasional public criticisms.
7. EH Complete unity with no public criticism of common policies.

Notes. Since the Yugoslav-Soviet dispute was partly resolved just prior to the Twentieth CPSU Congress, European parties' unity has ranged from moderate to very high. As with Soviet goal 2.1 (see p. B-15), care must be taken not to mistake surface conformity with depth of commitment.

7.4 Goal: Oppose European (NATO) Aid to China

Outcome. Did the level of Sino-West European cooperation aimed against the Soviet Union increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. West European commercial credits to China.
2. West European military assistance to China.
3. West European industrial assistance to China.
4. West European trade with China.

Technical Notes. The coder should emphasize relations as viewed from Moscow rather than Washington. However, normal international relations should not be interpreted as anti-Soviet merely because some Soviet writers so claim.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of West European-China Cooperation:

1. EH Fully coordinated major anti-Soviet measures and cooperation between West Europe and China.
2. VH Large scale credits and arms sales to China.
3. H Major West European assistance to some of China's military industries.
4. M Limited West European assistance to China's military industries.
5. L West European assistance to China's strategic industries.
6. VL West European grants of "easy" credits to China for trade.
7. EL No significant anti-Soviet cooperation between West Europe and China.

Notes. Ordinary trade and diplomatic relations should not be interpreted as anti-Soviet cooperation.

Since the 1960's, most West European countries have been careful not to give an anti-Soviet cast to their relations with China. However, some have been giving assistance to China's strategic civilian industries,

such as steel, and a few have begun to discuss limited assistance for China's military industries. In general, anti-Soviet/West European cooperation with China has ranged from very low to moderate and has not yet reached the high range of the scale.

7.5 Goal: Promote Peaceful, Mutually Beneficial Cooperation With Nonsocialist European Countries

Outcome. Did the level of Soviet commercial, scientific, technological, and cultural exchanges with nonsocialist European countries increase?

Measures.

1. Soviet trade with West Europe.
2. Soviet scientific/technological ties with West Europe.
3. Soviet financial ties with West Europe.
4. Soviet cultural ties with West Europe.

Technical Notes. Soviet writers often include cultural ties among the above list of desirable relationships. However, in practice they seem to show a desire for only a selected range of cultural ties. In particular they seem hesitant to expose the Soviet public to the full range of diverse publications and artistic expressions that exist in the West.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Ties with Nonsocialist European Countries:

1. EL No significant ties.
2. VL Restricted ties with only a few major capitalist European countries.
3. L Restricted ties with many capitalist European countries.
4. M Restricted ties with most major capitalist countries.
5. H Widespread ties but with selected major restrictions by some capitalist countries.
6. VH Widespread ties with some minor restrictions by the capitalist countries.
7. EH Widespread ties with no political restrictions/obstacles by the capitalist countries.

Notes. It is assumed that the Soviet Union will always try to maintain some restrictions on its contacts with the capitalist European countries even though it desires to remove all restrictions placed by the other side.

Soviet contacts with European countries increased steadily during the 1950's and 1960's from a range of low to moderate to a range of high to very high. During the 1970's Soviet ties have been at least very high.

Deemphasize the volume of contacts between the Soviet Union and European capitalist countries. Instead, emphasize the freedom of the Soviet Union to interact with European capitalist countries without political restrictions from the latter.

8. Soviet Goals Toward the Third World

8.1 Goal: Defend Fraternal Socialist Countries in the Third World

Outcome. Did any fraternal socialist country requiring assistance receive adequate assistance in time? Did any fraternal country have to submit to military threat because of Soviet inability to assist?

Measures.

1. Did any socialist LDC come under military threat?
2. Did any socialist LDC accuse the Soviet Union of inadequate military assistance?
3. Did any socialist LDC accuse the Soviet Union of military collusion with capitalist countries?
4. Did any socialist country accuse the Soviet Union of being weak in the face of capitalist or Chinese threats to socialist LDC's?
5. Did any fraternal socialist party in a developing country lose control because of a military coup, invasion, or counter-revolutionary rebellion?
6. Did any fraternal socialist country suffer economic hardship because of economic blockades or boycotts by capitalist/imperialist powers?

Technical Notes. Since the Sino-Soviet dispute took a turn for the worse in the mid-1960's, China has been excluded from the list of fraternal socialist countries.

Outcome Assessment Question. Security of Fraternal Socialist Countries (LDC's):

1. EL All socialist countries are threatened and likely to fall to antisocialist elements.
2. VL Most socialist countries are threatened and some are likely to fall to antisocialist elements.
3. L Most socialist countries are threatened and many can survive only through major Soviet assistance.
4. M Most socialist countries are threatened and some require Soviet assistance to survive.
5. H Some socialist countries face internal/external threats, a few require Soviet assistance to feel more secure.

6. VH Some socialist countries are insecure but need no external assistance to survive.

7. EH All socialist countries are completely secure.

Notes. Since the World War II, except for the Korean War period, the security of most developing socialist countries has been moderate to very high. (e.g., Rumania feels no need for Soviet troops on her soil).

During the early 1950's the security of developing fraternal countries was low to moderate.

8.2 Goal: Defend Progressive Regimes and Movements and Socialist-Oriented Countries

Outcome. Did progressive regimes and movements and socialist-oriented countries that were under threat survive?

Measures.

1. Number of stable socialist-oriented countries in the region.
2. Number of progressive regimes in the region.
3. Number of liberation movements destroyed during the period under consideration.
4. Strength of surviving liberation movements.
5. Number of reactionary governments (e.g., anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, or fascist governments).

Technical Notes. Socialist-oriented countries differ from socialist or fraternal socialist developing countries. The latter refer only to what the Western sources call Communist or Marxist-Leninist countries (excluding Albania and China since the Sino-Soviet dispute became vicious, and sometimes excluding Yugoslavia). Socialist-oriented countries include many developing countries with "progressive" policies such as state control of most major industries and financial enterprises. Fraternal socialist developing countries in early 1979 included: Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, Laos, and Cambodia. Socialist-oriented countries included a much larger list of Arab, African, and Asian countries.

Outcome Assessment Question. Security of Progressive Regimes/Movements and Socialist-Oriented Countries:

1. EL Many major threats requiring massive Soviet military intervention without high chances of success.
2. VL Major threats requiring Soviet troop deployment in the regions.
3. L Major threats requiring Soviet aid and military logistical support.
4. M Major threats in some cases requiring Soviet military and economic aid but not Soviet troops or naval support.
5. H Major threats in a few cases requiring small amounts of Soviet aid.

6. VH Minor threats requiring no Soviet assistance.
7. EH No significant threat to any movement, regime, or country.

Notes. Soviet leaders see progressive regimes/movements to be under major threat in most cases. In the past the Soviet Union has been relatively cautious in intervening on behalf of threatened regimes/movements. For calibration purposes, consider security of progressive regimes and movements in the African region as having ranged from moderate to very low, in Latin American and Southeast Asia from low to extremely low, and in the Middle East from low to extremely low.

8.3 Goal: Assist Economic Independence of Developing Countries

Outcome. Did the developing countries in the area affected by the crisis become economically more independent from the major capitalist economies? Did they become more socialist in their economic orientation?

Measures.

A. Trade Independence

1. Trade with the Soviet Union/trade with capitalist countries.
2. Trade with socialist countries/trade with capitalist countries.
3. Trade with socialist countries/GNP of the country.
4. Trade with socialist countries/world trade.

B. Socialist Economic Orientation

1. Declaration of socialist policies.
2. Nationalization of foreign investments.
3. Nationalization of major domestic industries.
4. Nationalization of material means of production.
5. Nationalization of financial institutions.
6. Nationalization of foreign trade.
7. Nationalization of all private property.
8. Nationalization of all financial capital.
9. Redistribution of wealth.
10. Nationalization of service industries.
11. Percent of economy nationalized (% GNP).

Technical Notes. Major capitalist countries are the U.S., Japan, Germany, France, U.K., Italy, Canada, and Australia, however, the most important are the first five.

Outcome Assessment Question. Economic Independence of Developing Countries:

1. EL Socialist program (as defined by Soviets) is discarded in favor of capitalism, dependence is extremely high.
2. VL Socialist program is greatly undermined by reactionary policies, dependence on capitalist countries is very high.
3. L Socialist program is adjusted to local conditions by local reformists, economic dependence is high.
4. M Partially socialist program adopted but unlikely to be implemented, moderate to high dependence on capitalist countries.
5. H Partially socialist program adopted and is being implemented, economic dependence is moderate to high.
6. VH Extensive socialist program adopted but faces instability because of dependence on capitalist countries.
7. EH Comprehensive socialist policy adopted. No significant dependence on capitalist countries.

Notes. In cases where data is available, use trade with capitalist countries/total trade to measure dependence.

8.4 Goal: Increase the Soviet Union's International Prestige Among Developing Countries

Outcome. Did Soviet prestige among developing countries increase?

Measures.

1. Support for Soviet regional policy by the LDC's in the region.
2. Support for general Soviet foreign policy by the LDC's.
3. Receptivity of LDC's to Soviet offers of aid.
4. Attitude of LDC's toward Soviet overseas military presence.
5. Support for Soviet policies in the U.N.
6. World opinion towards the Soviet Union (European and Japanese polls).

Technical Notes. Many Western experts of Soviet affairs view the Soviet Union as having an excessive inferiority complex which she tries to overcome through public relations spectacles (such as the space program, the Olympic Games, and military power displays).

Another common Western view of the Soviet Union is that she overemphasizes loss of face. However, it is difficult to measure this attitude and compare its level to, say, that of the United States. Moreover, the behavior associated with face-saving could very well be a display of "national determination" or inflexibility of foreign policy.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Prestige Among Developing Countries:

1. EL No LDC support in any international setting (e.g., the U.N.).
2. VL No support from any major LDC's.
3. L Opposition by most LDC's and popular fronts.
4. M Opposition by many LDC's including several major progressive LDC's and movements.
5. H Support by most/but opposition by several major progressive LDC's and movements.
6. VH Support by most significant LDC's and fronts.

7. EH Support by nearly all significant LDC's and popular fronts.

Notes. During the early 1950's, Soviet prestige among LDC's was very low to moderate. After Stalin's death, it increased to a moderate to high range.

8.4.1 Goal. Increase Soviet Prestige Among Developing Countries Through Aid, Trade, and Cultural Contacts

Outcome. Did Soviet aid, trade, and cultural contacts with developing countries in the region increase?

Measures.

1. Soviet economic aid.
2. Soviet military aid.
3. Soviet trade.
4. Soviet cultural relations.

Technical Notes. This goal focuses on a narrower range of indicators of Soviet prestige than the preceding goal.

Outcome Assessment Question. Overall Soviet Aid/Trade/Cultural Contacts With LDC's:

1. EL No contacts.
2. VL Minor, infrequent contacts.
3. L Frequent but minor contacts.
4. M Frequent contacts and small volumes of trade.
5. H Frequent contacts and moderate volumes of aid and trade.
6. VH Very high levels of aid, trade, and cultural ties.
7. EH Maximum reasonable level of contacts.

Notes. Cuba's ties with the Soviet Union have been very high to extremely high since 1970. Syria's ties to the Soviet Union have been moderate to very high over the same period. For most developing countries, however, Soviet ties are very low to moderate.

8.5 Goal: Contain Influence of China Among Developing Countries

Outcome. To what extent did Soviet efforts to contain Chinese influence in the area of the crisis meet with success? Alternatively, it can be asked did China's influence increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. China's diplomatic standing in the region.
2. China's economic relations with the region.
3. China's trade/Soviet trade with the region.
4. China's assistance/Soviet assistance to the region.
5. Soviet military presence in the region.
6. China's military presence in the region.
7. Attitude of local CP's toward China.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union has never publicly announced a containment policy toward China, but it is assumed here that it pursues such a policy particularly among CP's and other progressive groups.

China's influence among developing countries need not be inversely related to Soviet influence. However, assuming such a relationship simplifies coding and should be practiced wherever applicable.

Outcome Assessment Question. China's Containment Among Developing Nations

1. EL Containment is complete failure, China has close relations with most nation states and most CP's and progressive movements.
2. VL China has diplomatic and economic relations with many nations and some major CP's.
3. L China is surrounded by many nations that have friendly ties with the Soviet Union but are not hostile to China.
4. M China has friendly relations with several major countries and CP's.
5. H China has friendly relations with several small countries and CP's.
6. VII China has friendly relations only with a few small countries and CP's in the region.

7. EH Complete containment, no significant, nation-state has relations with China, China is surrounded by hostile nations.

Notes. China's containment since the mid-1970's has been moderate to high in most Third World regions.

Since Mao's death, China's isolation among CP's and liberation movements has increased while her isolation among non-Communist countries has declined.

China's abandonment of a people's war strategy in the early 1970's led to greater isolation in Africa but less isolation in East and non-Communist.

9. Soviet Goals Toward Asia

9.1 Goal: Deter/Oppose China From Military Adventurism Against the Soviet Union

Outcome. Did China increase/decrease its military provocations against the Soviet Union?

Measures.

1. Chinese military acts against the Soviet Union.
2. Soviet claims of Chinese military aggression.
3. Sino-Soviet border clashes.
4. Incidents of small border incursions or overflights of Soviet border regions by Chinese military forces.
5. Chinese harassment of Soviet border posts and patrols.
6. Shooting down of Soviet planes by Chinese anti-aircraft defenses or interceptors in the border regions.
7. Buildup of offensive weaponry by the Chinese near the border with the Soviet Union or Mongolia.
8. Chinese incursions and aggressiveness against Mongolia.

Technical Notes. Data about China's military preparation and actions against the Soviet Union tend to be poor and unreliable. The open sources include mostly self-serving statements of the two sides about events which they wish to publicize, e.g., Louis (1979).

Outcome Assessment Question. China's Military Aggressiveness Against the Soviet Union:

1. EH Frequent major actions of provocation, military build-up with apparent aggressive intention against the Soviet Union.
2. VH Frequent major acts of provocation but accompanied with a moderate mobilization.
3. H Frequent major acts of provocation but not accompanied by any significant mobilization.
4. M Frequent minor acts of provocation, major capability for adventurism.
5. L Infrequent minor acts of provocation, major capability for adventurism.

6. VL Infrequent minor acts of provocation, moderate capability for adventurism.

7. EL No significant acts of provocation and low military capability for adventurism, overwhelming Soviet military superiority.

Notes. China's military aggressiveness against the Soviet Union was generally extremely low to very low during the 1950's and very low to low during the late 1960's and 1970's.

9.2 Goal: Deter/Oppose China From Military Adventurism Against Fraternal Socialist Countries

Outcome. Did China's military aggressiveness and provocations against Asian fraternal socialist countries increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Border clashes between China and socialist countries.
2. Border disputes between China and socialist countries.
3. Overflights of socialist countries by Chinese aircraft.
4. Naval incidents between China and socialist countries.
5. Mobilization of Chinese forces for potential aggression near borders with Asian socialist countries.
6. Chinese covert operations within socialist countries (e.g., aid to Meo tribesmen in Vietnam).
7. Chinese harassment of border posts and patrols of its neighboring socialist countries.

Technical Notes. China's lack of "aggressiveness" may not be mainly determined by Soviet deterrent capability. Internal problems and the policies of other major powers may be equally or more important. However, the most relevant end result is the security of Soviet socialist allies from Chinese acts of aggression.

Outcome Assessment Question. China's Military Aggressiveness Against Socialist Countries:

1. EH Frequent major acts of provocation, military build-up with aggressive intentions.
2. VH Frequent major acts of provocation accompanied with a major mobilization.
3. H Frequent major acts of provocation accompanied with significant mobilization.
4. M Frequent minor acts of provocation, major capability for adventurism.
5. L Infrequent minor acts of provocation, major capability for adventurism.

6. VL Infrequent minor acts of provocation, moderate capability for adventurism.
7. EL No significant acts of provocation and low military capability for adventurism, overwhelming Soviet military superiority.

Notes. Until the early 1970's, China's aggressiveness against Asian socialist countries was extremely low to low. During the 1970's China's aggressions increased to low to extremely high.

9.3 Goal: Support/Defend Fraternal Socialist Countries in Asia Against Other (Imperialist) Threats

Outcome. How capable are the fraternal socialist countries of defending themselves against imperialist aggression?

Measures.

1. Capability of fraternal armies of Asian socialist countries.
2. Size of armed forces of fraternal socialist countries in Asia.
3. Soviet military capability to defend the socialist countries in Asia against a major military threat.
4. Soviet ability to give large scale military aid rapidly in an emergency situation.
5. Soviet naval presence in the region (number of vessels, type, etc.).
6. Soviet ability to intervene directly with land and air forces in support of socialist allies.
7. Soviet performance in giving aid to socialist allies in times of crisis.

Technical Notes. Although Soviet performance in support of her allies is an important element of this goal, the coder should limit evaluation to the end result: the military capability of the socialist countries to defend their security on their own.

The coder should consider security in terms of likely threats such as limited U.S. or Chinese military attacks rather than unlikely unlimited military attacks.

Outcome Assessment Question. Military Security of Fraternal Asian Socialist Countries:

1. EL Most countries are incapable of defending themselves even with massive Soviet assistance and intervention.
2. VL Most countries are capable of defending themselves with massive Soviet assistance and limited intervention.

3. L Most countries are capable of defending themselves with major Soviet assistance and small numbers of advisory personnel.
4. M Most countries are capable of defending themselves with limited Soviet assistance but some will require direct logistical support.
5. H Most countries are capable of defending themselves with limited Soviet assistance.
6. VH Most countries are capable of defending themselves against all likely threats without significant Soviet assistance.
7. EH All countries are capable of defending themselves against all likely threats without significant Soviet assistance.

Notes. For calibration use the following examples:

- During 1979 most fraternal Asian socialist countries (particularly Laos) were vulnerable to Chinese attack but most could defend themselves against a limited Chinese or U.S. military attack with minimal Soviet aid.
- During the 1950's most fraternal Asian socialist countries would have required at least major Soviet assistance in order to defend themselves against a limited U.S. military attack.

9.4 Goal: Develop Alternative Transport Routes to the Trans-Siberian Railway

Outcome. Did the security of East-West transportation from potential Chinese military threats increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Security of Trans-Siberian land routes.
2. Security of Trans-Siberian air routes.
3. Security of Arctic Sea route.
4. Security of Indian/Pacific oceans route.
5. Security of indirect air routes (i.e., routes requiring overflights of third countries).

Technical Notes. In case of a Sino-Soviet war the Soviet Far Eastern territories are likely to become isolated from the rest of the Soviet Union except for long-range Soviet aviation and ocean shipping. Soviet military planners appear to have developed a capability for their Far Eastern command to sustain a medium term isolation without losing its military capability against potential Chinese attackers.

Outcome Assessment Question. Security of East-West Transportation From Chinese Threat:

1. EL Chinese threats to land, air, and sea routes are high.
2. VL Potential Chinese threat to land and air routes are high but moderate for the sea routes.
3. L Moderate threats to land and air routes and limited threat to the sea routes.
4. M Limited Chinese threats to land, air and sea routes.
5. H Limited Chinese threats to overland and air routes but no threats to sea routes.
6. VH Potential Chinese threats to overland routes are limited.
7. EH No potential Chinese threat to the major carrier routes.

Notes. During the 1960's the security of East-West transportation, particularly during the Fall to Spring periods, was very low to moderate.

With the developments of Soviet long-range transportation and naval capability the security of Soviet transportation should have increased. But the increases were somewhat offset by improvements in Chinese military capabilities. Therefore, at best the security of the Soviet East-West transport network is moderate.

9.5 Goal: Undermine the Legitimacy of China's Territorial Claims Against Its Neighbors (Except in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao)

Outcome. Did the level of international acceptability of China's territorial claims against its neighboring countries (excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao) increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Number of countries with unresolved border disputes with China.
2. Number of countries in Asia who support Soviet policy of permanence of post-World War II borders.
3. Number of countries in Asia with diplomatic ties with China/number of countries with Soviet diplomatic ties.
4. Number of countries with territorial claims against the Soviet Union (e.g., China and Japan).
5. Number of countries with territorial claims against other Asian Socialist countries.
6. International support for Chinese/Japanese territorial claims against the Soviet Union.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union's policy toward its post-World War II borders is defensive. The Soviet Union's major territorial concern has been to induce recognition of the legitimacy of its present borders among its neighboring countries.

Outcome Assessment Question. International Acceptability of China's Territorial Claims:

1. EH Most Asian countries support China's claims. Japan and China both press their demands against the USSR in a broad diplomatic front.
2. VH Most Asian countries sympathize with China's demands but only a few major countries (including Japan) give her diplomatic support.
3. H Several Asian countries (including Japan) sympathize and a few support China in her territorial demands.
4. M A few Asian countries (including Japan) support China's territorial claims.

5. L A few Asian countries (including Japan) sympathize with China's territorial claims.
6. VL A few small Asian countries sympathize with China's territorial claims.
7. EL No country shows any sympathy for China's claims.

Notes. International support for China territorial claims has generally been low to very low. However, in recent years some anti-Soviet countries seem to have begun to think of this issue as one that could be used to widen the Sino-Soviet rift. Consequently, there seems to be a slight but perceptible move by some countries to show greater sympathy towards China's territorial claims against the Soviet Union and her allies, Vietnam and Laos.

9.6 Goal: Support Progressive Governments and Countries With Socialist-Orientation (Excluding Socialist Countries Such as North Korea, Vietnam, and, Since 1975, Laos and Cambodia)

Outcome. Did Soviet moral and material support for the socialist-oriented countries and progressive governments increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet moral (verbal) and diplomatic support.
2. Soviet material (economic) assistance.
3. Soviet material (military) assistance.
4. Limited Soviet naval deployment.
5. Limited Soviet logistical support of local combatants.
6. Limited Soviet logistical support of third-country forces (e.g., Cuban troops).
7. Limited Soviet ground forces deployment.
8. Soviet military deployment on an extensive scale.
9. Limited Soviet covert support.
10. Soviet use of nuclear threats (nuclear deterrence).
11. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with the United States or China in support of local allies.

Technical Notes. From the Soviet perspective, progressive governments and socialist-oriented countries in Asia have been very few: Indonesia under Sukarno, Burma, India, Cambodia under Sihanouk, and Sri Lanka.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Support for Progressive Governments and Socialist-Oriented Countries:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral (verbal) support.
3. L Diplomatic and moral (verbal) support.
4. .M Limited material assistance in a selected number of cases.
5. H Extensive material assistance in selected extreme cases and more limited material assistance in others.

6. VH Limited direct military support.

7. EH Large-scale, direct military support.

Notes. In only a few Asian cases the Soviet Union has given moderate levels of support to progressive governments: Sukarno's Indonesia and India. In most other cases the Soviet Union has limited itself to moral and diplomatic support. The reason for this policy is that most governments in Asia have been strongly anti-Soviet.

9.7 Goal: Support Peaceful and Mutually Beneficial Relations With Asian Countries

Outcome. Did the regional acceptability of Soviet advocacy of peaceful coexistence among nonsocialist Asian countries increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet trade with Asian countries.
2. Voting record of Asian countries in the U.N.
3. Cohesion of SEATO.
4. Attitude of Asian countries toward Soviet concepts of Asian mutual security system, nuclear free zones, and peaceful coexistence.
5. Number of Asian countries having diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union.
6. Hostility of nonsocialist Asian countries toward socialist countries and local CP's.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union's peace program for Asia emphasizes the elimination of anti-Soviet military blocs such as SEATO and ANZUS. More recently, containment of China appears to have become the primary goal, but Soviet writers so far have not admitted the existence of such a goal.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support for Peaceful Coexistence Among Nonsocialist Asian Countries:

1. EL No significant support by any nonsocialist country.
2. VL Lukewarm diplomatic support by a few small countries and insignificant economic ties.
3. L Strong diplomatic support by a few small countries but insignificant economic ties.
4. M Strong diplomatic support by a few small and major countries and insignificant economic ties with the Soviet Union.
5. H Strong diplomatic support by most countries and moderate economic ties with the Soviet Union.

6. VH Strong diplomatic support by most countries and moderate and growing economic ties with the Soviet Union.
7. EH Very strong diplomatic support and widespread economic ties with the Soviet Union by most countries in Asia.

Notes. Support for the Soviet policy of peaceful and mutually beneficial relations in Asia has never been high among nonsocialist Asian countries. In general it has ranged from very low to low support.

10. Soviet Goals Toward the Middle East and South Asia

10.1 Goal: Reduce Potential NATO/CENTO Threats to the Soviet Union

Outcome. Did the local governments' support for NATO/CENTO in the Middle East and South Asia increase/decrease? Did the cohesion of NATO/CENTO decrease?

Measures.

1. Cohesion of CENTO.
2. Regional hostility towards NATO.
3. Military cooperation among regional members of NATO and CENTO.
4. Contribution of regional members of NATO and CENTO to the defense of U.S. and West European interests.
5. Conflicts among regional members of NATO and CENTO.
6. Soviet military aid and sales to regional members of NATO and CENTO.
7. Soviet economic ties with regional members of NATO and CENTO.

Technical Notes. Soviet policy toward the NATO/CENTO threat probably involves a two-pronged strategy of encouraging the break-up of these blocs and improving diplomatic relations with their members.

Outcome Assessment Question. NATO/CENTO Threat in Middle East/South Asia:

1. EH Regional components of NATO/CENTO are extremely strong and cohesive and are backed by major regional military presence of the nonregional (European and U.S. components, NATO/CENTO regional front could become major invasion route against the Soviet Union).
2. VH NATO/CENTO military capability is strong enough to pose a major threat to the Soviet Union's southern flank in Europe and the Middle East.
3. H NATO/CENTO military capability is strong enough to pose a moderate threat to the Soviet Union's southern flank in Europe and the Middle East.
4. M Regional components of NATO/CENTO are closely aligned and militarily supported by considerable presence of nonregional components.

5. L Regional components of NATO/CENTO are closely aligned but the regional military presence of nonregional components is weak.
6. VL Regional components of NATO/CENTO are weakly aligned and the regional military presence of nonregional components is weak.
7. EL Regional components of NATO/CENTO are in disarray and there is no significant regional military presence by the nonregional components.

Notes. The NATO/CENTO threat in the Middle East/South Asia has never been high to very high from an objective viewpoint. However, the Soviet perceptions may have been different. During the 1950's the NATO/CENTO image as perceived by the Soviet leaders may have been strong enough to lead them to conclude that Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Pakistan were major threats to the Soviet Union's multinational southern states and allied countries such as Bulgaria and Rumania. Therefore, Soviet perceptions may have led them to believe that the NATO/CENTO regional threat was high to extremely high.

Since the coder is not likely to be able to find consistent information on Soviet perceptions of this threat, actual threat should be coded here.

10.2 Goal: Support/Defend Progressive and Socialist-Oriented Governments In the Region (e.g., Socialist and Nationalist Arab Governments, India, and Sri Lanka)

Outcome. Did the Soviet moral and material support to progressive and socialist-oriented governments in the region increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet moral (verbal) and diplomatic support.
2. Soviet material (economic) assistance.
3. Soviet material (military) assistance.
4. Limited Soviet naval deployment.
5. Limited Soviet logistical support of local combatants.
6. Limited Soviet logistical support of third countries' forces (e.g., Cuba).
7. Limited Soviet ground forces deployment.
8. Soviet deployment of land forces on an extensive scale.
9. Limited Soviet covert-operation support.
10. Soviet use of nuclear threats (nuclear deterrence).
11. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with the United States or China in support of local allies.

Technical Notes. From a Soviet perspective, progressive and socialist-oriented governments in the region have included most Arab socialist regimes such as the FLN in Algeria, Baathists in Iraq and Syria, and Nasser's government in Egypt.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Support for Progressive and Socialist-Oriented Governments:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral (verbal) support.
3. L Diplomatic and moral (verbal) support.
4. M Limited material assistance in selected cases.
5. H Extensive material assistance in selected extreme cases and more limited material aid in others.

6. VH Limited direct military support.

7. EH Large-scale direct military support.

Notes. Soviet support for progressive and socialist-oriented countries in Middle East/South Asia was low to extremely low until the mid-1950's. Then support began to increase and in the late 1960's and early 1970's reached moderate to very high levels.

10.3 Goal: Support/Defend Progressive and Democratic Movements in the Region (e.g., Nationalism, Communist Parties, Socialist Parties, and Liberation Groups)

Outcome. Did Soviet moral and material assistance to progressive and democratic movements in the Middle East/South Asia region increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet financial and moral support to local CP's and liberation movements.
2. Soviet material assistance.
3. Soviet diplomatic support.
4. Soviet opposition to persecution and harassment of progressive forces.
5. Soviet military intervention.
6. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with major powers in defense of local progressive forces.
7. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with local governments in defense of progressive forces.

Technical Notes. Soviet support for Middle East/Sc. Asian CP's has been constrained by her desire to maintain good relations with local governments which are often anti-Communist if not anti-Soviet.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Support for Progressive and Democratic Movements:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral and diplomatic support.
3. L Covert economic aid and moral support.
4. M Extensive material assistance in a selected small number of cases.
5. H Extensive material assistance in some cases and limited aid in other cases.
6. VH Limited direct military support.
7. EH Large-scale, direct military support.

Notes. Soviet support to Middle East/South Asian progressive and democratic forces has always been low to very low.

10.4 Goal: Support Economic Independence of Countries in the Middle East/
North Africa Region

Outcome. Did the economic independence of the countries in Middle East/
South Asia from the capitalist countries increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Nationalization of foreign businesses.
2. Control of the regional oil industries by local governments.
3. Industrial development of regional economies.
4. Soviet trade with the region/total trade of the region.
5. Soviet trade with the region/trade of the region with the OECD countries.
6. Soviet economic aid/Western economic aid,
7. U.S. and West European investment/GNP of the region.
8. Number of U.S./West European citizens working in the region.
9. Number of countries claiming socialist-oriented economic policies.

Technical Notes. A major Soviet concern in the Middle East has been the foreign oil monopolies' exploitation of regional resources. All moves by local governments to increase national control over oil resources are applauded by Soviet commentators.

During the mid-1950's the Soviet Union began to improve its relations with the Middle East/South Asian countries through encouragement of mutually beneficial economic interactions. By the early 1970's, the Soviet Union had successfully completed many economic agreements with the countries in the region. Although many of these projects benefit the Soviet Union, the probable aim of these or other projects may have been to induce greater economic independence from the West. In most cases it is difficult to guess which motive may have been predominant.

Outcome Assessment Question. Economic Independence of Middle East/South Asia from the West:

1. EL All major countries are greatly dependent on the West.

2. VL Only a few major countries are not mainly dependent on the West.
3. L Only several major countries are not mainly dependent on the West.
4. M Many major countries are mainly dependent on the West.
5. H Several major countries are mainly dependent on the West.
6. VH A few major countries are mainly dependent on the West.
7. EH No significant country in the region is mainly dependent on the West.

Notes. The coder should take into consideration that most countries in the region have been and continue to be greatly dependent on the West for their exports and imports.

Assume that Japan is included in the Western bloc.

10.5 Goal: Secure Soviet Naval Access to the Indian Ocean

Outcome: Did the friendliness and cooperation of the countries in the region toward the Soviet Union increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Number of countries in the region with friendly relations with the Soviet Union.
2. Number of countries in the region supporting Soviet concepts of peace zones and regional security.
3. Number of countries in the region voting in favor of the Soviet Union in the United Nations General Assembly.
4. Number of countries with Soviet military advisers.
5. Number of countries with Soviet air and naval facilities.
6. Number of countries receiving Soviet military aid and sales.
7. Number of countries with socialist-oriented governments.
8. Number of countries hostile to NATO military bloc.
9. Number of countries allowing Soviet military overflights.

Technical Notes. The most relevant determinants for this goal are the friendliness of regional countries toward the Soviet Union and their cooperativeness toward Soviet regional military presence. However, the relevant final outcome is Soviet naval access to the Indian Ocean.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Naval Access to the Indian Ocean:

1. EL Many strategic countries are hostile to the Soviet Union and hinder Soviet access.
2. VL Several strategic countries are hostile to the Soviet Union but cannot greatly hinder Soviet access.
3. L Several major countries are hostile to the Soviet Union but do not hinder access.
4. M A few major countries are hostile to the Soviet Union but cannot hinder access.

5. H Several major countries in the region are friendly and facilitate access and the rest are indifferent.
6. VH Most major countries in the region are friendly and cooperate in facilitating access.
7. EH All important states in the region are friendly to the Soviet Union and cooperate in facilitating access.

Notes. Soviet naval access to the Indian Ocean since the Second World War has increased considerably from low to moderate during the first 2 decades to moderate to high during the 1970's.

Increased Soviet access has been partly due to the increased blue water capabilities of the Soviet navy and partly due to Soviet diplomatic relations with the Middle East/South Asia region. However, the coder should emphasize the latter.

This goal is obviously related to the previously cited aim of securing alternatives to the vulnerable Trans-Siberian rail links to Soviet East Asia.

11. Soviet Goals Toward Africa

11.1 Goal: Defend/Support the Security of African Countries Proclaiming the Intention of Moving Toward Building Socialism

Outcome. How capable are the socialist countries of defending themselves against likely external threats without Soviet military intervention?

Measures.

1. Military capability of the socialist-oriented countries.
2. Military cooperation with the Soviet Union.
3. Soviet economic assistance.
4. Soviet military assistance (equipment).
5. Soviet direct logistical support of local military.
6. Limited Soviet military deployment (land/air forces).
7. Soviet naval demonstration.
8. Soviet diplomatic support.
9. Soviet support of third-country military intervention (e.g., Cuba).
10. Soviet declaration of support with nuclear weapons.
11. Soviet threats of military action.
12. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with the U.S.

Technical Notes. The important variable here is the ability of socialist-oriented countries to defend themselves rather than the symbolic nature of Soviet support.

In early 1979 the African countries fitting the label of "having declared the intention of moving toward socialism" included Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and the Congo.

Outcome Assessment Question. The Security of Socialist Countries in Africa:

1. EL No capability to maintain power even with massive Soviet intervention.
2. VL Defense requires massive Soviet intervention.

3. L Defense requires moderate levels of Soviet military intervention.
4. M Defense requires moderate levels of Soviet logistical support and material assistance.
5. H Defense requires moderate amounts of Soviet material assistance.
6. VH Defense requires small amounts of Soviet material assistance.
7. EH Capability to maintain power with no Soviet assistance against any regional threat.

Notes. During the mid-1970's the security of African socialist countries was low to very high. The least secure countries in 1979 were Angola and Ethiopia.

11.2 Goal: Support Other Progressive Regimes and Movements and Socialist-Oriented Countries

Outcome. Did Soviet moral and material support for progressive regimes and movements and socialist-oriented countries increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet moral support for progressive and democratic movements.
2. Soviet material assistance for progressive and democratic movements.
3. Soviet support for socialist-oriented countries.
4. Soviet support for Marxist regimes.
5. Soviet support for local CP's.
6. Soviet support for national liberation movements.
7. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with the United States and NATO countries in support of local progressive forces.

Technical Notes. Until recently Soviet support for African progressive movements had been constrained by the very limited ability of the Soviet military to project power beyond its borders. Since the late 1960's the increased capability of the Soviet long-range military airlift and overseas naval presence have gradually increased Soviet capability to exercise military power in Africa.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support of Progressive Regimes and Socialist-Oriented Countries:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral support.
3. L Diplomatic and moral support.
4. M Limited material assistance in a selected number of cases.
5. H High levels of material assistance in selected extreme cases and more limited material assistance in others.
6. VH Limited direct military support.

7. EH Unlimited direct military support.

Notes. During the 1960's Soviet support for progressive regimes and movements and socialist-oriented countries was low to moderate. Since the early 1970's Soviet support has increased to moderate to high levels.

11.3 Goal: Support the General Independence of African Countries

Outcome. Did the independence of African countries from the capitalist countries of Europe and North America increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. U.S. trade with Africa/total trade of Africa.
2. U.S. trade with Africa/Soviet trade with Africa.
3. U.S. investment in Africa/GNP of Africa.
4. West European trade with Africa/total trade of Africa.
5. West European trade with Africa/Soviet trade with Africa.
6. West European trade with Africa/GNP of Africa.
7. Hostility of OAU toward the capitalist countries.
8. Level of Soviet ties with Africa.
9. Soviet military aid to Africa/U.S. and European military aid.
10. Soviet arms sales/total arms imports of Africa.

Technical Notes. The coder should take into account that most African countries have a tendency to maintain an above normal level of interactions with their former colonial masters. For instance, France continues to be the major trading partner of most former French colonies.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Independence of Africa From Capitalist Countries:

1. EL Capitalist countries dominate most countries' economies and have closely coordinated diplomatic/military policies with most.
2. VL Capitalist ties consist of strong economic, military, and diplomatic ties.
3. L Capitalist ties consist of normal ties and strong military cooperation with most countries.
4. M Capitalist ties consist of normal ties and military assistance and arms exports to most countries.

5. H Capitalist ties consists of normal ties and low level military ties with many countries.
6. VH Capitalist ties consist of normal commercial and diplomatic ties only.
7. EH Capitalist countries ties consist of below normal commercial and diplomatic ties.

Notes. Until the mid-1960's African countries' independence from capitalist countries were very low to extremely low. Since then their independence has increased to moderate to high.

Use GNP's of trading partners as weights to determine normal levels for their trade.

11.4 Goal: Increase Soviet Influence/Prestige Among African Countries

Outcome. Did Soviet prestige/influence in Africa increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Voting record of African countries on the issues strongly supported by the Soviet Union.
2. Volume of Soviet trade with Africa/total trade of Africa.
3. Number of countries in Africa with diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
4. Number of African officials visiting USSR.
5. Receptivity of African countries to Soviet naval presence in nearby ocean waterways.
6. Soviet military presence on African lands.
7. Soviet military assistance (volume and number of recipient countries).
8. Number of countries proclaiming socialist orientation.
9. Number of countries proclaiming Marxist orientation.

Technical Notes. The relevant variable is Soviet perception of its prestige/influence among African countries. Nevertheless, the coder should focus on evaluation of Africans' view of Soviet prestige/influence since coding perceptions of perceptions is far too complex to be reliable.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Prestige/Influence in Africa:

1. EL Soviet Union has no significant ties with any major African countries.
2. VL Soviet ties consist of mainly minor commercial ties with major African countries.
3. L Soviet ties consist of commercial and normal diplomatic ties with a few cases of Soviet economic and military assistance.
4. M Soviet ties consist of friendly but not very strong relations with many countries and very strong relations with a few.

5. H Soviet ties consist mainly of strong diplomatic and economic ties with many African countries and close military ties with several.
6. VH Soviet ties consist of strong diplomatic, military, and economic relations and high influence with many countries.
7. EH Soviet ties with African countries are strong and Soviet influence is high with most African countries.

Notes. Soviet ties with African countries increased from extremely low levels in the 1950's to low to moderate levels in the 1960's and moderate to high levels in the 1970's.

Note that for African countries the perceptions of liberation movements are sometimes more important to the Soviet Union than those of governments.

Appropriate account should also be taken of the relative stability over time of Soviet-African ties (e.g., Somalia).

11.5 Goal: Contain Chinese Influence Among African Countries

Outcome. Did China's influence or prestige among African governments and liberation groups increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Number of African countries voting in favor of China in the United Nations.
2. Number of African countries with diplomatic relations with China.
3. Number of African countries receiving material assistance from China.
4. Number of African liberation groups recognized by OAU receiving assistance from China.
5. China's African trade/Soviet African trade.
6. China's military presence/Soviet military presence in Africa.
7. China's assistance/Soviet assistance to Africa.

Technical Notes. The coder should code this variable from the Soviet perspective, which gives more weight to influence among progressive and democratic groups than among reactionary and white racist groups.

Note that the preceding Soviet goal was concerned with Soviet prestige vis-a-vis the capitalist countries whereas the above goal is concerned with Soviet influence vis-a-vis China.

Outcome Assessment Question. China's Prestige and Influence in Africa:

1. EH China's influence far exceeds Soviet influence.
2. VH China's influence is equal to Soviet influence.
3. H China's influence is high among many countries and groups but is exceeded by Soviet influences.
4. M China's influence is high only among a few major countries.
5. L China's influence is high only among a few small countries.

6. VL China's influence is high only among a few small liberation groups not recognized by OAU.

7. EL China's influence is insignificant.

Notes. China's influence among African countries rose to its peak during the 1960's people's war strategy period. But even then China's influence was low to moderate. Since Mao's death, China's influence has been declining among "progressive" African groups and increasing among "reactionary" groups. From the Soviet perspective, the latter trend does not offset the former by any significant degree. Therefore, China's net influence in Africa has declined to low or very low.

12. Soviet Goals Toward Latin America

12.1 Goal: Defend/Support Cuba Against External Threats

Outcome. How capable is Cuba of defending itself against likely external threats without Soviet military intervention?

Measures.

1. Military spending/GNP of Cuba.
2. Military spending of Cuba at constant prices.
3. Size of armed forces of Cuba.
4. Size of air forces of Cuba.
5. Cuban armed forces' capability relative to its major adversaries (excluding the United States).
6. Cuba's economic capacity for withstanding the U.S. trade boycott.
7. Cuba's ability to deal with its internal enemies and exile groups hostile to Cuba.

Technical Notes. The Soviet Union's defense policy with respect to Cuba is not solely military. Soviet diplomatic policy is also involved. This seems to include a policy of encouraging diplomatic rapprochement between Cuba and all its neighbors. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union is interested in keeping Cuba isolated in order to maintain its dependence on the Soviet Union.

Outcome Assessment Question. Cuba's Military Capability:

1. EL Cuban forces are incapable of dealing with internal enemies or exile forces infiltrating Cuba.
2. VL Cuban military requires massive Soviet intervention to defend the island.
3. L Cuban military requires major Soviet intervention to defend island.
4. M Cuban military can defend island with modest Soviet intervention.
5. H Cuban military can defend island with no Soviet intervention against all threats except a major U.S. invasion.

6. VH Cuban military is capable of defending homeland and can project power overseas (Africa) with modest Soviet logistical support.
7. EH Cuban military is capable of defending homeland and can project power overseas (Africa) with no direct Soviet aid.

Notes. The defense capability of Cuba does not consist of military variables alone. However, the coder should emphasize military variables as the primary determinants.

12.2 Goal: Avoid Direct Military Confrontation With United States (and OAS) in Latin America

Outcome. Did any actions of the Soviet Union, Cuba, or local CP's provoke the United States (or OAS) into direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union or Cuba?

Measures.

1. Soviet military presence in Cuba.
2. Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean.
3. Soviet military intervention in Latin America.
4. Cuban export of revolution to other countries.
5. Cuban overt military intervention in Latin America.
6. Coup d'etat by local CP's leading to avowedly Marxist-Leninist governments in Latin America.
7. Permanent Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere.

Technical Notes. The coder should evaluate the probability of Soviet confrontation with U.S./OAS by the degree of hostility existing between the two sides.

The Soviet side includes Cuba and local CP's in Latin America. The U.S./OAS side includes all members of the OAS and other anti-Soviet groups in Latin America.

The Soviet Union would never publicly admit that any confrontation with the United States and OAS could be caused by Soviet actions.

Outcome Assessment Question. Probability of U.S./OAS Confrontation With the Soviet Union and Cuba (As Indicated by the U.S./OAS Hostility Toward the Soviet Union, Local CP's, and Cuba in Latin America:

1. EH High degree of hostility and tension by all countries toward Cuba, local CP's and the Soviet Union.
2. VH High degree of hostility by all countries but mainly against Cuba and local CP's.
3. H High degree of hostility toward local CP's but not against Cuba or the Soviet Union.

4. H High degree of hostility by many countries and low hostility by the U.S. toward local CP's.
5. L Hostility by a few major Latin American countries but not the U.S. against the local CP's.
6. VL No significant hostility by any major Latin country or of the U.S.
7. EL No significant hostility by any country.

Notes. Probability of U.S./OAS confrontation with Soviet Union/Cuba was high to extremely high during the 1950's and 1960's. Since the late 1960's the probability of confrontation has declined to moderate to low.

12.3 Goal: Encourage the Independence of Latin American Countries From the United States

Outcome. Did the level of general independence of Latin American countries from the United States increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. U.S. trade with Latin America/total trade of Latin America.
2. U.S. trade with Latin America/Soviet trade with Latin America.
3. U.S. investment in Latin America/GNP of Latin America.
4. Hostility of Latin America toward the United States.
5. Cohesion of the Organization of the American States.
6. Level of Soviet ties with Latin America.
7. Soviet military contacts with Latin America.

Technical Notes. The coder should take into account the fact that Soviet trade suffers from a higher transport cost than U.S. trade. However, in the past, the major disadvantage of Soviet exports has been the inferior quality of their exports compared to those of the U.S., Europe, and Japan.

Outcome Assessment Question. Level of Latin American independence from the United States:

1. EL U.S. dominates most countries' economies and has closely coordinated diplomatic/military policies with most.
2. VL U.S. ties include strong economic, diplomatic, and military ties with most countries.
3. L U.S. ties consist of normal ties and strong military cooperation with most countries.
4. M U.S. ties consist of normal ties and military assistance ties to most countries with OAS capable of military action.
5. H U.S. ties consist on normal ties and low level military ties with OAS in disarray.

6. VH U.S. ties consist of normal commercial and diplomatic ties only.
7. EH U.S. ties consist of below normal commercial and diplomatic ties only.

Notes. During the first 2 decades after the Second World War, the level of independence of Latin American countries was moderate to extremely low. Since the late 1960's, their independence has increased to moderate to high.

Use GNP's of trading partners as weights to determine "normal" levels of their trade.

12.4 Goal: Increase Solidarity Among Progressive and Democratic Forces in Latin America

Outcome: Did Soviet support for progressive and democratic forces in the region increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Soviet financial and moral support of local CP's.
2. Soviet material assistance to antifascist forces.
3. Soviet opposition to persecution of progressive forces.
4. Soviet diplomatic support of local CP's.
5. Soviet direct assistance to progressive regimes.
6. Soviet military support for Marxist regimes.
7. Soviet willingness to risk confrontation with the United States in support of local progressive forces.

Technical Notes. Soviet support for Latin American CP's and other progressive movements has been constrained by limited Soviet ability to project its power to Latin America, which is several thousand miles away from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has been hesitant to risk provoking the United States by adopting a high profile in the region.

Outcome Assessment Question. Support of Solidarity With Progressive Forces in Latin America:

1. EL No significant support.
2. VL Moral and diplomatic support.
3. L Covert economic aid and moral support in most cases.
4. M Extensive material assistance in a small number of cases.
5. H Extensive material assistance in some situations and more limited aid in other cases.
6. VH Limited direct military support.
7. EH Large-scale direct military support.

Notes. Soviet support to Latin American progressive and democratic movements since 1966 has been very low to moderate. Although Soviet support for Cuba has been more or less high (that is, included extensive material assistance), this has been an exceptional case.

12.5 Goal: Increase Soviet Prestige/Influence in Latin America

Outcome. Did Soviet prestige/influence in Latin America increase/decrease?

Measures.

1. Voting record of Latin American countries on the issues strongly supported by the Soviet Union.
2. Volume of Soviet trade with Latin America/total trade of Latin America.
3. Number of countries in Latin America with diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
4. Number of Latin Americans visiting USSR.
5. Receptivity of Latin American countries to Soviet naval presence in the nearby Atlantic and Pacific waters.
6. Number of countries receiving Soviet military and economic aid.

Technical Notes. The relevant variable is Soviet perception of its prestige/influence among Latin American countries. Nevertheless, the coder should focus on evaluation of Latin Americans' view of Soviet prestige/influence since coding perceptions of perceptions is far too complex to be reliable.

Outcome Assessment Question. Soviet Prestige/Influence in Latin America:

1. EL The Soviet Union has no significant ties with any major Latin American country.
2. VL The Soviet Union has largely minor commercial ties with major Latin American countries.
3. L The Soviet Union has close diplomatic ties with a few Latin American countries.
4. M The Soviet Union has close diplomatic and military ties with a few Latin American countries.
5. H The Soviet Union has close diplomatic ties with many Latin American countries and military ties with a few.
6. VH The Soviet Union has close diplomatic and military ties with many Latin American countries.

7. EH The Soviet Union has close, friendly ties and high influence among most Latin American countries.

Notes. Although the above codes emphasize bilateral ties instead of influence and prestige, the coder should try to infer the level of Soviet influence from such ties and any other relevant information.

APPENDIX C. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

This appendix deals with three topics:

- The validity of the goal and outcome data collected using the codebooks presented in Appendices A and B.
- The relationship between the crisis goals presented in the codebooks and the objectives data previously collected and analyzed by CACI (for instance, CACI, 1978e). (This can be regarded as a type of content validity (Bohrnstedt, 1970); for convenience it is treated apart from the more general discussion of validity).
- The reliability with which the goal and outcome data were collected.

VALIDITY

Validity has to do with the extent to which indicators accurately measure what they are intended to represent (Caporaso and Roos, 1973). It is a very complex question (or, more realistically, set of questions). Data are seldom absolutely valid or invalid; the real world situation is usually one of degree.

The validation of new types of data, such as the crisis outcome information generated in this project, is extremely difficult. Because (as was noted in Chapter 3 of CACI, 1979b) there are no comparable databases, there are no obvious comparisons to use as a basis for forming a judgment regarding the validity of the data generated.

Three approaches were adopted to produce valid data and to evaluate the success of this effort. The first and primary method was the employment of Soviet and U.S. source materials to identify the crisis goals

whose outcomes were to be evaluated. This component of the effort was outlined in detail in Chapter 3 of CACI (1979b) and documented in Chapters 4 and 5. Hence, it needs no further elaboration here.¹

A second, weaker, test of validity is the logical coherence and plausibility of the sets of goals identified using the project's methodology. Taken as an ensemble, they appear to capture the potential range of superpower interests that could be involved in recent international crises with no glaring omissions. This is, however, an admittedly subjective appraisal.

The final "test" (in a weak usage of the term) of the data's validity came in the primary analytical chapters of the technical report (Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of CACI, 1979b) in which it was shown that interpretable patterns resulted when the goal and outcome data were analyzed. While this evaluation again involves some subjectivity, it is, nevertheless, a nontrivial accomplishment for those familiar with social science data. In all too many cases, a methodology that appears plausible will result in data which produce idiosyncratic patterns that defy (or at least seriously challenge) analysis. Quite the opposite picture is found in the analyses presented in the technical report.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN "GOALS" AND "OBJECTIVES"

CACI has developed for DARPA two distinct data sets dealing with superpower aims during crises:

- The set of goals presented in Appendices A and B, the assessment of whose outcomes forms the core of the final technical report (CACI, 1979b).
- A previously assembled datafile dealing with Soviet and U.S. crisis objectives (for instance, CACI, 1978e).

¹ A related issue, the credence that can be placed in Soviet writings, is discussed in Chapters 3 and 7 of CACI (1979b).

The existence of these two files presents obvious questions: Why are there two data sets and how do they differ? The basis for answering these questions is provided by Tables 1 and 2, which present the Soviet goals analyzed in this project and the set of Soviet objectives analyzed in CACI (1978e).²

A point that stands out immediately when the two tables are compared is the generally greater contextuality and specificity of the goals presented in Table 1 as contrasted to the objectives listed in Table 2.³ For example, element No. 42 in the list of objectives, "Preserve Balance of Power," is an aim that is reflected (in whole or part) in at least three of the goals listed under the heading of "Europe":

- Maintain/increase security of East European buffer states,
- Oppose revival of militarism in West Germany, and
- Oppose anti-Soviet European-Chinese cooperation,

and all four of the goals listed under the functional heading of "Military":

- Defend the first socialist state against external threat,
- Defend the fraternal socialist countries (and Finland, Austria, and Sweden),
- Support progressive and democratic forces abroad, and

2

While there are some differences between the Soviet and U.S. databases for both goals and objectives, the similarities between the variables coded for the two superpowers are so strong as to obviate the need for a separate comparison of U.S. goals and objectives.

3

Note that objectives 47 through 59 are somewhat more specific than the preceding elements on the list, which are also on the list of U.S. objectives. Objectives 47-59 were deliberately added to capture more of the flavor of Soviet crises (for further details, see CACI (1978e)).

TABLE 1
Major Soviet Goal Sets
(49 goals)^a

Ideology

1. Support Marxist-Leninist ideology
2. Maintain ideological unity of the fraternal Communist countries
3. Maintain/enhance ideological leadership of CPSU
4. Support other progressive ideologies

Interparty Affairs

1. Maintain leadership of CPSU in foreign policies of CP's
2. Maintain unity of CP's in foreign affairs
3. Give support to CP's in capitalist countries
4. Give support to CP's in developing countries

Domestic Stability

1. Maintain/restore domestic stability
2. Oppose external interference in Soviet domestic affairs
3. Maintain/restore stability of non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union

Economic

1. Increase economic capacity of Soviet Union at a rapid pace
2. Increase economic cooperation with fraternal socialist countries
3. Expand mutually beneficial commercial relations with all countries
4. Assist economic independence of LDC's

Military

1. Defend the first socialist state against external threat
2. Defend the fraternal socialist countries (and Finland, Austria, and Sweden)
3. Support progressive and democratic forces abroad
4. Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces

Goals Toward Capitalist Countries

1. Reduce chances of war with the United States and NATO
2. Increase mutually beneficial exchanges
3. Press the anticapitalist ideological struggle

^a Written from a Soviet vantagepoint

Continued

Table 1
Major Soviet Goals
Continued

Europe

1. Maintain/increase security of East European buffer states
2. Oppose revival of militarism in West Germany
3. Promote the unity of fraternal socialist parties in Europe
4. Oppose anti-Soviet European-Chinese cooperation
5. Promote peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation with nonsocialist European countries

Goals Toward Third World Countries

1. Defend fraternal socialist countries in the Third World
2. Defend progressive regimes and movements and socialist oriented countries
3. Support economic independence of LDC's
4. Increase Soviet international prestige (among LDC's)
5. Contain Chinese influence among LDC's

Asia

1. Deter/oppose China from military adventures against USSR
2. Deter/oppose China from military adventures against fraternal socialist countries
3. Support/defend fraternal socialist countries against other external threats
4. Develop alternative transport routes to the Trans-Siberian railway
5. Undermine the legitimacy of China's territorial claims
6. Support progressive governments and countries with socialist orientation
7. Support peaceful relations with Asian countries

Middle East/South Asia

1. Reduce NATO/CENTO threats to the Soviet Union
2. Support progressive and socialist oriented governments in the region
3. Support progressive and democratic movements in the region
4. Support economic independence of countries in the region
5. Secure Soviet naval access to the Indian Ocean

Africa

1. Defend/support countries proclaiming intention of building socialism
2. Support other progressive regimes and movements and socialist oriented countries

Continued

Table 1
Major Soviet Goals
Continued

3. Support economic independence of African countries
4. Increase Soviet influence/prestige among African countries
5. Contain Chinese influence among African countries

Latin America

1. Defend/support Cuba against external threats
2. Avoid direct military confrontation with the United States and OAS
3. Encourage independence of Latin American countries from the United States
4. Increase solidarity among progressive and democratic forces
5. Increase Soviet influence/prestige in Latin America

TABLE 2^a
Soviet Objectives Variables

1. Deter imminent attack.
2. Improve or rectify deterrence posture.
3. Put down rebellion.
4. Restore a regime.
5. Regain access to economic resources.
6. Restore peace.
7. Restore territorial integrity.
8. Restore military balance of power.
9. Restore readiness.
10. Preserve readiness.
11. Preserve peace.
12. Confirm or re-establish prestige.
13. Preserve territory and/or facilities.
14. Preserve regime from external threat.
15. Preserve regime from internal threat.
16. Preserve, restore, or improve alliance.
17. Protect legal and political rights.
18. Induce maintenance of current policy.
19. Dissuade from a new policy.
20. Protect a military asset.
21. Support a new government.
22. Induce national reorientation.
23. Induce adoption of a new policy.
24. Bring about the fall of a regime.
25. Support insurgency.
26. Deny political access.
27. Deny military access.
28. Assure continued economic access.
29. Preserve or regain control of the sea.
30. Preserve or regain control of the air.
31. Protect human life.
32. Provide sanctuary or asylum.
33. Support critical negotiations.
34. Discover intentions or actions.
35. Prepare for alternative missions.
36. Support efforts by the United Nations.
37. Contain opponent(s).

^a Items 47-59 objectives are which were coded only for the Soviet Union and written from a Soviet vantagepoint.

(Continued)

Table 2
Soviet Objectives Variables
Continued

38. Prevent spread of war.
39. Preserve line of communications.
40. Regain technical advantage.
41. Restore prestige.
42. Preserve balance of power.
43. Prevent spread of capitalist influence.
44. Prevent nuclear proliferation.
45. Insure self-sufficiency.
46. Avoid direct involvement.
47. Preserve secrecy.
48. Preserve elite power/political system within USSR.
49. Preserve buffer system (E. Europe and Mongolia).
50. Preserve, restore unity of (and Soviet preeminence in) international Communism.
51. Prevent reemergence of Germany as a major power.
52. Contain PRC expansionism (ideological, political, economic, territorial).
53. Avoid isolation.
54. Maximize Soviet and Soviet leadership prestige.
55. Support shift in correlation of global forces against capitalism.
56. Neutralize/eliminate Western influence in the Third World.
57. Achieve recognition, equal status with U.S. as global superpower.
58. Prevent U.N. secretariat, etc. from taking independent action.
59. Alter balance of power favorable to USSR, allies, and clients.

- Increase the prestige of Soviet armed forces.

These differences in scope are natural outgrowths of the tradeoffs between scope/specificity and resources that are found in any project. While it would have been possible to assess crisis outcomes using only the objectives variables that had been previously developed, resources were sufficient to support a more detailed examination of functional and regional interests for both superpowers. Accordingly, the lists of goals were generated, using Soviet and U.S. source materials.

The differences in scope are also due, in part, to the differing literature bases from which each set of aims derives. The set of crisis objectives reflects a set of general concerns found in the (predominantly American) crisis management literature. The goals, on the other hand, are derived from U.S. and Soviet policy sources that tend to have more immediate foci than in the crisis management literature.⁴

In sum, the relationship between the two data sets is complementary, with the "objectives" giving a broader overview of crisis aims, while goals give functionally and regionally focused perspectives on self-defined superpower crisis interests.

RELIABILITY

As was argued in some detail in Chapter 3 of the main report (CACI, 1978b), a realistic assessment of goal achievement requires the use of judgment. While very considerable efforts (in the forms of Appendices A and B) have been taken to provide parameters for these assessments, they remain, nevertheless, judgments, and judges can and do differ. Accordingly, inter-coder reliability checks were conducted.

⁴ Moreover, these sets of aims are by no means exhaustive. One could pitch aims at far more general levels ("act conservatively") and much more specific ones ("insure access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles").

To provide for a more rigorous test, the blind intercoder reliability checks involved one of the two researchers with primary responsibility for the collection of data and a researcher who was not deeply involved in the coding of data in this particular phase of the project. The two also differed considerably in background, with the first having an academic background in political science and international relations while the second was a former career Soviet studies specialist in the U.S. Army with an M.A. in Soviet area studies.

Two major assessments were conducted. The first involved a determination of the relevance of each goal in a particular crisis. This is a crucial stage in the project's methodology since only crisis-relevant goals' outcomes are assessed so as to avoid computing a "box score" for goals not involved in the crisis from the vantagepoint of the evaluated superpower. Over a set of 2200 coding decisions, the percentage of agreement between the two coders was 89, a most acceptable level in this type of social science research.

The second major evaluation, involving the same coders, consisted of over 2000 outcome coding decisions, assessing change in goal achievement at one and five year intervals after the crisis. Here again the percentage of agreement between the two was most acceptable: 86.